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ABSTRACT 
U.S. Forces require an integrated Command and Control Architecture that enables 
operations of a dynamic mix of  manned and unmanned systems.  The level of 
autonomous behavior correlates to: 1) the amount of trust with the reporting vehicles, and  
2) the multi-spectral perspective of the observations. 
The intent to illuminate the architectural issues for force protection in 2030 was 
based on a multi-phased analytical model of High Value Unit (HVU) defense.  The 
results showed that autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles are required to defeat high-
speed incoming missiles. 
To evaluate the level of autonomous behavior required for an integrated combat 
architecture, geometric distributions were modeled to determine force positioning, based 
on a scenario driven Detect-to-Engage timeline.  Discrete event simulation was used to 
schedule operations, and a datalink budget assessment of communications to determine 
the critical failure paths in the the integrated combat architecture. 
The command and control principles used in the integrated combat architecture 
were based on Boyd’s OODA (Obseve, Orient, Decide, and Act) Loop.  A conservative 
fleet size estimate, given the uncertainties of the coverage overlap and radar detection 
range, a fleet size of 35 should be anticipated given an UAV detection range of 20km and 
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U.S. Forces will require a Command and Control (C2) Architecture enabling the 
coordinated operations of manned and unmanned systems by the year 2030.  The year 
2030 was chosen for the scope of the project because the technology necessary for our 
architecture will be available in one or two design cycles beyond our current capability.  
When existing C2 structures are unable to keep up with operational requirements for 
large numbers of manned and unmanned systems, a new C2 architecture capable of 
meeting this requirement will be required.  The purpose of this project is to develop the 
concepts for a new architecture based on operational needs.  We developed an 
architectural concept that identifies the functional and operational aspects that will be 
necessary to realize an integrated manned and unmanned conceptual architecture by the 
year 2030.  
Our Approach 
The systems engineering approach was to: 
• Differentiate the task statement of manned and unmanned systems based 
on time to perform task 
• Develop concepts of operations and key operational scenarios 
• Perform consequence analysis 
• Identify stakeholders 
• Determine key design drivers/ requirements 
• Identify capability gaps 
• Suggest key technology focus areas 
• Propose future studies to achieve our conceptual architecture 
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Two missions, force protection and reconnaissance, were chosen because they are 
common to all forces in their day to day operations.  Focusing on these two missions 
facilitated the development of the functions, operational activities, operational nodes, and 
information exchanges necessary to develop the C2 architecture concept.   
High Value Unit (HVU) protection is a vital function for commanders in all 
military services at all levels.  In 2030, HVU protection will become even more difficult 
due to the advances in adversarial capabilities. For this scenario, the advantage of 
utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles was modeled to extend the range of detection for a 
highly capable Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM).  We assume that in the year 2030 this 
ASCM threat will be capable of increased speeds of Mach 4+, with reduced radar cross-
section and low flight profile. 
  This model depicts defense of a Carrier Battle Group (CVBG) using an extended 
ring of detection provided by unmanned systems.  Additionally, this model can be 
applied to other joint situations, including the protection of land-based assets. 
Project Organization  
A matrix organization type format was used to coordinate the efforts of all team 
members utilizing Integrated Project Team for specific tasking and Track Teams for 
specific expertise.  These organizational teams conducted a detailed analysis of the 
project tasking and scoped the project into three essential deliverables: 
• Produce a coherent Vision of unmanned vehicles 
• Develop a Joint Systems vehicles concept 
• Design a Command and Control (C2) Architecture 
Following the scoping of the project a Systems Engineering Process Model was 
developed in order to schedule and plan the project to completion.  The process model 
was composed of four phases: Project Definition, Systems Analysis, Preliminary Design, 
and System Design for Utility. 
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Concept of Operations 
A Concept of Operations was developed in order to define and focus the 
architectural concept for the project.  The Overview of the Envisioned System, as shown 
below, demonstrates the robust collaboration of data sharing required to disseminate 
information across the battlespace.  Manned and unmanned systems will operate under a 
single architecture allowing any node within the system to exploit the collective 
knowledge of all nodes to execute the mission.  An open architecture with common 
interfaces will allow coalition forces or governmental agencies to fully integrate with 
U.S. forces. 
U.S. forces will increasingly use unmanned systems (UMS) as force multipliers.  
As unmanned systems become more productive and more predominant in the battlespace, 
human participation will gradually decrease.  UMS will provide increased opportunities 
to reduce human presence in dangerous environments.  Due to the increase in UMS a 
collaborative network will be required to manage these assets.  Common interfaces 


















A high level risk assessment, or consequence analysis, was conducted looking at 
the possible results of failing to act in establishing this architecture. 
• Decrease in situational awareness due to information overload 
• Reactive implementation of Unmanned Systems management 
• Immature technology development causes an inability to integrate systems 
• United States will fall behind technological rivals 
Stakeholder Analysis 
Two main categories of stakeholders for this project were developed; interested 
and affected organizations.  Interested Organizations are those groups that have 
expressed actual interest or provided input while affected organizations are those groups 
that, while not expressing interest in the project, would be highly affected by the 
outcome.  In the table, on the following page, the “x” in the block denotes where the 
organization has an interest in the function category, the capabilities category, or both.  
Our first primary sponsor N8F has priorities in the acquisition function.  Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) has priorities in the capabilities category of 





































































Navy Expeditionary Combat Command H H X X X X X X X X X
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport M M X X X X X X X X X
Unmanned Surface Vehicles (PMS‐403) M H X X X X X X X X X X
Naval Oceanography MIW Center M M X X X X X X
Naval Surface Warfare Center M M X X X X X X X X X X X X
Littoral and Mine Warfare (PMS‐420) M H X X X X X X X X X X X
Office of Naval Research L L X X X X X X X X X
Jet Propulsion Laboratory L M X X X X X X X X
OPNAV    N‐8F L M X X
OPNAV    N‐857 M M X X X X X X X X X X X
OPNAV    N2/N6 L M X X X X X X X X X
Naval Postgraduate School M M X X X X X X X X X X
UUV Advanced Development L H X X X X X
PEO LMW (PMS‐495) M M X X X X X X X X







Command and Control 
The Command and Control architecture enables knowledge sharing and the 
execution of an expanded Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop.  The 
Functional Decomposition of Command and Control (Section 4.1) was used to develop 
(1) the basic functions required for UMS and (2) an extensive assessment of UMS 
mission domain. 
Autonomy and Man in the Loop 
An assessment of autonomy was conducted in order to characterize the Human 
Robot Interface (HRI), Mission Complexity, and Environmental Complexity of the 
mission space for UMS.  SEA-16 used the ALFUS (Autonomous Levels for Unmanned 
Systems) as developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.  In the 
figure shown on the next page, a simplified model of three autonomy levels (Low, 
 xxxi
Medium, and High) was used during the simulation phases.  Each of the three phases 
was defined by the amount of Human Interaction (HI), Mission Complexity (MC) and 
Environmental Complexity (EC). 
 
Additionally, an assessment of Man in the Loop was conducted to characterize the 
role of humans and machines within the mission domain.  This assessment allowed for 
an understanding of strengths and weaknesses contrasting humans and machines. 
 
Engineering Assessment 
Trade studies were conducted to explore the areas most beneficial to UMS.  
Factors that were evaluated included: engine cycle efficiency, advanced fuels, and fuel 
cell/battery power systems. We feel that the current efficiency trends in sustainable and 
emission friendly resources will continue to be financial and technological drivers for 
the future force structure.  The Engineering Assessment of capabilities for UMS 
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provided the key inputs for multiple phase modeling, where application of future 
technology demonstrated longer endurance for UMS on-station time. 
Functional Architecture 
The purpose of this architecture is to describe the integration of unmanned and 
manned vehicles in all domains into a collaborative knowledge sharing environment, 
allowing for unity of effort amongst all the warfare tools in the battlespace.  The 
functional architecture contains a hierarchical model of the functions performed by the 
system, functional flow block diagrams, and diagrams showing the functional inputs and 
outputs.  This architecture includes the interfaces between UMS, C2 nodes, manned 
operational units, and external systems.  The unique aspect of this concept is that the 
architecture, while focused toward unmanned vehicles, also takes into account the 
integration of manned vehicles through the collaborative network.  The principal 
exchange of information is through a collaborative network which acts a data fusion 
network that is distributed across the forces. 
Modeling 
We applied the architecture concepts to one of the innumerable potential 
operational applications for unmanned vehicles.  Our model depicted the deployment of 
unmanned vehicles to provide the carrier battle group with early detection of an Anti-
Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM).  This analysis began with a determination of the UAV fleet 
size required to provide an ASCM early warning screen. 
Some key assumptions were made for the analysis  
• Benign environment 
o Sea States are between 0 to 3 
o No Enemy Jamming or EW countermeasures 
o No UAV to UAV engagements 
• ASCM RCS of 0.1 to 1 m2 
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• ACSM speed of Mach 4+ 
• Probability of Detection assumed to be 1 
• Continuous track handling capability of a detected ASCM 
• Detection to Firing Time a  constant 10 seconds 
• Maximum UAV patrol time approximately 45 hours 
• Repair time on failure of a UAV based on triangular distribution of 4 to 8 
hours, with a mode of 5 hours 
• Maintenance time after mission completion based on triangular 
distribution of 0.8 to 2 hours, with a mode of 1 
• The cumulative total time of flight before the UAV encounters a non-
catastrophic failure is assumed to be a normal distribution of mean 200 
hours and standard deviation of 60.79 
• Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of UAVs of 200 hours 
• 5% probability that the Time To Fail (TTF) will be below 100 hours of 
operation 
The geometric force layout was determined based on several parameters, 
specifically, a surface detection range of 60km, UAV detection range of 30km, a 
scanning angle of 100°, and desired continuous UAV radar coverage overlap for a Mach 
4+ missile of 1-4 sec. 
Modeling Phase II determined that a fleet size of 21±1 UAVs is required to 
achieve the persistent early warning screen, given UAV detection range of 30km and 
UAV radar coverage overlap of 1 sec.  For a conservative fleet size estimate, given the 
uncertainties of the coverage overlap and radar detection range, a fleet size of 35 should 
be anticipated given UAV detection range of 20km and UAV radar coverage overlap of 4 
sec. 
Summary of Results 
 xxxiv
A joint C2 architecture for manned and unmanned systems based on Boyd’s 
OODA Loop approach is necessary by the year 2030.  Development of such architecture 
will allow for large numbers of manned and unmanned nodes to operate within a single 
C2 structure.  Information sharing, provided by a collaborative information network that 
is unbounded by physical media, mission capabilities, or geographic location, will 
improve unity of effort. 
 xxxv
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1.1 PROJECT BACKGROUND 
Changing tactics and missions of the battlefields has challenged the 
Command and Control (C2) of combat throughout the history of warfare.  In the 
battlefields of the past, the commander relied on message runners and voice 
commands.  Messages could take weeks to months to cross a continent or ocean.  
Technology supports the modern battlefield commander by providing global 
reach with command only a few seconds delay.  Today’s commander can 
exercise command and control, albeit fundamentally, it is the modern application 
of the C2 of yesterday which he must use to determine a course of action.  The 
commander must overcome the ambiguity during military operations to analyze a 
situation, make a decision, and direct forces.  Given a parity of resources and 
capabilities, the commander that makes and carries out a correct decision before 
his adversary will be at an advantage. 
“We need for unmanned aircraft to act like manned aircraft.  
We need unmanned aircraft to be tasked like manned aircraft. 
We should be capable of flying both manned and unmanned 
platforms together, to include multiple unmanned airframes 
controlled by one operator,” the general continued. “And we 
need commanders to have the confidence that unmanned or 
manned, it doesn't make a difference, as they are equally 
effective,”1 
-Gen. William T. Hobbins, USAF (2006) 
The primary task of this integrated project is to design an overarching C2 
architecture concept for manned and unmanned vehicles operating in a 2030 
battlespace.  Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 16 (SEA-16) is not 
                                                 
1 “Unmanned Aircraft Key to Future Operations, General Says” American Forces Press 
Service http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?id=1730, accessed 17 May 2010. 
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attempting to redefine C2; rather application of proven C2 fundamentals is 
necessary to develop an architecture which integrates manned and unmanned 
vehicles in the air, land, sea, undersea, space domains.  The C2 cycle used in the 
development of our concept is Boyd’s OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, 
and Act), as further decomposed in Section 3.1. 
We successfully showed in this project that a future Command and 
Control architecture can integrate the many elements of the strategic, operational, 
and tactical elements of the U.S. and Coalition partners.  Regardless of the 
platform or tool that is executing the commander’s orders, we showed a C2 
architecture that allows for quality decisions to be executed inside the 
adversary’s decision making cycle. 
1.2. FUTURE STAKEHOLDERS 
Advances in missile technology have Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) 
speeds increasing towards the Mach 6+ threshold.  The application of this 
technology necessitates the application of all available technology to counter 
these high speed threats.  Therefore, the main consequence of not instituting the 
architecture developed in this project is that defensive measures for High Value 
Units (HVU) (aircraft carriers, strategic buildings, command posts, etc) utilizing 
current defensive systems, weapons, and tactics will be limited to one, or maybe 
no reactive launches. 
This limitation of defensive measures was a fundamental consideration in 
the stakeholder analysis conducted in this project.  The highest level stakeholders 
detailed in Section 2.10. are those organizations that have the long-term vision 
essential in order to implement the proposed architecture within this project. 
1.3. PROJECT TASKING 
1.3.1. Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) Tasking Statement 




“Develop a Joint Systems concept and supporting architecture that 
supports the integration and utilization of Unmanned Vehicles into 
the Navy Fleet Structure, focused on NECC [Naval Expeditionary 
Combat Command] missions.  Consider current and evolving 
unmanned technologies to develop a complete architecture that is 
flexible to emerging unmanned technologies.  Design a C2 
[Command and Control] architecture with a possible common 
control system.  Reassess the current utilization of manned and 
unmanned vehicles in seeking a reduction in architectural 
complexity, and determine alternative uses of those resources.  
Considering potential technology gaps, determine a more 
streamlined architecture with gap fillers.  Focus on the 
development of a system of systems and family of systems in 
support of the NECC enterprise.  Consider focused mission areas 
per platform to concentrate mission tasking, promote specialization 
of manning, and shrink force structure.  Iterate the task nature, as 
approved by your primary faculty advisor, Prof. Langford. 
Produce a coherent vision of unmanned vehicles in support of 
NECC tasks and identify the requirements for supporting or 
collaborating forces.”2 
                                                 
2 SEA-16 CAPSTONE PROJECT OBJECTIVES, 03 September 2009 
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1.4. SCOPING 
The SEA-16 Integrated Project Team scoped this problem by 
decomposing the Tasking Statement and building on those with key 
considerations.  These concepts were mapped to the three key deliverable items 
for the overall project.  These deliverables are: 
• Produce a coherent vision of unmanned vehicles 
• Develop a Joint Systems vehicles concept 
• Design a Command and Control (C2) Architecture 
Figure 1 displays a graphic representation denoting the key 
considerations with respect to the three identified deliverables (shown in gold 
bubbles) for this project. Arrows indicate inputs to the deliverables: Vision, 
Concept, and Architecture. 
1.4.1. Tasking Interpretation 
1.4.1.1. Tasking Statement Decomposition 
Concepts that were extracted from the tasking statement, as 
shown in black in Figure 1, are outlined below. 
Requirement for Coalition Operations The use of coalition 
partners will be more important in 2030 than it is today.  Enhanced 
interoperability with coalition partners will be possible with an overarching 
architecture that can be used by both the United States and its allies. 
Command and Control Command and Control of all 
systems in the fleet should be managed under a single architecture.  The 
limitations of the currnet system inhibits the commander due to the time taken to 
interpret inputs from separate systems into a coherent evaluation of the situation.  
Development of an overarching architecture will allow for the streamlining of 
information inputs and decrease the time for decision making.  This could 
increase commander’s situational awareness, allowing them to make more 
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informed decisions and allow users access to information in order to take proper 
action. 
Reduce Complexity To enhance the situational analysis of the 
battlespace, there must be an increase in processed data provided to the user.    
This processed data is essential to the efficient planning of combat operations.  
Additionally, an overarching architecture would reduce complexity by 
decreasing the information transfer lag produced by the cross connection of 
multiple incompatible systems. 
Integration and Utilization of UMS in the Navy Fleet Structure 
The fleet and force structure of the future will be a combination of manned and 
unmanned systems.  Regardless of the platform providing the information, any 
operator (manned or unmanned) should have access to all data in order to 
optimize support to combat operations. 
Utilization of UMS (Current Vs Future)   The current utilization 
of UMS must be examined in order to project the potential future mission space. 
This information will provide an understanding of missions, capabilities, and 
technological needs to develop the architecture to support these needs.  
Additionally, future technology, the roles of manned and unmanned systems, and 
the required levels of autonomy must be understood. 
Current Technical Gaps and Potentials Current  technology 
must be evaluated to identify the currnet gaps that exist in the systems.  These 
gaps can be addressed with potential technology and continued research, in order 
to design a system that meet the capability needs of the future. 
Reduction of Force Structure  The use of UMS in the 
future could aid in reducing the number of personnel on the battlefield.  This in 
one area where time was not committed for further study, but for any future 
system the cost and number of personnel compared to UMS would need to be 
evaluated. 
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1.4.1.2. Project Team Interpretation 
Additional concepts identified by the team were items not 
included in the project tasking statement, but that needed to be addressed in this 
project.  These additional items are shown in red in Figure 1, and outlined below. 
Raise, Train and Sustain Authority In the 2030 timeframe, this 
system must not only be technically realized, but the force must be ready to 
operate the system as well.  Considerations must be made to train users and 
maintainers to apply this system and maximize its usability. 
External Stakeholders  An understanding of the system 
needs requires an examination of stakeholders.  These include the function they 
play in the system as well as the mission capabilies they require.  The external 
stakeholders provide input and receive output from the system. A discussion of 
the process and results of the needs is shown in Section 2.10. of this report. 
Ideal UMS Fleet Structure UMS will be required to operate 
within the manned fleet structure, and enhance the functional capacity of the 
force.  The relationships between varying nodes within the system must be 
studied in order to fill the capabilities needed. 
Pros and Cons of UMS There are many implications that 
are tied to the use of UMS.  The concept must recognize the strengths and 
weaknesses of these systems with consideration to the strengths and weaknesses 
of manned systems. 
What problems are solved by UMS? What value is derived from 
using unmanned vehicles versus manned vehicles?  To answer this question, the 
group assessed societal views on the value of human life, the cost of training a 
person versus maintaining a machine, and the ease of replacing a machine versus 
a human.  Additionally, the missions were broken down to their essential tasks in 
order to identify task that are more effectively completed though the use of 
UMS. 
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Mission and Roles (with Assumptions) On what missions 
does it make sense to utilize unmanned systems? The group had to make 
assumptions based on the potential missions and uses of UMS in the year 2030.  
The group analyzed missions that could be enhanced through the use of UMS.  
The group also looked the different facets of those missions and determined what 
roles UMS would play. 
Vertical and Horizontal Linkages This area of study focused 
on the interactions between nodes in the battlespace.  The horizontal linkages are 
interactions between nodes with similar functions, such as C2 node to C2 node or 
between UV and UV.  The vertical linkages are the interactions between nodes 
with different functions, such as the C2 node to the operational vehicles.  These 
linkages are valuable because they give insight to the type of information that 
will need to be shared. 
Manned and Unmanned This area of study involved research 
as to how manned and unmanned forces will need to interact in the 
accomplishment of future missions.  A determination must be made as to 
whether manned and unmanned forces require separate C2 architectures or 
should their system’s C2 architectures be integrated?  To address this issue the 
group assessed the different roles each manned and unmanned forces would have 




Figure 1.   Broad Deliverables & Key Principle Considerations 
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1.4.2. Project Limitations 
Unmanned Systems (UMS) design cycles influenced the 
timeframe for the project.  For the implementation of our concept technology 
must mature through 2-3 design cycles.  This would enable the joint system to be  
obtainable by the year 2030. 
This project focused on U.S. manned and unmanned weapons systems, 
but acknowledges that collaboration with coalition forces will require analysis of 
foreign systems as well. 
The material in this report is not intended to recommend changes to the 
organizational layout of the Department of Defense, or imply any specific unit’s 
chain of command relationship. 
 Inclusion of any development item or current platform in this report does 
not imply endorsement for acquisition of that specific system. 
 Personnel allocation will be considered in general terms, and no specific 
personnel requirements will be determined. 
 A brief survey was conducted to examine the legal issues associated with 
the general operation of UMS.  These topics were limited to:  International Laws, 
Law of Armed Conflict, United Nations’ Convention on the Laws of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), National 
Sovereignty, and Issues within the United States.  These topics were addressed 
due to their direct correlation to the operation of UMS.  Additionally, this report 
does not attempt to determine who is legally responsible for actions conducted 
by autonomous vehicles. 
A full cost analysis of the system would be required in a future study of 
this proposed concept. 
This project did not include a cost estimate for a fully autonomous 
system. Much of the technology is still theoretical and the physical composition 
and bounds of the enabling system are not described in specific terms.  There are 
  10
two specific cost consideration categories: human costs (including training, 
human system integration, and salary and entitlements) and machine costs (lines 
of code, software maintenance, software upgrades, and other costs). 
Analysis was not conducted on specifics concerning air space 
management, water space management, or frequency management. 
1.5. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
1.5.1. Development of Systems Engineering Process Model 
Initially, the Systems Engineering (SE) Track Team Members developed 
a list of tasks required to formally develop a systems engineering process.  
Below is a list of the main tasks required: 
• Problem Definition 
• Factors for Design 
• Trend Analysis  
• Development of Assumptions for both Military and Technology 
• Needs Analysis 
• Review of Current C2 process regarding unmanned systems. 
• Develop a Conceptual C2 Process for the year 2030 
• Capabilities Analysis 
• Gap Analysis 
• Stakeholder Analysis 
• Risk Assessment 
• Development of Scenarios 
• Decomposition of Command and Control  
• Functional Decomposition 
• Methods of Analysis 
• Develop Modeling/ Simulation 
1.5.2. Systems Engineering “Vee” Process 
The “Vee” model is a widely recognized Systems Engineering process.  
The “Vee” model, shown in Figure 2, was developed to address issues 
concerning the decomposition, definition, integration, and verification of a 
  11
system.3  Mooz and Forsberg describe what they call “the technical aspect of the 
project cycle” by the “Vee” process model.4 
The model begins with the definition of system requirements on the 
upper left as the problem is decomposed and defined.  This phase of the model is 
meant to resolve the system architecture, preparing the details that will be 
essential to system design.  First, the system requirements are defined primarily 
based on stakeholder needs and the functions for which the system will be 
designed to perform.  These requirements are meant to clarify the functions to be 
performed by the system.  The functions are allocated to subsystems. The system 
is comprised of subsystems.  The systems engineer matches functional 
requirements to subsystems, allowing for specific components to be chosen that 
will perform the required functions at the component level.  Once this level of 
design is completed, the system design is then “built upwards” to begin to 
produce a user-validated system on the upper right of the Vee Model.  
Verification of components and systems with respect to the originating 
requirements occur through each level of the integration and verification 
sequence.  After verification and validation, the system becomes fully 
operational. 
                                                 
3 Mooz , Hal and Kevin Forsberg. The Dual Vee – Illuminating the Management of 
Complexity. Paper submitted to the Sixteenth Annual International Symposium of the 
International Council 
4 Blanchard, Benjamin S. and Wolter, J Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis, 4th 
Edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2006. 
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Figure 2.   Systems Engineering “Vee” Model5 
The “Vee” Model provided a basis to begin developing our process 
model of the project.  It became apparent early on that the “Vee” Model was not 
the logical choice for our process due to many functions that would not be 
considered or analyzed.  One example is the last phase when the system is tested 
and validated.  Our project focused on analysis of a future concept, and specific 
subsystems were not designed of tested. 
Additionally, the “Vee” Model includes many processes that are not 
required for this project, several aspects of this model which are not applicable, 
and multiple tasks are not detailed to the level needed in order to develop a 
system architectural concept. 
1.5.3. SEA-16 Project Tailored Process 
SEA-16 developed a tailored process based on a modified “Vee” Model, 
shown in Figure 3.  Our modified model is composed of four phases.  These 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
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phases are: Project Definition, Systems Analysis, Preliminary Design, and 
System Design for Utility. 
This model provided the framework for the development of the 
architecture concepts and allowed the team to decompose and refine the project 
as work progressed from “Project Definition” through “System Design for 
Utility”. 
Work in each phase of the project builds upon itself as the basis for each 
follow-on phase. Additionally, a feedback loop provides the capability to review 
work completed in previous phases.  This feedback loop recognizes the need for  
multiple iterations required for development. 
1.5.3.1. Project Definition Phase 
In the Project Definition phase, the problem was decomposed through 
several tasks.  A formal vision statement was developed to provide 
direction for the study.  This vision statement is contained in Section 2.1.  
A stakeholder analysis was conducted which identified and analyzed each 
stakeholder’s functional role and capability mission area.  The functional 
requirements are the role they play in relation to the system and the 
capability requirements relate to mission areas of the system.  The results 
of the stakeholder analysis are detailed further in Section 2.10. and shown 
in Table 4.  The results of the needs analysis are contained in Section 2.3.  
During this phase, the team also completed a Consequence Analysis to 
identify trends and issues pertaining to the implementation of the 
architecture. These results are contained in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. 
Command and Control, Technological, Geopolitical, and Military factors 
for design were listed to guide the context of the project.  
  14
 
Figure 3.   SEA-16 Modified “Vee” Model 
1.5.3.2. Systems Analysis Phase 
The Systems Analysis phase consisted of trade studies in five catagories.  
The group reviewed UMS and their functionality in current operations, to 
provide a context in which to project their future roles.  The study of UMS 
included an engineering assessment of trends and technological advancements.  
Human effects to a system, specifically the implications of a man in the loop and 
the selection of a level of autonomy was examined.   
1.5.3.3. Preliminary Design Phase 
The Preliminary design phase of development built upon the concepts 
from the Project Definition and Systems Analysis phases to produce the system 
concept of operations and the architecture products which define the system. 
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1.5.3.4. Systems Design for Utility Phase 
The System Design for Utility phase applied the system concepts to 
model system application.  In this project, the model demonstrates one of the 
countless possible applications of the system. 
1.6. TEAM ORGANIZATION, ROLES, RESPONSIBILITY 
1.6.1. Team Composition 
Each team member was assigned to specific Integrated Project Team 
(IPT), which are standing groups ready to receive project tasking, as illustrated in 
Section 1.6.2, and to a specialty area Track Team, as illustrated in Section 1.6.3.  
Team members in each specific discipline area were selected for an IPT to ensure 
cross-disciplinary inputs and interaction.  This organizational concept promoted 
efficient exchanges of information, reduced redundant efforts, and promoted 
lively discussions.  Detailed work within a specific discipline area was 
completed by the Track Teams.  Work within the Track Teams focused on the 
subject matter of their curriculum. 
The SEA-16 organization is shown in Table 1.  LT Thompson was 
selected as the Project Manager and had overall responsibility for successful 
completion. MAJ Ang Teo Hong (Republic of Singaporean Air Force) was 
elected Assistant Project Manager. 
During the fall quarter 2010, the students in Monterey began to work 
with the Singaporean-based students. Following the Systems Engineering 
process lecture, which was conducted by Professor Gary Langford in October 
2009 with students from NPS and the National University of Singapore (NUS) 
though a Video Teleconference (VTC), the Temasek Defence Systems Institute 
(TDSI) students set up the Singapore SEA-16 Organizing Committee (SSOC) to 
spearhead all initial project discussions and clarifications between the two 
geographically separated groups of students. The members of the SSOC were 
MAJ Ang Teo Hong, MAJ Lim Han Wei, MAJ Gabriel Tham Chi Mun, Yinon 
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IPT1 IPT2 IPT3 IPT4
Systems Engineering LT Johnson LT Nilsson LT Moran CDR Quincy
MAJ Ting Chi Yon Delvin Gho Wong Ka‐Yoon Yinon Costica 
Tommy Chia LT Adam Matthews Jason Wong
MAJ Lim Han Wei ME5 Ng Wei Gee Tan Yean Wee ME5 Tong Kee Leong 
Lu Chin Leong Chia Boon Chye Henry Seet ME5 Lo Chee Hun
ME5 Gabriel Tham
Ho Liang Yoong Raymond Quah Quek Chee Luan Ang Kah Kin
Toh Boon Pin Ng Yeow Cheng

















TABLE 1.   SEA-16 MATRIX ORGANIZATIONCHART. 
1.6.2. Integrated Project Teams 
Four members of SEA-16 were assigned to lead an IPT.  LT Johnson led 
IPT 1, LT Nilsson led IPT 2, LT Moran led IPT 3, and CDR Quincy led IPT 4. 
1.6.2.1. Integrated Project Team 1 
IPT1 focused on current mission capabilities and gaps for the 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) mission area of NECC.  This was done 
with a question and answer session with actual EOD personnel.  From the 
information gathered an analysis of potential future uses of UMS throughout the 
EOD spectrum was performed.  From that analysis three scenarios were 
developed to explain the mission, gaps and possible solutions for UMS in EOD.  
These mission gaps were then presented to the Steering Committee in order to 
explore possible follow on studies and agree upon the ultimate area of focus. 
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1.6.2.2. Integrated Project Team 2 
IPT2 initially conducted research regarding NECC’s Riverine 
forces.  The team researched the chain of command, manning, equipment, and 
mission requirements.  The team then analyzed the operating environment to 
identify threats, environmental and terrain aspects, and common scenarios faced 
by Riverine operators.  The team identified potential uses of unmanned vehicles 
in order to enhance operational effectiveness. 
IPT2’s next major focus area was the development of the 
functional architecture.  The team developed a functional decomposition, 
functional flow block diagrams, input/output diagrams, and performance 
characteristics for each function. 
1.6.2.3. Integrated Project Team 3 
IPT3 completed work in several key areas.  First, the group 
examined the missions and roles of the Maritime Expeditionary Security Force 
(MESF) component of NECC.  These missions were detailed in a hierarchical 
fashion according to functional breakdowns. The highest-level function was 
“Conduct Force Protection”.  As the project evolved, the team focused on the 
implications of having a man-in-the-loop for a system.  This trade study involved 
identified human and machine roles, and considered the information in terms of 
the command and control paradigm. 
1.6.2.4. Integrated Project Team 4 
Initially, IPT4 developed a plan for the project.  The team 
conducted a tradeoff of three Systems Engineering process models (i.e., 
waterfall, spiral, Vee), to compare the time and documentation requirements.     
This analysis led to the Systems Engineering Waterfall Process developed by the 
Systems Engineering team.  IPT4 researched and selected a definition for 
autonomy and autonomous.  IPT4 also selected the Autonomy Levels for 
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Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) model that would be used by the teams.  This 
evaluation is further described in Section 3.3. 
1.6.3. Track Teams 
As with the IPTs, members of the team were also assigned to a Track 
Team.  The purpose of the Track Teams was to focus the knowledge of the group 
on the specialties associated with their curriculum.  There were five Track Teams 
involved in the project; the Systems Engineering Track Team led by CDR Keith 
Quincy, the Simulations Track Team led by Wong Ka-Yoon, the 
Communications, Network, and Sensors Track Team lead by MAJ Tong Kee 
Leong, the IA Track Team lead by Toh Boon Pin, and the Weapons Track Team 
lead by LTJG Dustin Cunningham. 
1.6.3.1. Systems Engineering Track Team 
The Systems Engineering (SE) Track Team was responsible for 
the overall coordination of the project.  This team provided the overall direction 
for the project by developing the Waterfall model which was used to manage the 
processes for the project.  They provided the knowledge and guidance to scope 
and iterate the project.  Team members attended conferences, lectures, and 
corresponded with stakeholders.  Due to scoping, not all aspects of the concept 
would be examined, and these decisions were determined by the SE Track Team.  
A listing of items that would require future research and study to aid in realizing 
the system concept proposed is included in Section 6.3. of this report.  
1.6.3.2. Simulation Track Team 
The Simulations Track, comprised of students from the 
Operations Research (OR) and Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation 
Institute (MOVES) curriculum provided perspective on the problem formulation 
and scenario selection by comparing current operational practice with proposed 
future operations. The team members played a role in defining the scenario for 
demonstration of the C2 architecture proposed in this report. An analytical-
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stochastic model, augmented with discrete event simulation, was built to 
illustrate the notional force size and force effectiveness of a fleet of unmanned 
aerial systems in detecting an incoming ASCM. A sensitivity analysis was 
conducted.  These results, further detailed in Section 5.7., showed that for this 
concept between 21 and 35 UAVs would be required to extend the ISR and 
subsequent Force Protection ring around a HVU.  Through both the process and 
results of the modeling and simulation, greater clarity was achieved concerning 
the future C2 architecture, component systems and Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS). 
1.6.3.3. Communications, Networks, and Sensors Track 
Team 
The Communications, Sensors, and Networks Track Team 
provided the expertise in communications and surveillance to the various in IPT 
during the initial stages of the project. After the shift in focus for the project, the 
team provided critical support the Command and Control Architecture Task 
Force (C2ATF) and Operations Research and MOVES Task Force (OMTF).  
Specifically, the sensors group provided the geopolitical trends and operational 
imperatives that shaped the way the sensors technology may evolve. The team 
also explored and highlighted possible technologies that supported the Command 
and Control (C2) architecture. The team also focused on the C2 architecture 
development.  Additionally, the sensors team contributed to the development, 
simulation and validation of the C2 architecture by evaluating and proposing an 
appropriate sensor detection range for a sea-skimming missile operating at 
supersonic speed. An evaluation report was submitted for both C2ATF and 
OMTF. 
The Communications and Network (CN) systems facilitate 
dissemination of information over vast Area of Operation (AO) in a timely and 
organized manner. These mechanisms would form the backbone for Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) architecture and 
enable joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
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Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) operations. In this integrated project, 
the CN team provided expertise to the C2ATF in developing the Command and 
Control architecture for air, land and sea operational theatre, established the 
generic type of traffic profile between sensors, command and shooters in the 
OODA loop.  The CN team also supported OMTF in analyzing communications 
link budget and assessed the viability of the communications network in the 
proposed scenario. 
1.6.3.4. Information Assurance Track Team 
The Information Assurance (IA) group was involved in the design 
of Command & Control (C2) architecture capable of supporting different type of 
operations involving manned and unmanned vehicles in 2030. The team 
members worked closely with other groups to ensure a coherent C2 architecture 
that is capable of supporting the various initiatives. The IA group also identified 
ways to safeguard information assets by examining problems from an 
information assurance perspective.  The confidentiality; integrity and timely 
availability of information often play an important part in the success of military 
operations. This included 
 assessment of security for individual components that formed the 
C2 architecture to ensure information flow among these components. 
Appropriate security measures (such as access control, authentication protocol, 
implementation of cryptography) were proposed taking into consideration the 
constraints imposed by the operational environment.  Potential risks were 
identified to help support proper risk management decision making. 
1.6.3.5. Weapons Track Team 
The Weapons Systems Track provided the technical view-point 
for the SEA-16 design project by implementing the study of Mechanical and 
Astronautical Engineering.  The students in this track provided identification of 
technical problems and helped solve platform specific issues in terms of future 
performances and data extrapolation.  Weapons Systems students researched and 
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analyzed current unmanned platforms to understand what these systems will be 
capable of over the next two decades.  Additionally, during focused trade studies 
of propulsion-based technology, the knowledge of design, testing, maintenance, 
failure prediction, and operation requirements for the technologically advanced 
military equipment of the future allowed for platform performance predictions 
that were integrated into the models and simulations.  The Weapons Systems 
Track also worked in cooperation with the CNS Track team on areas that 
involved the application of sensor-shooter OODA loops. The ability to bridge the 
gap between engineering technology and military operations, in addition to 
presenting mathematically and technically diverse material, made the Weapons 
Systems Track and integral part of the SEA-16 design project. 
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2.0. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS (CONOPS) 
2.1. PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The military domain of 2030 was viewed as being both local and global, which 
meant that information gathered at a specific location must be able to be disseminated to 
enrich the situational awareness of forces regardless of where operational nodes are in 
relation to the information gatherers.  The C2 architecture needs to be flexible to allow 
new technology to be integrated into the C2 framework.  The overarching C2 architecture 
will provide the structure to drive the integration of technological advances into the 
existing system.  Without an overarching C2 structure, the US and coalition forces may 
not be able to exploit technological advances as well as it could with an adequate 
architecture. 
2.2. BACKGROUND 
There is no overarching command and control architecture that integrates manned 
and unmanned vehicles within the battlespace.  Some problems with the current system 
include: 
• Direct communication occurs only directly between specific users and 
vehicles, or directly between users (Shown in Figure 4) 
• Situational awareness is not maximized due to communications and 
data sharing limitations 
• It is difficult for users to provide cross mission utilization of platform 
• Fusion of information occurs by the collaboration of users directly 
with each other 
• Overall, forces are a mix of individual systems and micro-level 
systems of systems 
There exists a need to fulfill an enhanced Command and Control Capability 
that: 
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• Provides a Common Battlespace picture to all users 
• Includes a Common interface needed to enable system integration 
 
Figure 4.   Characterization of Current Command and Control Relationships 
2.3. TRENDS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
2.3.1. Technology Trends 
SEA-16 conducted a trade-study to determine trends in technology that 
may have key impacts on the C2 architecture required for future battlespace coordination 
and tasking. 
Common Communication Architecture In recent years the U.S. Navy 
has battled a costly maintenance, logistics and support problem.  Much of the trouble lies 
with the fact that many of the C4I systems aboard Navy ships requires a separate network 
infrastructure with a unique set of connections maintenance and repair experts to keep the 
system running.  Experts believe that migrating to a single Common Communication 
Architecture reduce the expense of networks while the abilities continue to expand.6 
Composable Systems  Composable systems that allow different 
systems to collaborate and enhance multiple capabilities will be prevalant in the future. 
                                                 




With the increase in functionalities per product, unmanned vehicles and soldiers can 
achieve higher levels of autonomy.7 
Nanotechnology Nanotechnology is the study of the controlling 
matter on an atomic and molecular scale. This technology generally deals with materials 
of the size 100 nanometers or smaller. 
Nanotechnology is very diverse, ranging from extensions of conventional 
device physics to completely new approaches based upon molecular self-assembly, from 
developing new materials with dimensions on the nano-scale to investigating whether it 
can directly control matter on the atomic scale. 
The implications of nanotechnology ranges from medical and 
environmental, to fields such as engineering, biology, chemistry, computing, materials 
science and communications.  Specific to implications to military C2 functions, 
Potentially, nanotechnology is a key driver to increase memory space and processing 
power, miniaturization of electronic devices and improving energy efficiency.8 
Improvement in Energy Efficiency  Synthetic Fuels, lithium ion 
batteries and fuel cells are examples of improvement in energy density over the recent 
years.  This increase in density will no doubt directly affect the endurance of Unmanned 
Vehicles.  With a higher endurance, operational time will increase and thereby giving rise 
to an increased radius of operation. 
Automation Assuming technology advancement continue to make 
moderate gains, the ability for machines to conduct more and more routine operations 
will allow for the reduction of man power.  An example of this can be found in the 
Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).9  Increases in automation allow for machines to 
do more of the work that humans currently perform, and reduce operator interaction. 
                                                 
7 Hoffman, Michael, “ Technology by 2030: Looking to Change Game,” Air Force Times, January 20, 
2010, http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2010/01/airforce_scientist_011810w/ 
8 American Elements “Nanotechnology Information Center,” 
http://www.americanelements.com/nanotech.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
9 Access my Library “General Dynamics Robotic Systems Awarded Navy LCS Automated Contrac”. 
July 21, 2008, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-34837787_ITM 
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Micro Air Vehicle Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) refers to a class of 
unmanned air vehicle (UAV) that is restricted by size.  According to the definition 
employed in Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) program, the 
limits on MAVs are those crafts that are less than 15 cm (about 6 inches) in length, width 
or height.  MAVs are at least an order of magnitude smaller than any conventional UAVs 
currently operational use.10 
Taking inspiration from flying insects and birds to achieve unprecedented 
flight capabilities has fast become a new trend in the MAV community.  Other than 
unsteady aerodynamics of using flapping wings, aspect that further inspired the engineers 
includes; distributed sensing and acting, sensor fusion and information processing. 
MAVs are envisioned to be an affordable system that will be locally 
owned and operated at the platoon level or below.  With the reduction of latency and size 
inherent in current assets, MAVs will be capable of operating in constrained 
environments like urban canyons and ultimately the interior of buildings. Consequently, 
individual soldiers will receive on-demand information about the surroundings, resulting 
in unprecedented situational awareness, greater effectiveness and fewer casualties.  
MAVs are predicted to undergo a rapid evolution in military usefulness in the near 
future.11 
                                                 
10 McMichael, James M.,“Micro Air Vehicles – Towards A New Dimension in Flight,” Federation of 
American Scientists, August 7, 1997, http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/mav_auvsi.htm 
11 Hanlon, Mike, “UAVs Get Smaller: The Micro Air Vehicle Nears Readiness,” Giz Magazine, 
September 25, 2005, http://www.gizmag.com/go/4779/ 
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2.3.2. Assumptions 
Technology assumptions and military assumptions were made to 
determine possible implications for 2030 operations.  Six key assumptions in the 
categories of technology and military were identified.  These results can be found in 
Table 2 and Table 3. 
Technological Assumptions There will be reduced proliferation of 
proprietary technology, making system interfaces highly compatible and reducing the 
costs required to modify a product for compatibility.  Systems will have increased 
functionality, with multiple mission capabilities.  To complete multiple missions at once, 
systems will require high levels of autonomy because humans will be unable to maintain 
the required operational tempo.  As unmanned systems become more productive, human 
participation could decrease.  This will increase the general reliance on unmanned 
technology, requiring the implementation of a collaborative C2 architecture to manage 
these assets.  Energy efficiency will increase, enhancing mission capability by increasing 
on-station time for all vehicles. Lastly, the possible lower costs of entry into this 
technology will make it available to many state and non-state actors throughout the 
world.  This will make maintaining cutting edge technology critical to counter these 
continually evolving threats. 
Assumption Implication 
Moving from proprietary architecture to a common 
architecture 
High R&D costs to mature common UMS C2 
architecture 
Increased individual system functionality and 
mission capabilities
Higher level of autonomy for unmanned vehicles 
Unmanned systems with increased autonomy will 
become highly productive
Increased productivity of highly autonomous 
systems will reduce necessity for human 
participation
Increased reliance on unmanned technology Collaborative integrated C2 architecture will be 
necessary to manage large quantities of vehicles
Increased use of efficient energy sources Increased on-station time for unmanned vehicles 
Smaller technology gap on a global scale Critical to investment in advanced technology 
 
TABLE 2.   TECHNOLOGY ASSUMPTIONS. 
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Military Assumptions  The first assumption in 2030 is U.S. forces 
will have a near-peer competitor, necessitating the use of UMS as force multipliers.  In 
addition to our own forces, coalition forces will be needed to counter common threats to 
maintain global security.  To enable their participation, common interfaces will be needed 
to ensure full collaboration and the maximum availability of assets.  The increased 
military reliance on technology will drive the need for a technologically savvy force.  The 
desire to protect human life continues to increase, and unmanned vehicles will continue 
to provide opportunities to reduce human presence in dangerous environments.  Our 
forces will need to be able to react quickly to conflicts around the world, possibly 
requiring more expeditionary forces to be forward based.  Finally, all forces will be 
fighting for the use of the RF spectrum.  This will necessitate maintaining spectrum 
dominance and optimization of available space. 
Assumption Implication 
U.S. forces will have a near-peer competitor Affects all current planning norms and assumptions, 
including need for UMS as a force multiplier
Greater use of coalition forces Increased need for common interfaces
Increase in military reliance on technology Higher need for technologically trained force 
Protection of military personnel will be paramount Removal of humans from dangerous environments will 
necessitate increased unmanned presence.
Reliance on mobile global force  Expeditionary “ad-hoc” forward basing becomes more 
common 
Contention of finite RF spectrum usage between all 
forces (Friends and Foes) 
Need for spectrum dominance and optimization strategy 
 
TABLE 3.   MILITARY ASSUMPTIONS. 
  29
2.4. OVERVIEW OF THE ENVISIONED SYSTEM 
2.4.1. Overview 
 
Figure 5.   Overview of the 2030 Joint Command and Control Architecture Concept 
The 2030 Joint Command and Control Architecture, as shown in Figure 5., 
will enable a robust collaboration of information across all warfare domains to 
disseminate information in order to enhance situational awareness within the battlespace.  
This allowed any node within the system to exploit the collective knowledge to execute 
its mission. Advanced collaboration will be enabled by advances in information sharing, 
specifically a Collaboration Network with High Computing Power, compatible 
communications standards, and an Advanced Cross Medium Rebroadcast capability.  An 
open architecture design allowed for coalition forces or government agencies to interface 
with the system, and fully integrate with U.S. forces. 
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2.4.2. System Scope 
The system will be composed of all nodes and their interfaces that 
operate in the battlespace and are under the authority and responsibility of U.S. military 
forces, or operating in cooperation with those forces.  Each of these acts as either an 
input, output, or both with respect to the system. 
Nodes include, but are not limited to: 
• Manned Vehicles 
• Unmanned Vehicles 
• Personnel 
• Broadcasting and Rebroadcasting Stations 
• Satellites 
• Computer Networks 
• Command Centers 
2.5. GLOSSARY 
 See Section 7.0. for a complete listing of all abbreviations, acronyms, and 
definitions used in the compilation of this project. 
2.6. DOCUMENT REFERENCES 
See Section 8.0. for a listing of sources that were referenced multiple times.  
Footnotes are used throughout the paper to properly document sources. 
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2.7. GOALS, OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE FOR THE NEW SYSTEM 
2.7.1. Goals and Objectives of the New Capability 
The goals and objectives of the system are summarized in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.   Goals and Objectives of the System 
Enhance Force Capabilities. This architecture concept must enhance force 
capabilities on higher command levels, by providing commanders and planners with 
improved awareness of the entire battlespace through improvements in ISR.  By utilizing 
more timely and complete information, commanders will have the opportunity to have a 
shortened OODA Loop.  Additionally, an open architecture design ensured coalition 
forces and government agencies can operate with forces and increase overall capabilities. 
Protect Resources. The system must protect several categories of critical 
national resources.  These categories include personnel, facilities, and equipment. 
Generally, UMS are used for missions that are considered “dull, dirty, or 
dangerous,” with respect to humans.12  The value of military personnel continues to 
grow, as reducing the risk to human life has become a critical consideration from the 
strategic to the tactical level.  Personnel costs continue to rise, and individual training 
                                                 
12 Canning, John S. A Definitive Work on Factors Impacting the Arming of Unmanned Vehicles. 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA. May 2005. p. 12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA436214 
Goals and Objectives of the System 
• Enhance force capabilities 
o Improve battlespace awareness 
o Achieve higher ISR capability 
o Shorten commander’s OODA Loop 
o Enhance or allow cooperation between other force elements 
• Protect resources (personnel, facilities, equipment, economic) 
• Provide cost effective capability solutions 
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requirements typically increase as a more technically capable force is required.  Military 
planners desire to increase functional capability while removing human operators from 
dangerous positions. 
Greater battlespace awareness better prepares forces to protect critical 
infrastructure.  Facilities and equipment can have increased threat warning time, and 
commanders can properly match force capabilities to protect priorities. 
Provide cost effective capability solutions. “The determining driver will likely 
be the cost of providing a particular warfighting capability.”13  Maximizing utility with 
budgetary limitations will continue to be a challenge for the Department of Defense 
(DoD).  Assets must be designed to be highly effective while observing the cost restraints 
that exist.  The implementation of UMS in the battlespace will change costs of personnel 
tremendously.  As highly trained warfighters are replaced by machines, highly trained 
technical personnel will be required to maintain and operate the systems. 
2.7.2. Rationale for the New Capability 
There exists a deficiency in the current C2 architecture that is exposed by 
numerous emerging factors, including: high-speed threats, large numbers of nodes 
without an overarching architecture, heavier reliance on technology in battlespace, 
information overload, and reactive implementation of UMS management for systems 
interoperability. 
2.8. HIGH-LEVEL FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS 
2.8.1. High Level Features 
The following high-level functional requirements, illustrated in the Figure 5 were 
derived from operational scenarios. 
• Self-Protection – Manned and unmanned systems, through collaboratation, 
will increase the level of protection for HVU. 
                                                 
13 Canning, John S. A Definitive Work on Factors Impacting the Arming of Unmanned Vehicles. Naval 
Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, VA. May 2005. p. 12, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA436214. 
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• Cross-medium Rebroadcast – The ability to transmit data across medium 
boundaries, such as from aircraft to submerged vehicles.  This feature will 
be essential to the overall functioning of the architecture as it enables data 
to be transmitted across available communication assets. 
• Communications Relay - The network relies on each platform having the 
capability to receive and then retransmit data and information to other 
nodes within the battlespace. 
• Self-Appointed Master UMS – Any unmanned vehicle can assume tactical 
control of a large number of Unmanned Vehicles, and facilitate command 
and control capabilities of the controller. 
• Self-forming/ Self-Healing Network – Failure or loss of a system does not 
preclude operation as the remaining UMS have the ability to replace the 
Self-Appointed Master UMS. 
• Swarm Behavior – Control methodology capable of utilizing swarm 
tactics for UMS vehicles across all domains.  The unmanned vehicles must 
have sufficient autonomy to recognize and adapt to its local environment, 
only passing to the network required data, so that the network does not 
become overloaded with information. 
• Sensor/Platform Diversity - Sensors must enable the exploitation of all 
necessary observables such as acoustic waves and electromagnetic waves.  
The sensors must cover the range of electromagnetic waves including 
observable, infrared, and radio frequencies. 
• Different levels of Autonomy/Artificial Intelligence - UMS operating in 
the battlespace may operate at the required level of autonomy.  High levels 
of autonomy will be required to conduct swarm tactics and operations 
requiring efficient use of a communications network.  Lower levels of 
autonomy may be required for particular missions such as an explosive 
ordinance technician disabling an improvised explosive device. 
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2.8.2. Additional Features 
• Renewable & Sustainable Energy - The efficient use of fuel resources will 
be an important element of future operational vehicles.  Wherever 
possible, renewable sources of fuel, such as bio fuels, will need to be 
utilized. 
• High Computing Power & Storage Capacity - The architecture relies 
heavily on the ability to collaborate data.  In order to maintain such large 
amounts of data and have that data available as useable information, the 
computing and storage capacity of the network must be sufficient. 
2.9. IMPACT CONSIDERATIONS 
2.9.1. Operational and Organizational Impacts 
• Cultural resistance to changing what is typically considered uniquely 
human professions could cause some challenges to the implementation of 
this concept. 
2.9.2. Consequence Analysis 
Risk analysis is a basic element of any program and should be considered 
throughout all phases of the lifecycle.  While risk is a very detailed evaluation of possible 
future issues, for this project a higher level consequence analysis was conducted.  In 
general two main categories were addressd that are associated with a future force 
structure that encompasses manned and unmanned systems working together.  The first 
category encompasses what happens if thre is failure to act now and research the fielding 
of such a system; and the second category deals with what could potentially happen if 
such a system was developed and fielded. 
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2.9.2.1. Failure to Act 
• Due to the lack of efficient transfer of raw data there may exist a problem 
of information overload and therefore a decrease in situational awareness 
• Continuing with a reactive implementation of UMS management rather 
than proactive achievement of a more effective structure 
• Technology will not mature to enable integration and interoperability of 
manned and unmanned systems 
• Failing to pursue this concept may cause the United States to fall behind 
its rivals and partners in the command and control of UMS 
2.9.2.2. Impact of Implementation 
• With a heavier reliance on technology there will become a higher demand 
for data analysis and Information Technology personnel 
• With a heavier reliance on technology there will become a requirement for 
a technically savvy force 
• A possible restructuring of DoD may be required in order to meet the 
challenges of an integrated manned and unmanned force 
• Future conflicts will require the United States to work more with allies, 
resulting in a higher reliance on coalition forces 
• Higher reliance on coalition forces will require parallel technology and 
doctrinal development for all forces 
• In order for parallel technology development to succeed there will be a 
need for international common standards for interoperability 
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2.10. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
There are two main categories of stakeholders for this project: interested and 
affected organizations.  Interested Organizations are those groups that have expressed 
actual interest or provided input to the project.  Affected organizations are those groups 
that have as of yet expressed interest in the project but would be majorly affected by the 
outcome of this project. 
2.10.1. Interested Organizations 
Included in the Interested Organizations are the project sponsors.  This project’s 
primary sponsors were the Director of Warfare Integration (N8F) and Navy 
Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC).  Any project that explores UMS will have a 
large number of stakeholders, but one that examines developing a joint unmanned vehicle 
architecture casts a large net, and includes areas of study which can attract interest from a 
variety of organizations. 
A stakeholder analysis which formally lists these interested organizations is 
shown in Table 4. 
2.10.2. Affected Organizations 
Affected Organizations encompass a broad range of agencies, from those either 
currently using or developing UMS to those that have capability requirements that would 
benefit from the use of UMS.  The organizations were separated into eight groups: 
Industry/Government Organizations, Military, Government Agencies, Other Nations, 
International Organizations, Other Organizations, Enemy Threats, and Users. A 
stakeholder analysis which formally lists potentially affected organizations is shown in 
Table 4. 
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2.10.3. Stakeholder Functions 
The stakeholder analysis, as shown in Table 4, differentiates the activities into 
four areas, where stakeholders could have interaction.  These four areas are Acquisition, 
Management, Logistics, and Operator. 
• The Acquisition process shows those organizations that would be 
interested in the development, procurement, production, and testing of 
UMS.  A Joint Architecture would reduce some redundant system 
development and would also promote a system of systems design concept, 
reducing the cost associated with integrating systems after development or 
deployment.  These organizations range from military acquisition 
commands to government contractors who produce systems. 
• The Management process describes those organizations that are 
responsible for the administration and coordination of UMS usage.  A 
Joint Architecture would reduce the complexity of managing disjoint 
systems; directly increasing productivity at all levels in support of 
component commanders and user level commands. 
• The Logistics process shows those organizations that are responsible for 
the maintenance and transportation of manned and unmanned systems.  A 
Joint Architecture would simplify the logistics tail, by implementing 
standard procedures, repair parts, and interfaces.  An example includes the 
Program Executive Offices responsible for the execution of specific UMS 
programs. 
• The Operator process applies to those organizations responsible for either 
the user level usage of UMS or whoever is responsible to the user for 
support.  The benefit of a Joint Architecture for the user is increased 
access to information in the field.  Examples of the Operator function are 
specific user commands and those command organizations providing 
personnel or equipment to the component commander. 
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2.10.4. Stakeholder Capabilities 
Through the stakeholder analysis, nine capabilities were identified, and 
stakeholder activity was evaluated for each of these capabilities, as shown in Table 4.  
The capabilities determined to be most important are Communications (COMMS); 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR); Strike, Force Protection, Electronic 
Warfare (EW), Maritime Warfare, Land Warfare, Transport, and Air Warfare. 
• The Communications capability is for those stakeholders who are 
responsible for transmission, reception, or rebroadcasting of voice or data 
communications. 
• The ISR capability is for those stakeholders who provide battlespace 
awareness functions. 
• The Strike capability is for those stakeholders who provide precision 
bombing and attack functions. 
• The Force Protection capability is for those stakeholders who provide 
defensive functions within the battlespace. 
• The EW capability is for those stakeholders that provide support to the 
battlespace via the electromagnetic spectrum (electromagnetic jamming 
and attack, Electromagnetic Support (ESM), and anti-radiation weapons). 
• The Maritime Warfare capability is for those stakeholders that provide 
Surface Warfare support to the battlespace. 
• The Land Warfare capability is for those stakeholders that provide land 
combat resources to the battlespace. 
• The Transportation capability is for those stakeholders that provide the 
timely movement of complete systems or maintenance parts. 
• The Air Warfare capability is for those stakeholders that provide aircraft 
of anti-aircraft support to the battlespace. 
  39
2.10.5. Analysis of Stakeholder Needs 
The stakeholders were analyzed in terms of level of expected interest in the 
project, assessment of project impact towards their requirements, process activity, and 
capabilities.   Stakeholder interest and assessment of impact is generally categorized in 
qualitative levels: Low (L), Medium (M), and High (H), with some stakeholders 



































































Navy Expeditionary Combat Command H H X X X X X X X X X
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport M M X X X X X X X X X
Unmanned Surface Vehicles (PMS‐403) M H X X X X X X X X X X
Naval Oceanography MIW Center M M X X X X X X
Naval Surface Warfare Center M M X X X X X X X X X X X X
Littoral and Mine Warfare (PMS‐420) M H X X X X X X X X X X X
Office of Naval Research L L X X X X X X X X X
Jet Propulsion Laboratory L M X X X X X X X X
OPNAV    N‐8F L M X X
OPNAV    N‐857 M M X X X X X X X X X X X
OPNAV    N2/N6 L M X X X X X X X X X
Naval Postgraduate School M M X X X X X X X X X X
UUV Advanced Development L H X X X X X
PEO LMW (PMS‐495) M M X X X X X X X X
PEO (U&W), NAVAIR L M X X X X X X X X X X X X
Industry/ Government Contractors
Lockheed Martin M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
iRobot Maritime M M X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Hydroid L M X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Orca Maritime L L X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Military 
Department of Defense M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
US Army M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
US Air Force M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
US Marine Corps M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
US Navy M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Component Commanders M M­H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Government Agencies 
Drug Enforcement Agency L M X X X X X X X X X
Defense Intelligence Agency L M X X X X X X X X X
Central Intelligence Agency L M X X X X X X X X X
Federal Bureau or Investigation L M X X X X X X X X X
Dept of Homeland Security L M X X X X X X X X X X X
US Coast Guard L M X X X X X X X X X X
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms L M X X X X X X X X X
Other Nations
Allies L M­H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
International Organizations
United Nations L M­H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
North Atlantic Treaty Organization L M­H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Other Organizations
Red Cross L L X X          
International Standards Organizations L H X X X X          
Enemy threats
Insurgents M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Enemy Forces M H X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Criminal M M X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Illegal Immigrants L L X
Users
SEAL Teams M H X X X X X X X X X X X
Rangers M H X X X X X X X X X X X
Riverine M H X X X X X X X X X X X
Explosive Ordnance Disposal M H X X X X X X X X X X X








TABLE 4.   STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS.
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2.11. FACTORS FOR DESIGN 
The SEA-16 project is focused on analyzing the problem at a higher, more 
conceptual level, and not developing systems engineering products for a detailed system. 
Therefore, determining detailed requirements that are tied to specific design criteria is not 
the focus area.  Rather, SEA-16 has focused on capabilities and design characteristics that 
are critical for the success of the architecture. 
2.11.1. Overall Architecture Characteristics 
Design provides architecture with its notional attributes.  Design is more than how 
something works.  Design is how the functions of the system are presented to users so the 
users can interact with the system’s interfaces. These interactions occur at the system 
boundaries, therefore the system functions are enacted at the boundaries.  The following 
issues occur at the boundaries. 
• Available The system must be ready and operating in an effective and 
efficient manner in order to accomplish the mission.  There are two factors 
which affect availability: reliability and maintainability.14 
o Reliability is the ability to perform the mission as required.  
Reliability is measured as a probability that the system will 
accomplish its intended mission.15  The systems that are part of the 
architecture will need to be designed and built to operate in the 
various operational environments that the system may have to 
operate in.  For example, the system will have to perform at sea, in 
humid climates, in dirty or dusty environments or even possibly in 
space.  Mission accomplishment is a result of systems that can be 
counted on to perform their intended activities. 
                                                 
14 Benjamin Blanchard and Wolter Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis (New Jersey, Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006), 370. 
15 Ibid. 
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o Maintainability is design dependent and relates to the ability of a 
system to be maintained.16  There will need to be enough 
operational assets available at any given time to accomplish the 
mission.  Cost and stowage limitations preclude having vast 
amounts of spare systems on hand to replace systems that are in 
need of repair.  Therefore, the systems must be capable of being 
brought back to a fully operational status through corrective 
maintenance.  Ideally, the preventative and condition based 
maintenance will reduce the amount of corrective maintenance that 
is required. 
• Survivable The systems that will comprise the architecture will face 
enemy and environmental challenges, and the systems must be able to 
stand up to these challenges. Some of the challenges faced may be 
chemical, biologial, radiation threats, or electromagnetic pulse weapons.  
The sytstems will have to be designed to meet the current threat and 
projected threats.  
• Supportable The elements of the architecture must be able to be 
logistically sustained. The sustainability of the systems must not be an 
afterthought in the design process; rather the sustainability must be a key 
design parameter.  The different elements of the architecture will be 
deployed throughout the world, therefore, mobility and speed will be 
important considerations when determining supportability requirements.17 
• Cost effective Budgetary constraints in both the United States and allied 
countries are going to force defense systems to maximize the value that 
they bring to the fight.  The U.S. national deficit is increasing and, 
according to a Congressional Budget Office estimate, is projected to 
                                                 
16 Benjamin Blanchard and Wolter Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis (New Jersey, Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006), 418. 
17 Blanchard, Benjamin, S.; Fabrycky, Wolter, J.; “Systems Engineering and Analysis,” 4th ed, Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006, pg 510-511. 
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exceed 82% of the national economy by the year 2019.18 The vast 
majority of the increase in the national deficit will be attributed to 
entitlement spending such as Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security.19  
A likely place to reduce spending will be on discretionary spending areas 
of the national budget such as defense spending.  Therefore, the 
development of systems to support the unmanned system architecture 
must be cost effective.  One of the goals of increasing the use of 
unmanned vehicles is the reduction in manpower costs.  Therefore, the 
costs of the system must not outpace the costs of traditional, manned 
systems. 
• Flexible Allow technological advances to be integrated to 
architecture.  Technological advances in unmanned systems, computing 
capabilities, software enhancements, sensor capabilities, and other areas 
will enable the systems to improve capabilities as long as the systems are 
designed to be updated when emerging technology arrives.  The systems 
will have to be designed with the expectation that parts of the system will 
need to be updated as technology evolves. 
• Interoperable  It will be critical that the system elements can 
integrate with joint U.S. systems as well as with coalition partner 
equipment.  Recent experiences with the operation of UAVs in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have led the the Department of Defense to recognize 
the limitations posed by control systems that are proprietary.20  
Proprietary systems allow a particular company’s UAV to be able to be 
controlled by a specific control station that cannot control another 
company’s UAV.  In order to achieve effective situational awareness a 
                                                 
18 Montgomery, Lori, “Deficit Projected To Swell Beyond Earlier Estimates,” March 21, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/20/AR2009032001820.html. 
19  Imendorf, Douglas, W. “The Long Term Budget Outlook”, Testimony Before Congress, July 16, 
2009, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/104xx/doc10455/Long-TermOutlook_Testimony.1.1.shtm. 
20 Defense Industry Daily, “It’s Better to Share: Breaking Down UAV GCS Barriers”, March 16, 
2010, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/uav-ground-control-solutions-06175 
  43
military operator needs to be able to access and utilize the data from 
multiple UAVs in an operational area.  Utilizing different control stations 
is ineffective and infeasible. 
 In 2008, the DoD began an effort to acquire a command and 
control system for UAVs that will control a variety of UAVs from the 
unmanned helicopter MQ-8 Fire Scout to the long range Global Hawk.  
The goal is to control multiple UAVs without being impeded by 
proprietary limitations.21 
 The importance of interoperability has been identified by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through its Standardization 
Agreement (STANAG) 4586, which “establishes specifications for a 
common ground station system for UAVs used by NATO military forces. 
Compliance with STANAG 4586 allows NATO member nations to jointly 
support military operations using their own UAVs and ground control 
station equipment. This increases interoperability and allows data and 
information processed by member nation UAVs to be shared real-time 
through a common ground interface.22”  For interoperability to be 
achieved in the 2030 timeframe, the generation of standards must go 
beyond just UAVs, and extend to commonality between all domains.  For 
example, UAVs, UUVs, UGVs, and USVs should be controllable from a 
common controller and not have separate, proprietary control systems. 
2.11.2. Command and Control Factors 
The functional architecture is premised on two top level requirements. 
• Allow knowledge sharing The sharing of knowledge allows each 
commander to understand what each other commander in an effort is 
planning and executing.  The shared knowledge allows each commander 
                                                 
21.Ibid. 
22 Boeing Corporation Media Release, “Boeing Scan Eagle Team Achieves Compliance with NATO 
UAV Interoperability Standard,” February. 07, 2007, 
http://www.boeing.com/news/releases/2007/q1/070207a_nr.html. 
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to direct his assets toward the accomplishment of the mission in a 
coordinated manner.  The more that each commander understands what 
the other elements are doing, the more likely that the entire force will 
achieve unity of effort. 
 Effective knowledge sharing and unity of effort leads to a 
decentralization of command and an increase in operational tempo. When 
knowledge sharing is emphasized, commands will be less likely to hoard 
information.  When knowledge is readily available to operators and 
commanders, the amount of time to make quality decisions is reduced. 
• Enable OODA Loop  Allow monitoring of the situation, 
understanding of the situation, generation of different courses of action 
and well informed decision making.  The architecture should enable the 
OODA loop to be executed quicker than the adversary’s version of the 
OODA loop.  The C2 system must also allow the tasking and directing of 
assets, including the capability to provide control.  A detailed discussion 
of the OODA functions is contained in Section 4.1. 
2.11.3. Network Factors 
• Interface Enable interface through interoperability and common 
communication standards.  The interfaces will need to occur at the 
syntactic and semantic level.  The syntactic level is the standardization of 
data and messaging formats and security tags. Semantic level 
interoperability is achieved by coordinating doctrine and operational 
procedures.  Interface must be achieved between U.S. agency’s systems 
and coalition systems.  Some key interfaces for the sharing of information 
will be:  UV to UV in the same domain and across domains (USV to 
UUV, UAV to UUV, UGV to UAV, USV to UAV, UGV to USV, UGV to 
UUV), UV to manned vehicles, UV to C2 nodes, and manned vehicles to 
C2 nodes. 
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• Data fusion The large amounts of sensors and information sharing 
devices that will be in the 2030 battlespace present the risk of 
overwhelming decision makers with information.  The network that will 
handle the dissemination of information must sort and prioritize data into 
reports that are viewable and intuitive to human intelligence or artificial 
intelligence as appropriate. 
• Information Assurance The ability to secure data is imperative to 
conducting operations that rely highly on networked operations.  
Information assurance must be an integral design characteristic of the 
systems which comprise the network.  Information will provide 
confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity to the information in the 
network. 
• Scalability One of the objectives of the architecture is to allow 
communication between assets that are in the same geographical region, 
but also between assets that are beyond line or sight.  Long range 
communication and information sharing will be an important capability.  
The network must provide regional to global coverage. 
• Resilience to interference and jamming The success of the 
architecture requires heavy reliance on the unimpeded use of the radio 
frequency (RF) spectrum.  Although RF communications will enable 
collaboration between critical nodes, the key enabler is also vulnerable to 
enemy jamming.  The system must have efficient tactical communications 
that allow operation in low to high electronic warfare threat environments. 
• Cross medium broadcast—communicating across mediums is necessary 
to achieve a seamless integration between vessels operating in different 
mediums.  For example, a UUV must be able to communicate to a UAV 
and to a C2 node located on the sea surface or on land. 
• Close to real time communications  Latency and bandwidth affect 
the network speed.  Latency refers to delays in the network as data is 
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processed.  Low latency networks suffer lower wait times for data 
processing. Bandwidth is the overall capacity of the network and is 
measured in throughput per period of time (bits per second).  The higher 
the bandwidth the more information that can be transferred quickly.  
Latency can affect bandwidth as high latency can create bottlenecks that 
can decrease bandwidth.23  The goal of the network is a geographically 
dispersed network with real time communications.  Therefore, a low 
latency network with high bandwidth is required. 
2.11.4. Operational Factors 
• High endurance The level of endurance of a system will determine 
how often the asset has to turn over to replacement assets.  The longer the 
asset’s endurance the less frequently turnover is required, thus the fewer 
assets that are required.  The ability to stay on station for longer periods of 
time will reduce the number of systems required to maintain continuous 
station keeping.  Improved combustible engines, improved batteries, and 
lighter materials may lead to improved endurance.  Unmanned vehicles 
operating in the battlespace will conduct surveillance and force protection 
missions which require assets to remain on station continuously.  A 
discussion of the missions and types of UAVs are contained in Figure 8. 
• Multiple levels of autonomy  The system must allow low to high 
autonomy operations.  The required levels of autonomy are based on 
mission requirements and bandwidth requirements.  A description on 
levels of autonomy is contained in Section 3.3. 
• Mission capable assets The UMS used to execute the required 
missions must be capable of defeating enemy threats.  For example, UVs 
must have the required level of stealth, fire power, and sensor capabilities. 
                                                 
23 Mitchell, Bradley, “Network Bandwidth and Latency”, 
http://compnetworking.about.com/od/speedtests/a/network_latency.htm. 
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3.0. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
3.1. COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPT 
3.1.1. Boyd’s OODA Loop 
The OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) Loop, as shown in Figure 
7, is an information strategy concept for information warfare developed by Colonel John 
Boyd in the early 1970’s.  Boyd developed the theory based on his experience as a fighter 
pilot and work on energy maneuverability.  He initially used it to explain victory in air-
to-air combat, but in the last years of his career, he expanded his OODA loop theory into 
a grand strategy that would defeat an enemy strategically by “psychological” paralysis. 
Colonel Boyd viewed the enemy as a system that acts through a decision 
making process based on observations of the world around it.  The main objective is to 
complete the OODA loop process at a faster tempo than the enemy and to take action to 
lengthen the enemy’s loop, causing the enemy to be unable to react to anything that is 
happening to him.24 
SEA-16 chose to utilize Colonel Boyd’s OODA loop as a guide for several 
reasons.  First, the model is generally accepted amongst DoD organizations and is 
understood by most commanders.  The model is simple and time tested.  The model is 
also comprehensive enough to cover the stimulus to order cycle.  Through the functional 
decomposition of OODA, the model adequately covers the key elements of the C2 
definition including: planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces 
in order to accomplish a mission. 
Using Boyd’s OODA Loop as a guide, the model was applied to 
unmanned vehicles and decomposed how each step in the OODA process is conducted.  
A full description of the functional architecture is contained in Section 4. 
                                                 




Figure 7.   Boyd's OODA Loop25 
                                                 




3.2. OVERVIEW OF UNMANNED SYSTEMS (UMS) 
3.2.1. Range of UMS 
Unmanned Vehicles are generally classified into three types, based on the 
medium in which they perform their roles in normal operating modes.  These 
classifications of vehicles are: 
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
• Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV)  
• Unmanned Maritime Vehicles 
o Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) 
o Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV) 
• Unmanned Outer Space Vehicles (UOSV) 
The perception and roles or UMS have evolved greatly over the past several 
years.  “UAVs were considered exotic toys and not essential tools for victory on the 
modern battlefield. This all changed as the U.S. demand for surveillance assets soared 
and its fleet of UAVs expanded by leaps and bounds.”26  Unmanned vehicles are now 
seen less and less as a completely separate entity within the Department of Defense, and 
have slowly gained a high level of acceptance and recognition as systems with improving 
reliability.  With use of UAV’s increasing from about 1,000 flight hours in 1987 to over 
600,000 flight hours in 2008, their presence in combat has grown exponentially. 
                                                 
26 Dickerson, Larry. New Respect for UAVs. Aviation Week & Space Technology. 26 January 2009, 
http://www.aviationweek.com. 
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The number of unmanned vehicles in service and in development continues to 
increase.  Figure 8 gives an overall view of the proliferation of UMS across all mission 
areas, and Table 5 displays the number of named UMS identified by Joint Capability 
Area.  The sheer number of vehicle types is indicative of how much UMS have 
penetrated nearly every aspect of the military.  Current guidance on unmanned vehicles 
reflects a rising level of acceptance in the military towards UMS.  Now, when 
considering the use of UAV’s, they “should be treated similarly to manned systems with 
regard to the established doctrinal warfighting principles.”27  In the maritime domain, 
unmanned vehicles are formally considered as a fires resource alongside more traditional 
maritime platforms. 
A survey of current and future UMS is contained in Appendix B. 
 
TABLE 5.   NUMBERS OF NAMED UMS.28 
                                                 
27 Joint Publication 3-30.  Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 12 January 2010. Fig. III-
32 
28 U.S. Department of Defense. FY2009–2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap. p. 8. 
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Figure 8.   Missions of Unmanned Systems29 
3.2.2. Classes of UMS Classes of UMS 
3.2.2.1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 
There are five categories of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles30, which are 
distinguished by three primary parameters: Maximum Gross Takeoff Weight, Normal 
Operating Altitude, and Speed.  These categories are shown in Figure 9.  With the 
exception of Group 1, which have low altitudes and are typically small, and fly low and 
                                                 
29 Weatherington, Dyke D. “Unmanned Systems Roadmap” Presentation.  Accessed 1 April 2010 at 
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2007psa_peo/Weatherington.pdf 
30 Joint Publication 3-30.  Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. 12 January 2010. Fig. III-
15. 
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slow, these vehicles now integrate completely in Air Operations despite the absence of an 
onboard pilot. 
 
Figure 9.   Categories of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
3.2.2.2. Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) 
Seven classes of UGVs were proposed by the Joint Robotic Program in 




Figure 10.   Classes of Unmanned Ground Vehicles 
3.2.2.3. Maritime Unmanned Vehicles 
 Maritime Unmanned Vehicles are separated into two categories: 
Unmanned Surface Vehicles and Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. 
3.2.2.3.1. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV) 
Unmanned Surface Vessels are divided into four primary classes: X-Class, 
Harbor Class, Snorkeler Class, and Fleet Class.31  These four classes are distinguished 
primarily by their differences in length and mode of operation (surface or semi-
submersible). In Figure 11, these classes are paired with specific primary and secondary 
missions. 
                                                 
31 The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) Master Plan.  23 July 2007. p. xii. 
Micro: < 8 pounds 
Miniature: 8-30 pounds 
Small (light): 31-400 pounds 
Small (medium): 401-2,500 pounds 
Small (heavy): 2,501-20,000 pounds 
Medium: 20,001-30,000 pounds 
Large: >30,000 pounds 
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Figure 11.   Classes and Missions of Unmanned Surface Vehicles32 
3.2.2.3.2. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV) 
There are four classes of UUVs that were recommended in 2004, generally 
based on the size and weight of the platforms.  Described in Figure 12, these four classes 
of UUVs are: Man-Portable, Light Weight Vehicle (LWV), Heavy Weight Vehicle 
(HWV), and Large Class. 
                                                 
32 The Navy Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) Master Plan.  23 July 2007. p. D-11 
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Figure 12.   Parameters of Four Classes of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles33 
3.2.3.4. Unmanned Outer Space Vehicles (UOSV) 
There are no specific classes of unmanned outer space vehicles (UOSV), 
but categories include satellites and resupply vehicles. 
3.2.3. Implications of Using UMS 
3.2.3.1. Advantages of UMS 
There are many advantages to utilizing UMS for military applications. 
• Protect human life: Unmanned vehicles can accomplish high 
risk missions that would otherwise risk human life.  For example, 
in Iraq, many improvised explosive devises were detonated with 
the help of unmanned ground vehicles.  Unmanned vehicles 
accomplish the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions that can put a 
pilot’s life at risk.34 
                                                 
33 The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan. 9 November 2004. p. 67. 
34 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Background Issues for Congress, April 25, 2003,  page 5,  
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31872.pdf  
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• Reduce manpower: Unmanned vehicles can accomplish 
missions that would otherwise require humans to be in manned 
vehicles. 
• Extend combat capabilities: Unmanned vehicles can supplement 
a combat element and allow forward surveillance, strike, or other 
combat capability. 
• Increased time on station: Unmanned vehicles are not limited 
by human endurance during missions. 
• Generally smaller than manned platforms: Unmanned vehicles 
do not have to account for human passengers and or comfort, thus 
can be made smaller. 
• Stowage ease:  The smaller size of UMSs allows less stowage 
space.   
3.2.3.2. Disadvantages of UMS 
While there are some strong advantages to using UMS, there are also 
some disadvantages that must be recognized. 
• Technology gaps: Machines have not been advanced to the 
point where they can match human intelligence. 
• Ethical questions: As more and more UMSs are utilized in 
strike missions, the question arises as to when can a machine kill a 
human on its own? 
• Command and Control challenges:  Current technology 
limits control of UMSs to one controller per UMS.  As more and 
more unmanned vehicles are used, many UMSs must be able to be 
controlled by a common controller. 
• Flexibility of mission: A human operated vehicle can adapt to the 
environment and change its mission given the threat and tasking. 
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• Human is removed from the local OODA Loop. The human is 
not in the scenario and must rely on sensor data that does not allow 
first hand human involvement. 
3.3. AUTONOMY LEVELS FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS (ALFUS) 
3.3.1. Definitions of Autonomy 
3.3.1.1. Dictionary Definition of Autonomy 
The condition or quality of being independent or self-governing.35 
3.3.1.2. SEA-16 Definition of Autonomy 
“Operations of an unmanned system (UMS) wherein the UMS receives its 
mission from the human and accomplishes that mission with or without further Human-
Robot Interaction (HRI).  The level of HRI, along with other factors such as mission 
complexity, and environmental difficulty, determine the level of autonomy for the UMS.  
Finer-grained autonomy level designations can also be applied to the tasks, lower in 
scope than mission.” 36 
3.3.2. ALFUS Framework 
The autonomy of a UMS is “characterized by the missions that the system is 
capable of performing, the environments within which the missions are performed, and 
human independence that can be allowed in the performance of the missions.” 
                                                 
35 Marckwardt, Albert H. “Webster Comprehensive Dictionary, Encyclopedic Edition”, J.G. Ferguson 
Publishing Company, Chicago, IL, 1997, p. 99. 
36 Huang, Hui-Min, “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume I: 




Figure 13.   Aspects of the ALFUS Framework 
The ALFUS Framework, as depicted in Figure 13., highlights that levels of 
autonomy are characterized by three aspects: Human Independence (HI), Mission 
Complexity (MC), and Environmental Complexity (EC).  These three aspects can be 
further detailed by assigning a set of metrics in order to complete the specification, 
evaluation, measurement, and analysis of the specific UMS missions.   The Human 
Independence axis specifically addresses the level of autonomy while the Mission and 
Environmental Complexity provide context.  See Section 3.3.3. for more detailed 
information on Human Independence, Mission Complexity and Environmental 
Complexity. 
The ALFUS framework allows for the decomposition of the Unmanned System 
and their missions with respect to requirements, capabilities, levels of complexity, and 
detailed sophistication.  Additionally the framework enables the operator to define the 
UMS’s autonomous operational modes.37 
                                                 
37 Huang, Hui-Min, “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume II: 
Framework Models”, Intelligent System Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec 
2007, p. 17.  
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3.3.3. ALFUS Characteristics 
 
Figure 14.   ALFUS Characteristics38 
The three aspects of Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems, as shown in 
Figure 14., are analyzed by characteristics that determine the level of autonomy. 
 Human Independence (HI) is characterized by the frequency and duration of 
robot initiated interactions, the workload and skill levels required for system operation, 
and the operator to UMS ratio. 
Mission Complexity (MC) can be characterized by the subtasks and decisions 
required for the specific mission.  Additionally, the organization, including the 
collaboration with the organization, can be measured.  The specific performance of the 
UMS within the mission space can be used to characterize the Mission Complexity.  
Finally, the allowed situational awareness and knowledge requirements can be used as a 
metric. 
Environmental Complexity (EC), probably the biggest unknown during 
operations, is essential in determining the level of autonomy.  The most common metrics 
                                                 
38 Huang, Hui-Min, “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS)” brief, Intelligent System 
Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec 2007, p. 8. 
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for Environmental Complexity are terrain variation; object frequency, density and intent; 
climate variability, mobility constraints; and communication limitations and 
dependencies. 
3.3.4. ALFUS and Bandwidth 
An additional topic of study was to determine the correlation between ALFUS 
and the amount of bandwidth required to support operations.  As shown in Figure 15., the 
amount of bandwidth required is directly related to the amount of Operator Authority 
needed to control the UMS.  High Operator Authority will require constant 
communication between the operator and the UMS this in turn will require large amounts 
of bandwidth for the transmission of control data.  As shown, there is an inverse 
relationship between Operator Authority and Computer Autonomy (for example the 
lower requirement for Operator Authority the higher the allowable Computer Autonomy); 
therefore there is also an inverse functional relationship  between ALFUS and bandwidth. 
Additionally, with low bandwidth (high autonomy) the communications cost will 
be low, due to reduced equipment usage, but software expenditures will be big due to the 
large cost of developing high levels of autonomy.  With high bandwidth (low autonomy) 
the software costs will be low, due to low development costs, but the communication 
costs will be high due to the requirement for versatile equipment. 
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Figure 15.   ALFUS vs Bandwidth. 
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3.3.5. Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) 
As shown in Table 6 &7 (ALFUS Levels 5-10 and 0-4)39, Autonomy Levels for 
Unmanned Systems has been broken down to levels 0 – 10, covering Remotely Piloted 
Vehicles to Fully Autonomous Vehicles.  Each level has been detailed further by the 
Level Descriptor and the OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) Loop.  Each table 
defines the levels with reference to the OODA Loop; allowing for the classification of 
each UMS capability to a specific autonomy level.  These autonomy levels are essential 
in developing and running the simulations to test the overall architecture.  As one of the 
inputs to the simulation, an accurate accounting of each UMS’s autonomy level is 
essential due to the communications demand requirements per vehicle. 
 
                                                 
39 Huang, Hui-Min, “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS)” brief, Intelligent System 
Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec 2007, p. 25. 
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Level Level Descriptor Observe Orient Decide Act
Perception/Situational Awareness Analysis/Coordination Decision Making Capability
10 Fully Autonomous Cognizant of all within Battlespace Coordinates as necessary Capable of total indepenance Requires little guidance to do job
Distributed tactical group planning
Individual determination of tactical goal
Individual task planning/execution
Choose tactical targets
Proximity inferance - intent of self and 
others (allies and foes)
Strategic group goals assigned Coordinated tactical group planning
Individual task planning/execution
Reduced dependance upon off-board 
data
Enemy tactics inferred Choose targets of opportunity
Tactical group goals assigned
Limited inference supplemented by off-
board data
Tactical group goals assigned
Enemy location sense/estimated
Tactical group plan assigned
Collision avoidance Air collision avoidance
Group diagnosis and resource 
management
8 Battlespace Cognizance Group accomplishment of strategic goal 
with minimal supervisory  (example: go 
SCUD hunting)
9 Battlespace Swarm 
Cognizance
Battlespace Inference - Intent of self and 
others (allies and foes)
Complex/intense environment - on-board 
tracking
Strategic group goals assigned
Enemy strategy inferred
Group accomplishment of strategic goal 
with no supervisory assistance
5
Short track awareness - History and 
predictive battlespace data in limited 
range, timeframe, and numbers Enemy trajectory estimated
Individual task planning/execution to 
meet goals
Coordinated tragectory planning and 
exectution to meet goal - group 
optimization
Ranged awareness - on-board sensing for 
long range, supplemented by off-board 
data
Sensed awareness -  Local sensors to 
detect others, fused with off-board data
RT Health diagnosis; ability to 
compensate for most failures and flight 
conditions; Ability to predict onset of 
failures (eg Prognositic Health Mgmt)
On-board trajectory replanning - 
optimizes for current and predictive 
conditions
7 Battlespace Knowledge
Real Time Multi-Vehicle 
Cooperation
6
Possible close air space separation (1 - 
100 yds) for AAR, formation in non-
threat conditions
Group accomplishment of tactical plan as 
externally assigned
Group accomplishment of tactical goal 
with minimal supervisory assistance
Group accomplishment of tactical goal 
with minimal supervisory assistance
Real Time Multi-Vehicle 
Coordination
 
TABLE 6.   ALFUS LEVELS 5-10.40 




Level Level Descriptor Observe Orient Decide Act
Perception/S ituational Awareness Analysis/Coordination Decision Making Capability
Tactical plan assigned
Assigned Rules of Engagement
RT Health Diagnosis; ability to 
compensate for most
Deconfliction
failures and flight conditions - inner 
loop changes
reflected in outer loop performance
Tactical plan assigned
RT Health Diagnostis (What is the 
extent of the problem?)
RT Health diagnosis (Do I have 
problems?)
Off-board replan (as required)
Preloaded mission data Pre/Post Flight BIT (Built in Test)
Flight control (altitude, rates0 
sensing
Telemetered data
Nose camera Remote pilot commands
Ability to compensate for most 
control failure and flight conditions 
(ie adaptive inner-loop control)
Self accomplishment of tactical plan 
as externally assigned
Self accomplishment of tactical plan 
as externally assigned
Medium vehicle airspace seperation 
(100's of yds)
On-board trajectory replanning - 
event driven Self resource 
management
Abort/RTB if insufficient
Evaluate status vs required mission 
capabilities
Contol by remote pilotN/A
Preprogrammed mission and abort 
plans
Wide airspace separation 
requirements (miles)
Report status
Execute preprogrammed or uploaded 
plans in response to mission and 
health conditions
Self accomplishment of tactical plan 
as externally assigned




Robust Response to Real 
Time Faults/Events
Health/status history and models
Health/status sensors
Flight control and navigation sensing









TABLE 7.   ALFUS LEVELS 0-4.41 





Figure 16.   ALFUS Simplification42 
In order to simplify the simulation the Autonomy Group used the model 
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.  As shown in Figure 
16., the eleven separate levels are further decomposed into three main levels (Low, 
Medium, and High).  To accomplish this, the extreme levels 0 and 10 were removed (due 
to the lack of applicability for this project) and the remaining nine levels were grouped 
into three levels.  This reduction of complexity simplified the  simulation phase of the 
project.  Each of the three levels was defined by the amount of Human Interaction (HI), 
Mission Complexity (MC), and Environmental Complexity (EC). 
                                                 
42 Huang, Hui-Min, “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS)” brief, Intelligent System 
Division, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Dec 2007, p. 25 
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3.4. MAN IN THE LOOP ANALYSIS 
To determine the role of humans and machines within a sophisticated system, it 
was necessary to examine the general characteristics of humans and machines in order to 
better understand where their capabilities within a process should be allocated.  Both 
have inherent qualities that can be exploited within a system to provide the greatest 
utility.  Equivalently, they have weaknesses that system design should attempt to 
marginalize.  Within a Command and Control system, all of these qualities can affect 
every level of functionality, and when they are well-balanced, a truly efficient system 
design can be realized. 
Currently, there are three basic categories of functional allocation for humans and 
machines.43 
• Comparison allocation 
• Leftover allocation 
• Economic allocation 
Comparison allocation is a method of making general comparisons of human and 
machine capabilities in order to allocate system functions.  Leftover allocation is 
primarily a vehicle for assigning roles to humans where machines functionality does not 
exist.  Economic allocation can be difficult to perform, due to the various costs that must 
be identified and considered, but allocation is quantitative, and not a “judgment” by the 
systems architect.  Comparison allocation is more complicated than either Leftover or 
Economic allocation, as the decision on whether a human or machine should perform a 
function is purely a qualitative judgment.  Inagaki states there is a need for “a systematic 
way of thinking and methodology that can investigate and evaluate design of human-
machine collaborations in a quantitative manner with appropriate precision.”  This man-
in-the-loop analysis was performed to identify concepts and methods that can be applied 
while conducting Comparison allocation. 
                                                 
43 Inagaki, T. Human-Machine Collaboration for Safety and Comfort. Presented to ENRI International 
Workshop on ATM/CNS. 2009. p. 1. 
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3.4.1. Human and Machine Strength Comparison 
For many years, scholars have attempted to compare the strengths and weaknesses 
of humans to those of machines.  One of the pioneers in this research was Paul M. Fitts.  
In 1951, he developed one of the first lists that identified the strengths of humans and 
machines with respect to one another.  Fitts’ simple comparison is shown in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17.   Fitts’ List44 
The Department of Defense Human Engineering Program Processes and 
Procedures is a modern take on this subject.45  This listing, shown in Figure 18. and 
                                                 
44 Buede, Dennis M., The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods. John Wiley & Sons, 
New York, NY. p. 253. 
45 U.S. Department of Defense. MIL-HDBK-46855A (Human Engineering Program Processes and 
Procedures). 17 May 1999. p. 153. 
Humans appear to surpass present-day machines with respect to the following: 
• Ability to detect small amounts of visual or acoustic energy 
• Ability to perceive patterns of light or sound 
• Ability to improvise and use flexible procedures 
• Ability to store very large amounts of information for long periods and to 
recall relevant facts at the appropriate time 
• Ability to reason inductively 
• Ability to exercise judgment 
 
Present day machines appear to surpass humans with respect to the following: 
• Ability to respond quickly to control signals, and to apply great force 
smoothly and precisely 
• Ability to perform repetitive, routine tasks 
• Ability to store information briefly and then to erase it completely 
• Ability to reason deductively, including computational ability 
• Ability to handle complex operations, i.e. to do many different things at once 
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Figure 19. describes the functions in which humans and machines excel.  This assessment 
of humans and machines does not differ greatly from the generalizations made in Fitts’ 
List.   
Sadly, the strengths of humans as assessed in 1951 have not changed over the 
years.  What is noteworthy is the similarity of the strengths of machines, which has not 
changed greatly  despite tremendous developments in technology over the past several 
decades.  Because of this, the strengths of humans and machines will remain nearly 
identical in 2030, and can be applied for future system development. 
 
Figure 18.   DoD-Identified Functions Where Humans Excel46 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
• Detection of certain forms of very low energy levels 
• Sensitivity to an extremely wide variety of stimuli 
• Perceiving patterns and making generalizations about them 
• Ability to store large amounts of information for long periods - and 
recalling relevant facts at appropriate moments 
• Ability to exercise judgment where events cannot be completely defined 
• Improvising and adopting flexible procedures 
• Ability to react to unexpected low-probability events 
• Applying originality in solving problems: i.e., alternative solutions 
• Ability to profit from experience and alter course of action 
• Ability to perform fine manipulations, especially where misalignment 
appears unexpected 
• Ability to continue to perform when overloaded  
• Ability to reason inductively  
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Figure 19.   DoD-Identified Functions Where Machines Excel47 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
• Monitoring (both men and machines) 
• Performing routine, repetitive, or very precise operations 
• Responding very quickly to control signals 
• Storing and recalling large amounts of information in short time-
periods 
• Performing complex and rapid computation with high accuracy 
• Sensitivity to stimuli beyond the range of human sensitivity (infrared, 
radio waves.) 
• Doing many different things at one time 
• Exerting large amounts of force smoothly and precisely 
• Insensitivity to extraneous factors 
• Ability to repeat operations very rapidly, continuously, and precisely 
the same way over a long period 
• Operating in environments which are hostile to man or beyond 
human tolerance 
• Deductive processes 
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3.4.2. Sources of Human and Mechanical Error 
An additional consideration that must be made when allocating functions to 
humans or machines is the general types of errors that are possible for each of them.  
Table 8 lists common sources of human and machine error. 
It is difficult to measure human error, especially because each human has 
differing levels of experience, tolerance, and effort.  Studies of mechanical error are 
much more likely to be quantifiable, as components often meet exact specifications and 
historical performance can be analyzed. 
  
TABLE 8.   SOURCES OF HUMAN AND MECHANICAL ERROR. 
3.4.3. Command and Control Considerations 
The strengths of humans and machines can be allocated to the four phases within 
Boyd’s OODA Loop, as shown in Table 9.  What is noticeable immediately is the great 
versatility of humans in the “Decide” category, and the greater range of strengths for 
machines in the “Act” category.  These qualities do not imply that humans or machines 
are preferred for any single phase of this Command and Control methodology.  Any 
  71
sophisticated system is likely to need a dynamic combination of human and mechanical 
input for a wide variety of stimuli, processes, and actions. 
 
  
TABLE 9.   STRENGTHS OF HUMANS AND MACHINES RELATED TO 
BOYD’S OODA LOOP. 
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3.4.4. Functional Performance Role Allocation 
H.E. Price proposed a simple methodology to determine whether a function 
should be allocated to a human or to a machine.48   Functions are scaled in his model, 
shown in Figure 20., based on the each of their levels of performance, rated from 
Unsatisfactory to Excellent, and plotted on a simple two-dimensional axis.   This model is 
highly reliant on the judgment of the decision maker, and on consistent decisions between 
multiple decision makers. 
 
Figure 20.   Price’s Comparison Methodology for Allocating Roles to Humans or 
Machines49 
                                                 
48 Price, H. E. The Allocation of Functions in Systems. Human Factors. Vol 27, No. 1.1985. p. 33-45. 
49 Price, H. E. The Allocation of Functions in Systems. Human Factors. Vol 27, No. 1.1985. p. 33-45. 
  73
Below is a description of the generalized relationships that are mapped on Price’s 
Scale: 
1. Little difference in human and machine; choice made on the basis of 
criteria other than relative performance. 
2. Human performance exceeds machine performance; the decision should 
be made by the human. 
3. Machine exceeds human performance; decision should be made by the 
machine. 
4. Poor Machine performance; decision should be allocated to humans. 
5. Poor Human performance; decision should be allocated to machine. 
6. Unacceptable for both human and machine, arguing for a different design 
approach. 
3.4.5. Current Decision Methodology 
There is no definitive accepted process in determining whether or not a mission 
should be completed by a manned unit or an unmanned unit.  Figure 21. shows a process 
currently used to make this decision.  This process was provided by the office of 
OPNAVN812D.50 
                                                 
50 Email from CDR Edward J. McDonald OPNAV N812D, Integration Pentagon, Room 4D453 (703) 




Figure 21.   Example of Current UMS System Decision Tree51 
This decision process requires the decision maker to make choices based on 
several general themes.  Ultimately, costs are a major constraint that will need to be 
analyzed after major functional drivers are evaluated. 
In future integrated vehicle architecture, differing levels of autonomy based on the 
ALFUS framework will be required at each node in the system.  All systems will have 
varying degrees of autonomy. 
                                                 
51 Email from CDR Edward J. McDonald OPNAV N812D, Integration Pentagon, Room 4D453 (703) 
614-0280 DSN 224-0280 edward.j.mcdonald@navy.mil  Mon 3/8/2010 6:38 AM 
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3.4.6. Human Machine Collaborative Decision Making (HMCDM) 
The designs of systems where humans and machines collaborate have been 
modeled after human processes, which are augmented by mechanical capabilities.  
Malasky asserts that “Future C2 planning systems can be improved if the humans and 
machines are integrated fully in a way that takes advantage of the strengths of both.”52  
This HMCDM experiment proposes that collaboration should be designed from the 
beginning of the decision making process, and demonstrated the potential for 
improvement in the quality and speed of solutions to a military planning problem.53 
When humans and machines are capable of collaborative decision making, the 
question still remains, “Who is in charge?”  If a human operator is designated to have 
overarching authority, then the capability for a machine to override the human operator 
must also be considered.  This paradigm is illustrated in Figure 22.54  Assuming human 
operator control authority, Region A shows machine recognition that an action was not 
taken when it should be taking place, and Region B shows the recognition by the machine 
of inappropriate actions being taken by the human.  Recognizing these possible results, 
the decision maker must choose whether or not to allow mechanical intervention, and 
whether human operators should still have the ability to override the corrective action 
based on human factors of interpretation. 
                                                 
52 Malasky, Jeremy S. Human Machine Collaborative Decision Making in a Complex Optimization 
System. 12 May 2005. p. 146. 
53 Malasky, Jeremy S. Human Machine Collaborative Decision Making in a Complex Optimization 
System. 12 May 2005. p. 145. 
54 Inagaki, T. Human-Machine Collaboration for Safety and Comfort. Presented to ENRI International 
Workshop on ATM/CNS. 2009. 3. 
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Figure 22.   Human Control vs. Computer Judgment55 
                                                 
55 Inagaki, T. Human-Machine Collaboration for Safety and Comfort. Presented to ENRI International 
Workshop on ATM/CNS. 2009. 3. 
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3.5. INFORMATION ASSURANCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR C2 
ARCHITECTURE 
 The confidentiality, integrity, and timely availability of information is enabled by 
encryption, frequency shifting and system redundancies  often play an important part in 
the success of military operations. This section seeks to find ways to safeguard 
information assets by examining problems from an information assurance perspective. 
3.5.1. Identity and Key Management 
Identity management is crucial to any large scale organization in 
managing the effectively accesses of individuals to its resources.  The conventional 
identity management concept deals with managing the identities of individuals in a 
system.  In an Unmanned Vehicle (UV) scenario, the individuals dealt with are no longer 
humans. The scope of identity management will thus have to be extended beyond human 
subjects. 
One of the most important requirements for identity management is to 
identify a subject uniquely.  For human subjects, the focus was on “what we are” (e.g. 
biometrics such as fingerprint or facial features), “what we have” (e.g. tokens such as 
smart card) and “what we know (e.g. password) to uniquely identify an individual.  For 
UVs, the simplest implantation would probably have to be in the form of a “secret” that 
only the UV knows.  The system would have to trust that once a UV proved that it has 
knowledge of a unique “secret”, it is who it claims to be.  This “secret” can be in the form 
of a cryptographic key stored in a tamper proof device embedded inside the UV. 
Lifecycle of a UV 
A good identity management system would have to take care of the entire 
lifecycle of the subjects. 
A secret key would have to be generated during the production of a UV in 
a secure manner.  This key would have to be unique cryptographically and stored in a 
tamper proof device in such a manner that any attempts to tamper with the device would 
result in the destruction of the key.  A feasible implementation of such a mechanism 
would be an asymmetric key pair where the private key is stored inside a tamper-proof 
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chip embedded inside the UV and the public key is tied to the identity of the UV in a 
central identity management database in the system. 
Just like a clearance level is given to each human individual, each UV may 
be given a clearance level (unclassified, secret, top secret) that identies the information 
that they are allowed to access.  An alternative implementation would be a role-based 
mechanism where each UV is assigned a specific role and the resources are tied to the 
role that they are assigned to.  The UV may switch to a number of different roles 
throughout its lifecycle and the system must be designed to accommodate this change. 
A common database scheme would have to be established to allow 
different types of unmanned vehicles to be enrolled into an enterprise wide identity 
management system and for keeping track of all the keys embedded inside each 
unmanned vehicle.  A separate key management system and Public Key Infrastructure 
might be necessary to support the deployment and management of keys to the unmanned 
vehicles. 
Once a UV is retired, destroyed, compromised, or transferred out of the 
system, the identity management system would have to terminate its associated account 
and privileges to make sure no other individual is able to make use of that identity to gain 
unauthorized access to the system. 
3.5.2. High Assurance Internetworking 
The goal of high assurance internetworking is to protect the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information while in transit across the 
network.  At the same time, attacks against the network have to be identified and blocked.  
Cryptography (Encryption, hashing and digital signatures) is used to provide the 
protection of the data as it transits the network while traffic filtering (firewalls, intrusion 
detection) is used to protect the network against attacks. 
The amount of protection required for various data types is identified and 
tabulated in OV3. The following factors were considered: 
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• Confidentiality The confidentiality of data is usually 
protected by performing encryption. However, performing 
encryption on large amounts of data can cripple the performance of 
the system. As such, data such as live video feed would not be 
encrypted. 
• Integrity The integrity of the data can be provided by 
performing hashing on the data along with digital signatures. 
Control data sent to UVs need to have high integrity to prevent 
aggressors from hijacking the UVs. 
• Availability Availability can be provided by introducing 
redundancies in the system. The level of availability required in the 
system is decided by the criticality and timeliness requirements of 
the system. 
Additional features could be implemented in the system to improvement 
the assurance of the network.  The security data from diverse sources across the networks 
can be aggregated and normalized to provide a holistic view of the network health and 
status.  A business intelligence framework could also be utilized to maximize the 
usefulness of historical and near real-time network defense data.  Capabilities could be 
developed to detect non-traditional forms of network intrusion. In addition, some form of 
visualization could also be implemented to provide better awareness of the network 
topology and detected intrusions.56 
3.5.3. Tamper-Proof Device 
There are two aspects of tamper proof devices.  A tamper-evident device 
provides a lower level of security than a tamper-resistant device since the former only 
detects evidence of unauthorized access to the protected device while the latter prevents 
                                                 
56 Network Security Section,  http://www.nrl.navy.mil/chacs/5544/. 
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unauthorized access of the protected device.  Having a tamper-resistant device is more 
relevant than having a tamper-evident device for the UMS in this architecture. 
The two scenarios in this project, reconnaissance and force protection, 
require extensive data collection as part of the operation.  It is important that the storage 
device be tamper-resistant.  Requirements for tamper-resistant storage within the UMS 
are: 
• Weight of device – lightweight is preferred as additional 
increase in weight affects the payload of the unmanned 
vehicles 
• Power consumption – unmanned vehicles can only operate as 
long as their batteries allow, so additional increase in power 
consumption will reduce the operating time of the unmanned 
vehicles 
• Data storage space – having a large data storage space means 
able to collect more data for analyzed. 
• Robustness – device must not fail under harsh environment 
conditions 
• Authenticity guarantees – ensuring authorized access to the 
device 
• Confidentiality guarantees – ensuring data in the device are not 
able to be viewed by unauthorized access 
• Integrity guarantees – ensuring that data in the device are not 
modified 
• Performance overhead to security – having an enhanced 
encryption algorithm requires more computation power which 
adds on to the power consumption of the device. On the other 
hand, having a basic, simple encryption algorithm may lower 
the security level of the device 
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While there are ready tamper-resistant secure storage devices available 
commercially, there are still some research challenges for tamper-resistant devices.  They 
are: 
• Protect Confidentiality of information - looking at enhanced 
methods  to prevent unauthorized users from viewing data and 
exploring reverse-engineering protection mechanism 
• Protect Functional Integrity - ensure device performs its intended 
function and does not allow device to be tampered, and 
enhancement of secure processors architecture 
• Protection against unauthorized copying or modification - 
verification methods to check valid changes of new versions of 
data 
• Authenticity guarantees  - establishing and maintaining origin of 
data as well as exploring methods to associate signatures with data 
and establishing versioning for data fragments 
• Scalability - able to handle/manage large size file system, number 
of users, number of processes; design small form factor devices 
and yet support expansion (scalability) 
• Performance overhead - techniques for lowering performance 
overheads for cryptography ciphers; design enhanced ciphers to 
include parallelism 
Optimistically, some of these challenges can be addressed with 
technological advancements in the coming future.  More importantly, having tamper-
resistant secure storage to be implemented in unmanned vehicles is a small step towards 
information operational assurance of the system.57 
                                                 
57 Elizabeth Haubert Joseph , Joseph Tucek , Larry Brumbaugh , William Yurcik, “Tamper-Resistant 
Storage Techniques for Multimedia Systems,” In IS&T/SPIE International Symposium Electronic Imaging 
/ Storage and Retrieval Methods and Applications for Multimedia. 2005. 
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3.5.4. Availability and Denial of Service 
The UVs will operate in a rich collaborative information environment that 
is potentially hostile.  Hardware failures, resource exhaustion, environmental conditions, 
or any complicated interaction between these factors can affect the availability of the 
system.  The adversary may launch denial of service attacks by manipulating the 
environment so as disrupt communication, for example by jamming our communications 
from a distance or put themselves in the networks and disrupt infrastructure functions and 
lines of communications, such as routing of message performed by the individual nodes.  
In addition, the communications infrastructure may be unable to handle the heavy 
demands where many messages are routed for synchronization of activities, sharing of 
information and collaboration.  The impact is degradation in situational awareness and 
defense capabilities in both scenarios. 
The architecture should be resilient against noise and provide robust anti-
jamming capabilities to defeat jamming attacks.  In addition, solutions must be developed 
to authenticate nodes and defend against resource exhaustion, flooding attacks to waste 
bandwidth and energy, traffic redirections and other forms of denial of service attacks.  
Factors such as frequency allocation, radiated power, battery life, and organizational lines 
of communications should also be analyzed. 
Assuming large scale deployment of cheap nodes, the network should be 
resilient to individual node failure as a node may fail at any time.  Node failure may be 
due to hardware or software failure, end of battery life, compromised or destroyed by the 
adversary.  The architecture should allow new nodes to be added to the network to 
replace a failed node.  New nodes may also be introduced to enhance system 
performance, e.g. to increase the operating range.  These nodes should be integrated 
seamlessly into the existing network without impacting overall performance. 
The adversary may intercept and subvert a node in the network or 
introduce their own nodes to disrupt our operations.  Strong authentication and tamper-
proof technologies must be developed to increase the assurance that a node has not been 
compromised and that it has been authorized to participate in the network.  These 
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mechanisms must be economical and must take into account the overall payload and 
battery life that the UVs can support.  Messages should also be authenticated without 
introducing too much overhead and slowing down the operation to unacceptable levels. 
The ability to detect and react against a denial of service attack is critical to the 
availability of assets.  The architecture should at least provide the means to report the 
incident of an attack to the operator for man-in-the loop intervention.  Development of 
self-healing capabilities will further improve service availability by discovering, 
diagnosing, and reacting autonomously to network disruptions.  Self-healing components 
will detect system malfunctions (accidental or deliberate) and start corrective actions 
based on defined policies to recover the network or a node, thus automatically recovering 
from damages.  Algorithms to be developed include election and activation of backup 
nodes, re-routing to the next available nodes and coordinating physical re-location of 
nodes.  These algorithms must be as efficient as possible since the UVs will have low 
processing power, even though it was expected that hardware processing power to 
increase tremendously by 2030. 
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3.6. ENGINEERING ASSESSMENT OF CAPABILITIES UNMANNED 
SYSTEMS: ENGINEERING FOR 2030 
3.6.1. Introduction 
Current trends of sustainable energy, “greener” emission friendly energy 
resources and overall efficiency as a financial driver can be seen through a majority of 
civilian and military projects.  It would come to no surprise that the military will help 
lead the way in ground-breaking research and application of new technologies. 
Trade studies wereconducted to explore the technology area’s most beneficial to 
unmanned systems.  Specifically, engine cycle efficiency, advanced fuels, and fuel 
cell/battery power systems were studied. The trade study emphasized maximizing a 
specific unmanned systems’ ability to stay on station (longer endurance). 
3.6.2. Fuel Cycle Efficiency 
3.6.2.1. Internal Combustion Engines 
 With perhaps the lowest of cycle efficiencies, internal combustion 
engines still have a stake in military platforms.  The MQ-1 Predator, runs off of a turbo-
charged ROTAX 912 four stroke engine.  With an average efficiency of 25% (broadly 
speaking), the internal combustion engine, described by the Otto cycle, can be improved 
by improving internal combustion efficiency (expected to reach levels as high as 40%, 
15% higher than current designs).  The technology driving these high efficiency gains can 
be found in ground-breaking engine designs. 
The most publicized engineering success in the area has been the Scuderi 
Split Cycle Engine.  While the split-cycle design has been around since 1914, it has been 
plagued by low volumetric efficiency and low thermal efficiency.58  The Scuderi Group 
has solved the “breathing” problem of volumetric efficiency on the compression side by 
reducing the clearance between the piston and the cylinder head to less than 1 mm.59 The 
                                                 
58 Scuderi Engine, “Why is the Scuderi Split Cycle Engine Better?” http://www.scuderiengine.com/  
(accessed April 23, 2010).  
59 Ibid. 
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design alteration described, effectively pushes almost 100 percent of the compressed air 
from the compression cylinder into the crossover passage, eliminating the breathing 
problems associated with previous split-cycle engines.60 
With regard to thermal efficiency, the split-cycle has to date been 
significantly worse than in a conventional Otto cycle engine because previous designs 
maintained firing before top-dead-centre (BTDC) - like a conventional engine. In order to 
fire BTDC in a split-cycle engine, the compressed air trapped in the crossover passage is 
allowed to expand into the power cylinder as the power piston travels upwards.61 
However, by releasing the pressure of the compressed air, the work done on the air in the 
compression cylinder is lost. The power piston then has to recompress the air in order to 
fire BTDC. In a conventional engine, the work of compression is done only once, leading 
to much better thermal efficiency.62  In Scuderi's design, the thermal efficiency problem 
has been solved by breaking from conventional design best practice and instead firing 
after top-dead-centre (ATDC). Firing ATDC in a split-cycle arrangement eliminates the 
losses resulting from recompressing the gas.63 
Aside from split-cycle design, additional improvements to the internal 
combustion engine are emerging.  Radical designs such as the 5-stroke engine are 
predicting efficiency increases up to 20%, and allowing for internal combustion engines 
to match that of current highly efficient diesel engines.  One engineering firm, Ilmor, has 
brought this invention to light by introducing a 5-stroke engine prototype as a plausible 
and working engineering design.  According to Ilmor, the 5-stroke concept engine utilizes 
two high-pressure fired cylinders operating on a conventional 4-stroke cycle that 
alternately exhaust into a central low-pressure expansion cylinder, whereupon the burnt 
gases perform further work. The low-pressure cylinder decouples the expansion and 






compression processes and enables the optimum expansion ratio to be selected 
independently of the compression ratio; leading to increased efficiency.64 
3.6.2.2. Diesel Engines 
One of the most surprising driving forces in more efficient engine cycles is 
coming from Washington D.C.  The passing of the U.S. EPA 2010 Emissions Standards 
has greatly accelerated advancements in diesel technology.  The EPA emissions standards 
pose a significant challenge for developing clean diesel power-trains that are affordable. 
Along with exhaust emissions, an emphasis on heavy-duty vehicle fuel efficiency is 
being driven by increased energy costs as well as the potential regulation of greenhouse 
gases.65  With the standards setting strict requirements on minimum engine efficiency, 
companies such as Cummins Diesel have begin designing and implementing several 
measures to improve their diesel engines.  Three areas of emphasis that lead to substantial 
improvements in engine thermal efficiency are the maximization of the engine closed 
cycle efficiency, the reduction of open cycle losses and engine parasitics, and the 
integration of Highly Efficient Clean Combustion (HECC) engine technology with after 
treatment.66  Emphasis on areas highlighted by Cummins Diesel can lead to future diesel 
efficiency upwards of 65% by the year 2030. 
This focused attention on diesel engines will not just allow for more 
efficient long-haul truck and tractor applications, but could possibly have ties to future 
military systems.  While diesel engines are not the preferred propulsion system for 
unmanned air vehicles, they could have significant implications for future unmanned 
surface vessels and underwater vehicles. 
                                                 
64 Ilmor Engineering, “The 5-Stroke Concept Engine,” http://www.ilmor.co.uk/concept_5-
stroke_1.php (accessed April 22, 2010)  
65 Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Office “Advanced Combustion Engine Research and 
Development 2009” (paper presented at the annual progress meeting for the U.S. Department of Energy, 
Washington D.C., December 2009). 
66Ibid  
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3.6.2.3. Gas Turbines 
Gas turbine cycles currently serve as one of the military’s prime movers.  
From naval surface ships, to unmanned Global-Hawk aerial surveillance platforms, gas 
turbines have a significant stake in propulsion.  Much like the advancements of internal 
combustion and diesel engine cycles, the gas turbine will be able to become more 
efficient over the next two decades.  For efficiency increase to occur, the gas turbine 
needs to be examined in its most simple representation; the Brayton cycle.  For gas 
turbines, the Brayton cycle can be analyzed as simple or combined. 
Simple and combined gas turbine cycle diagrams are shown in Figure 23. 
below.  The Brayton cycle can be characterized by two important parameters: pressure 
ratio and inlet temperature.  The pressure ratio of the cycle can be described as the 
compressor discharge pressure divided by compressor inlet pressure.67  However, in an 
actual cycle there is some slight pressure loss in the combustion system and thus the 
pressure at the combustor discharge is less than the combustor inlet.  The other 
significant parameter, turbine inlet temperature, is thought to be the highest temperature 
reached in the cycle. 
                                                 
67 Frank Brooks,  “GE Gas Turbine Performance Characteristics,” GE Power Systems- GER3567H 
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Figure 23.   Comparison of Simple & Combined Cycles68 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
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In simple-cycle applications (the top curve), pressure ratio increases 
translate into efficiency gains at a given inlet temperature.  However, for combined-cycle 
systems, as shown in the bottom of Figure 23., pressure ratio increases have a less 
pronounced effect on efficiency.69  Note also that as pressure ratio increases, specific 
power decreases. Increases in the turbine inlet temperature result in increased thermal 
efficiency.  Simple-cycle efficiency is achieved with high pressure ratios. Combined-
cycle efficiency is obtained with more modest pressure ratios and greater firing 
temperatures. 
3.6.2.4. Pulse Detonation Engines (PDEs) 
Still in development, pulse detonation engine technology is being pursued 
as the means to achieve more efficient high-speed flight.  PDEs offer an alternative 
source of propulsion to current turbojet and ramjet/scramjet systems, by incorporating 
nearly constant volume combustion vice constant pressure combustion, which governs 
Brayton cycle operations.70  The cycle is shown in Figure 24.  In a PDE, the combustion 
chamber is filled with a fuel/air mixture and detonated.  A detonation wave propagates 
through the chamber creating high pressures that produce thrust.71  Products of 
combustion are exhausted and the cycle starts again. Either running this cycle at high 
frequencies or coordinating multiple combustion chambers can produce quasi-steady 
thrust.72  
                                                 
69 Brooks, Frank., “GE Gas Turbine Performance Characteristics,” GE Power Systems- GER3567H 
 70 B. Bartosh, “Thrust Measurement of a Split-Path, Valveless Pulse Detonation Engine” (MSME 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,  2007) 13 
71 Hutchins, T.E. and Metghalchi, M. “Energy and Exergy Analyses of the Pulse Detonation Engine”  




Figure 24.   The Pulse Detonation Engine Cycle73 
This type of combustion produces two beneficial results, higher 
temperature increase and higher pressure.  The higher combustion pressures (compared to 
Brayton Cycle), and a lower entropy rise, result in a total enthalpy increase; thus allowing 
for efficiency increases of 25-35% over typical Brayton cycles.74  Overall PDE cycle 
efficiency is estimated to be as high as 55% by 2030.  Figure 25., shows the comparison 
of the Brayton cycle to the Humphrey cycle, which best models pulse detonation engine 
systems. 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
 74 Bartosh, B., “Thrust Measurement of a Split-Path, Valveless Pulse Detonation Engine” (MSME 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School,  2007) 13 
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Figure 25.   Comparison of Humphrey and Brayton Cycles75 
Currently, the application of PDE technology is more suited for cruise 
missile type platforms, but further advancements and design of unmanned platforms 
could see the application of PDE to the design of unmanned systems.  
3.6.2.5. Constant-Volume-Combustion (CVC) Hybrid Engines 
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has invested 
resources in a program focused on combined-cycle propulsion system architecture, with 
separate CVC and turbine engines, intended for high-Mach military aircraft.76  This 
program, titled “Vulcan,” is one of the most specific applications of the CVC concept.  
The “Vulcan” is the combination of a turbojet and a CVC process.  Constant volume 
combustion technology can be integrated into a turbine engines through many different 
architectures – a combined-cycle propulsion system with a separate CVC engine and a 
turbine engine sharing a common inlet and common nozzle; CVC engine integrated into a 
                                                 
75 Ibid. 
76 “Constant Volume Combustion (CVC) Technology for Vulcan Program Phase II” Solicitation  




turbine engine fan duct; CVC engine integrated into a turbine engine augmenter; and a 
hybrid system, where a turbine engine combustor is replaced with a CVC module.77  All 
of the aforementioned architectures greatly improves the performance and increases the 
capability of turbine engines. 
Constant volume combustion systems have the potential to significantly 
decrease the fuel consumption of U.S. Navy air and surface combatants (manned and 
unmanned platform) and provide increased capability.78  Specifically for naval surface 
applications, the CVC-hybrid engine will be smaller in terms of output and size relative 
to the propulsion turbine units, but the ship power turbine units will consume only half 
the fuel originally required.79  Capabilities of U.S. Navy surface vessels continue to grow 
due to the need to incorporate more capable and numerous defensive and offensive 
systems to address new threats and missions; replacing conventional combustors and 
integration of CVC into the power generation gas turbines on these vessels promises 
additional ship electrical power and lower Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC).80 
3.6.2.6.  Forecast of Cycle Efficiency Increases 
The focus of the above trade study was to gather information to best 
extrapolate the efficiencies of several different engine cycles involved with military 
platforms.  In order to best predict the future, current technology needed to be established 
as a reference point.  Figure 26. shows the average efficiency of all the previously 
mentioned engine cycles over the next two decades.  The efficiencies displayed in the 
plot are forecasts of potential capabilities. 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Warwick, Graham “DARPA Lifts the Covers on the Vulcan Engine Program” posted  June 6, 2008, 




Figure 26.   Extrapolation of Engine Cycle Efficiency 
3.6.3. Advanced Fuel Technology 
 The area of fuel research contains avenues that can have significant impacts on 
military platforms.  From current distillate fuels to “greener” bio-fuel products and 
advanced synthetic fuels, there exists potential for increased performance directly from 
fuel sources. 
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3.6.3.1. Distillate Fuel 
Distillate fuel can be more commonly described as fuels that are 
petroleum derived.  Over the past one hundred years, petroleum based fuels have been 
refined and produced to yield more efficiency and cleaner by-products.  One of the most 
measurable figures for fuels is the Net Heat of Combustion (by mass or volume).  The 












JP-4 1951.0 43570 33190 U.S. Air Force Fuel
JP-5 1952.0 43050 35200 U.S. Navy Fuel
JP-8 1979.0 43240 35060 U.S. Air Force Fuel
JP-10 1993.0 42100 39582 U.S. Navy Fuel  
TABLE 10.   U.S. MILITARY JET FUEL LOOP. 
From Table 10, it can be seen that for the past 50 years, there is not 
significant or any improvement in terms of Net Heat of Combustion by Weight or by 
Volume.  With even this brief snapshot of fuels, it can be concluded that any 
improvement from distillate fuel will most likely be insignificant. 
3.6.3.2. Bio-Fuel 
With an ever-increasing reliance on petroleum-based fuels, there is a need 
to find an alternative to petroleum in order to reduce the dependency on foreign oil.  




Figure 27.   Projected U.S. Reliance on Petroleum Imports81 
With such dependency on petroleum imports and fluctuating fuel costs, Defense 
Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) released a solicitation calling for 
alternatives to aviation fuel.  This analysis is shown in Figure 27.  This solicitation has 
already lead to successful test of Syntroleum, a 50-50 blend of synthetic and JP-8 fuel 
with Air Force B-52’s in flight.  This fuel is synthetic kerosene produced from natural gas 
through the Fischer-Tropsch (F-T) process.82  Additionally, the U.S. Navy celebrated 
Earth Day April 22, 2010 by showcasing a flight test of the "Green Hornet," an F/A-18 
Super Hornet multirole fighter jet powered by a bio-fuel blend.83  The Green Hornet runs 
on a 50/50 blend of conventional jet fuel and a bio-fuel that comes from camelina, a 
hardy U.S.-grown plant that can thrive even in difficult soil.84 
                                                 
81  
82 Zamorano, Marti, "B-52 synthetic fuel testing: Center commander pilots first Air Force B-52 flight 
using solely synthetic fuel blend in all eight engines",  Aerotech News and Review, 2006-12-22 
83 Navy Tests Biofuel-Powered 'Green Hornet, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=52768 April 22, 2010. 
84 Ibid. 
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The use of non-renewable fossil fuels to provide jet fuel should be seen only as a 
means to an inevitable end.  It is possible that bio-fuel alternatives together with (F-T) 
produced synthetic kerosene could offer a potential long-term renewable solution to U.S. 
fuel vulnerabilities.  Therefore it is only foreseeable that U.S. will be moving towards 
bio-fuel in the near future.  Table 11 below shows the properties of bio-fuel as compared 












Jet Fuel 43.2 34.9 150 - 300 <-40 1.2
Biodiesel 38.9 33.9 >400 0 4.7
Ethanol 27.2 21.6 78 -183 1.52
Butanol 36.0 29.2 118 -89 3.64  
TABLE 11.   BIO-FUEL TO JET FUEL COMPARISON. 
As seen in Table 11, using bio-fuel there will yield a significant drop in energy 
content as compared to distillate jet fuels currently in use.  Thus, there is a high 
possibility that fuel alone will not be the sole factor that can be used to improve 
endurance for Unmanned Vehicles. 
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3.6.3.3. Future of Fuel Technology 
 
Figure 28.   Prediction of Energy Content of Future Fuel 
Advanced fuel technology offers the best application for increased 
performance in the arena of synthetically derived fuels.  One such currently being 
explored, High Energy Density Material (HEDM) is a material that might be used as the 
fuel for the future.  Due to its high energy numbers, Cubane is 71% higher in terms of 
Net Heat of combustion by volume, which makes it a good candidate for improving 
endurance for Unmanned Vehicles.  At the moment, Cubane is not only expensive to 
synthesize, but is also extremely time consuming for a material expected to be used in 
large quantities.  The results are shown in Figure 28. 
3.6.4. Battery Technology 
3.6.4.1. Current Battery Technology 
Throughout the last decade batteries have evolved to power electric 
vehicles. The demand for cleaner fuel, longer endurance and minimal cost has caused this 
field of research and development to grow at an exponential rate. The three major battery 
technologies leading this field are Lead-acid, Nickel Metal Hydride (Ni-MH) and 
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Lithium-ion Battery. Research in the field of Lead acid batteries is nearing an end due to 
their large size and reputation of being environmentally unfriendly.  See Table 12 below, 
for comparison among the three battery technologies85. 
Lithium-ion Batteries has become the way of the future because of its high 
energy density and long life cycle.  Further research and development into Lithium-Ion 
batteries will be discussed later. 
  
TABLE 12.   BATTERY TECHNOLOGY COMPARISON. 86 
3.6.4.2. Lithium-Ion 
As noticed in the above chart it is clear why Lithium-Ion batteries and its 
research are in the forefront for future use in electric and hybrid technology. As seen in 
the chart, lithium batteries have a higher energy density, higher working voltage and life 
cycle than that of Ni-MH and lead-acid batteries. 
However, the true selling point of Lithium-Ion lies in its more practical 
advantages87: 
                                                 




 Efficiently fit most devices due to various shapes and sizes. 
 Lighter weight. 
 Power transferred at a lower rate of current. 
 No memory effect. 
 Self-discharge rate of approximately 5-10% per month. 
3.6.4.3. Lithium Iron Phosphate LiFePO4 
Lithium Iron Phosphate is a variation in the chemistry of lithium ion 
batteries.  General electric Battery company research and development teams have done 
various field of study into this type of chemistry.  They site this chemistry as “becoming 
the best-choice materials in commercial Li-ion Batteries for large capacity and high 
power applications.” 
Advantages of Lithium Iron Phosphate88: 
• Larger capacity compared to other chemistry. 
• High power applications 
• Safe as lead-acid battery 
• Comparable power to lithium ion cells at lower cost. 
Disadvantages of Lithium Iron Phosphate89: 
• Cost (production of lithium batteries are still very expensive) 
• Specific energy (energy/volume) of a new LFP battery is lower 
than a new LiCoO2 battery. 
• Many brands of LFP's have a low discharge rate compared with 
lead-acid or LiCoO2 
                                                 
88 Ibid 
89 Lithium Iron Phosphate Batteries , 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_iron_phosphate_battery#Advantages_and_disadvantages 
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3.6.4.4. Future Battery Developments 
The lithium air battery is an advanced design in which a lithium anode is 
electrochemically coupled to atmospheric oxygen through an air cathode.  During 
discharge, lithium ions flow from the anode through an electrolyte and combine with 
oxygen at the cathode (typically consisting of porous carbon) to form lithium oxide Li2O 
or lithium peroxide Li2O2, which is inserted in the cathode; this is coupled to the flow of 
electrons from the battery's anode to the cathode through a load circuit90.  The advantage 
of lithium air batteries compared to other technology is the higher density that typical 
lithium ions batteries because of the lighter cathode. 
Another revolutionary battery concept, the “nanowire battery” was 
invented by a team led by Dr. Yi Cui at Stanford University in 2007.  It is made up of a 
stainless steel anode covered in silicon nanowires, to replace the traditional graphite 
anode.  Since silicon can store up to ten times more lithium than graphite this allows for a 
greater energy density on the anode and reduces the mass of the battery.  This battery has 
a higher surface area allowing for a faster charging and discharging91 
3.6.5. Fuel Cell Technology 
The advantage of fuel cell technology is found in its practical operating basis: 
converting chemical energy in the fuel into electricity, silently, without explosion or 
combustion.  Fuel cells have a number of advantages over other technologies for power 
generation.  They have the potential to use less fuel than competing technologies and 
emit no pollution when used.  In terms of future applications, fuel cells can provide 
power for onboard use (sensors, communication, etc) as well as direct drive propulsion to 
physically move the system.  There are also many reasons why a fuel cell might be useful 
in specific environments, such as the high quality of electricity generated or their quiet 
operation.92  
                                                 
90 Lithium Air Battery, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lithium_air_battery  
91 Nanowire Battery, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanowire_battery 
92 Fuel Cell Today, “General Fuel Cell Information,” http://www.fuelcelltoday.com/ (accessed 05 
May, 2010). 
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3.6.5.1. Polymer Electrolyte Membrane 
One outstanding example is the German Type 212 Howaldtswerke-
Deutsche Werft (HDW) submarines.  These submarines utilize an air-independent 
propulsion (AIP) system with polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cells developed 
by Siemens.  These fuel cells enclose a solid polymer electrolyte and yield power outputs 
in the range of 30-40 kW.93 On the anodic side of the proton exchange membrane, 
hydrogen is decomposed into its protons and electrons.  The electrons are then used in the 
submarine's power supply.  The electrons return via the cathode to re-combine with the 
protons, and together with the oxygen molecules in the air form pure water.94 
Polymer Electrolyte Membrane fuel cells used in automobiles are called 
Proton Exchange Membrane fuel cells.  Currently, the car industry is the most promising 
industry that is actively investing and researching in PEM technology.  The potential 
power generated by a fuel cell stack is limited by the number and size of the individual 
fuel cells that comprise the stack and the surface area of the PEM. Nevertheless, the 
benefits of PEM are as follows:95 
• Minimize Emissions. Gasoline- and diesel-powered vehicles emit 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), mostly carbon dioxide (CO2), that 
contribute to global climate change. However, PEM only by-
product is water. 
• Reduced Oil Dependence. Hydrogen can be derived from 
domestic sources, such natural gas and coal, as well as renewable 
resources such as water. This forms a political and economy 
protection by being less dependent on other countries and less 
vulnerable to oil price shocks from the volatile oil market. 
                                                 
93 Peter Hauschildt and Albert Hammerschmidt, “PEM Fuel Cells – An Attractive Energy source for 





Besides PEM fuel cell, there exist other types of fuel cell technology.  
Designs involving an ion-conducting material that range from a liquid alkaline or acid 
fixed in a matrix as carrier to molten inorganic salts. 
Several other fuel cell designs are compared in Table 29. 
 
Figure 29.   Comparison of Fuel Cell Technology 
3.6.6. Case Study: UAV application 
To better understand what exactly could be gained from studying the 
advancements in technologies such as fuel research and development, engine cycle 
efficiency, and battery chemistry, an extrapolation of performance parameters for two 
UAV platforms was conducted.  The MQ-1 Predator and the RQ-4 Global Hawk, 
perhaps two of the most publicized UAVs, were analyzed using estimations of increased 
engine cycle efficiency and advanced synthetic fuel net heat of combustion estimations. 
Table 13 shows the effect engine cycle efficiency alone has on the Predator and 
Global Hawk flight characteristics.  Assuming the numbers for 2010 are the current 
operating specifications, the expected increase in its three key combat parameters can be 
mapped out over decade long intervals until 2030: 
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TABLE 13.   UAV PERFORMANCE PREDICTION FOR YEAR MILESTONES - 
ENGINE EFFICIENCY ONLY. 
Table 14 shows the added effect of increased net heat of combustion (by weight) 
in addition to engine cycle efficiency increases shown from Table 13 above: 
TABLE 14.   UAV PERFORMANCE PREDICTION FOR YEAR MILESTONES - 
ENGINE AND FUEL EFFICIENCY. 
The combined increase displayed is 22%.  This is a fairly conservative 15% 
increase in engine efficiency plus a 7% increase in net heat of combustion (by weight).  
The two tables above can be seen graphically below in Figure 30. 
 Radius (nm) Coverage Area (nm2) Endurance (hours) 
 
(Current) 
2010 2020 2030 
(Current) 
2010 2020 2030 
(Current) 
2010 2020 2030 
RQ-4 Global 
Hawk  5400 5940 6210 9.16E+07 1.11E+08 1.21E+08 36 39.6 41.4 
MQ-1 Predator 500 550 575 7.85E+05 9.50E+05 1.04E+06 40 44 46 
 Radius (nm) Coverage Area (nm2) Endurance (hours) 
 
(Current) 
2010 2020 2030 
(Current) 
2010 2020 2030 
(Current) 
2010 2020 2030 
RQ-4 Global 
Hawk  5400 5940 6588 9.16E+07 1.11E+08 1.36E+08 36 39.6 43.92 
MQ-1 Predator 500 550 610 7.85E+05 9.50E+05 1.17E+06 40 44 48.8 
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Figure 30.   Endurance Increases by 2030 for the Predator & Global Hawk UAV's 
Applying generalized increases in efficiency values and increase in net heat of 
combustion (by weight) as direct percentages was assumed valid by implementing the 
Breguet Range Equation. 
 
Equation 1: Breguet Range Equation 
Assuming the velocity of the platform (V), the Earth’s gravitational constant (g), 
the platforms lift-to-drag ratio (L/D) and natural log of platform initial and final weights 
remain constant, the specific fuel consumption (SFC) can be changed to reflect efficiency 
increases. 
Increasing Engine Efficiency & Fuel Energy Density
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3.7. Legal Consideration 
 A high level assessment of legal considerations was conducted.  This section 
addressed legal constraints and areas to understand the access of Unmanned Systems to 
national and international waterways and airspace. 
The Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) requires all DoD activities be fully 
compliant with any and all arms control agreements of the U.S. Government.  
Additionally DoDD 5000.1 requires that the acquisition and procurement of any DoD 
weapons and weapon systems shall be compliant with any and all applicable domestic 
law and treaties and international agreements. U.S. Government arms control agreements 
relating to unmanned systems (UMS) included the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces 
in Europe (CFE), the Vienna Document 1999 (VDOC), Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty (INF), Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), and the United 
Nations Transparency in Armaments Resolution (UNTIA).  Conventional arms 
agreements that do not name MS, but include air and ground military vehicles include 
CFE, VDOC, INF, GEMI, and UNTIA.  WA and MTCR are conventional arms 
agreements that directly address UMS.96 
3.7.1. International Laws 
3.7.1.1. Law of Armed Conflict 
“The Law of War” or “Law of Armed Conflict” is the customary and 
treaty law applicable to the conduct of warfare on land and the relationships between 
belligerents and neutral states.  It requires that belligerents refrain from employing any 
kind or degree of violence which is unnecessary for military purposes and that they 
conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry.”97  This in 
and of itself poses a level of autonomy which is unachievable with today’s technology.  
                                                 
96 FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap, Pentagon, Washington, DC, April 2009, p 
42. 
97 McDaniel, Erin A, “Robot Wars: Legal and Ethical Dilemmas of using Unmanned Robotic Systesm 
in 21st Century Warfare and Beyond, “ Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff 
College, 2008, p 15. 
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The Law of Armed Conflict could limit the applicability of weaponized unmanned 
systems in future combat environments and would need to be addressed on the level of 
International Law. 
The legality of using an autonomous vehicle to kill enemy forces will be a 
concept that needs further study.  The difficulty with this concept is that will humans 
allow the vehicle’s software be the deciding factor on who is an enemy and therefore 
should be attacked.  An additional question is “Who is responsible when an autonomous 
vehicle conducts “murder” (ie kills an innocent person)?” 
3.7.1.2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) 
All US Naval Ships must fully adhere to the UNCLOS or as they are 
commonly referred to as the “Rules of the Road”98.  Any UMS that is used no matter the 
level of autonomy that it possesses must also comply with the “Rules of the Road”.  This 
means that in addition to the Command and Control required to operate they must also be 
programmed to follow the rules of the road.  This will be one of the engineering 
challenges that must be met for UMS to operate smoothly in the future force structure. 
3.7.1.3. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
At a minimum, Unmanned Air Systems will need to follow International 
Civil Aviation Organization rules and regulations.  In addition, due to unique restrictions 
not seen in manned aviation, further regulation may be put on Unmanned Air Systems 
while in International Airspace. 
3.7.2. National Sovereignty 
The entry of any vessel or aircraft, including Unmanned Systems, into the 
territorial seas or airspace of any country would need prior consent by that country, 
except in reference to Safe Haven, Innocent Passage, or Assistance Entry.  The use of 
unmanned vehicles in or near territorial waters/airspace will require laws to go beyond 
                                                 
98 COMDTINST M16672.2D, NAVIGATION RULES, available from http://www.navcen.uscg.gov, 
accessed 20 January 2010 
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what is currently written.  The moral or ethical question of programming machines to 
employ lethal force has increasingly become an important element that will require laws 
at the international level. 
3.7.3. Issues within the United States 
Currently, the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) International 
Committee F38 was selected by the U.S Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to 
develop industry standards for small Unmanned Systems.  These standards will be 
essential in allowing small UMS to have filed flight plans and to fly missions within the 
national airspace in conjunction with manned aircraft.99  Additionally, these standards 
would be a stepping stone in allowing larger UMS the authorization to fly within current 
FAA controlled airspace. 
Any Unmanned Surface Vehicle must integrate within the Coast Guard 
International Regulations for Avoiding Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), also known as the 
“Marine Rules of the Road”.  Besides additional regulations specifically geared towards 
Unmanned Systems the vehicles must use high levels of autonomous guidance, 
navigation and control systems that provide advanced collision avoidance software. 
                                                 
99 ASTM International, “ASTM to Develop Small Unmanned Air Vehicle Systems Standards for 
FAA”, available from http://engineers.ihs.com/news/2010/astm-unmanned-air-vehicle-systems-
030110.htm, accessed May 16, 2010. 
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4.0. SYSTEM ANALYSIS 
4.1. FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE  
4.1.1. Functional architecture Development 
4.1.1.1. Functional Architecture Description 
The functional architecture for the SEA-16 Integrated Project contains a 
hierarchical model of the functions performed by the system, functional flow block 
diagrams, and diagrams showing the flow of inputs to and outputs from the functions.  
The functional architecture also contains the Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) which 
measure the outputs of the system functions. 
Before the functional architectural products are shown, some basic 
definitions will be given to clarify what is being described.  The first item described is the 
definition of a system’s functions.  Dennis Buede defines and describes the nature of a 
system’s functions below: 
A function is an activity or task that the system performs to 
transform some inputs into outputs.  Every function has activation 
and exit criteria. The activation criterion is associated with the 
availability of the physical resources, not necessarily with the start 
of the transformation activity. The function is activated as soon as 
the resource for carrying out the function is available. When the 
appropriate triggering input arrives, the function is then ready to 
receive the input and begin the transformation process. The 
activation criterion for the function then is the combination of the 
availability of the physical resource and the arrival of the 
triggering input. The exit criterion of a function determines when 
the function has completed its transformation tasks.100 
                                                 
100 Buede, Dennis, M, The Engineering Design of Systems ( New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
2000), 178. 
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Buede’s definition emphasizes that a function describes the action taken 
by the system to transform an input to an output.  The input could be information, 
material resources, electromagnetic signals, energy, or other resources that must be acted 
upon by an element in the system.  The transformation of the resource results in an output 
that is useful to either another physical element of the system or to an external 
stakeholder.  The usefulness of the output are classified and measured using MOEs. 
A functional hierarchy or decomposition is a representation of a how a 
function is broken down into its sub functions.  The functional hierarchy created was a 
structured top down beginning with the top level function, Manage UV Operations, and 
decomposing level by level to the lowest level functions.  The functions are decomposed 
in as much detail as required but not all functions are decomposed to the same level of 
detail. 
Buede states that functional flow block diagrams (FFBDs), “provide a 
hierarchical decomposition of the system’s functions and show a show a control structure 
that dictates the order in which the functions can be executed at each level of the 
decomposition.”101  Some important details portrayed in the FFBDs are whether 
functions are executed in series or parallel, and whether they are completed once or 
multiple times before meeting exit criteria.  Throughout the FFBDs, the system is 
described in a fully operational mode. 
A critical component of the success of the functional hierarchy is the 
conservation of all the inputs to and outputs from the top level function.102  Conservation 
of inputs and outputs means that all inputs to the decomposition are utilized by the 
system and are consumed by a transformative activity. 
The input/output diagrams detail the inputs to the functions and the 
resulting outputs.  The diagrams show how the inputs enter the system from the external 
                                                 
101 Buede, Dennis, M, The Engineering Design of Systems ( New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 
2000), 340. 
102 Buede Buede, Dennis, M, The Engineering Design of Systems ( New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000), 178. 
  111
environment, and how these inputs are transformed and transferred internally until a final 
output is achieved and sent to the external environment. 
The MOEs show how the outputs from the functions are measured for 
their effectiveness.  As was discussed in Section 2.5, the effectiveness of C2 is tied to the 
accomplishment of the mission.  Therefore, the outputs of the functions are measured for 
specific areas that relate to mission accomplishment. 
4.1.1.2. Developing the Functional Architecture 
The functional architecture was created using the process contained in 
chapter seven of Dennis Buede’s text, The Engineering Design of Systems, as 
summarized below: 
Step 1:  The team analyzed the concept of operations, the joint 
systems concept, and originating requirements.  The team sought to gain a better 
understanding of the system bounds, the problem the system is going to solve, and the 
level of decomposition that would be required.  The team then created functional steps 
that satisfied the vignettes in the concept of operations.  Figure 31. illustrates the inputs to 
the creation of the functional architecture.  The mechanism the team used to perform the 
functional architecture is a systems engineering software tool called CORE that is 
produced by a company called Viacom. 
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Figure 31.   Developing Functional Architecture 
Step 2:  The team combined these functions into a functional 
decomposition.  The team analyzed the input flows from outside the system.  The team 
then reconfirmed the functional decomposition against operational concept to ensure 
completeness.  The steps taken to create the functional decomposition are illustrated in 
Figure 32. and detailed below: 
1. Determined purpose and viewpoint of the system as developed in 
the Joint Systems Concept and the Concept of Operations. 
2. Developed external systems diagram in order to bound the 
system.103  The diagram can be created from the operational concept and should be 
consistent with the scenarios developed in the Joint Concept.  All inputs from external 
systems and controls that enter system through external interfaces are identified as well 
as the outputs. 
3. Developed data list from external systems diagram. 
                                                 
103 Buede, Dennis, M, The Engineering Design of Systems (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 
144. 
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4. Generated activity list. 
5. Defined A-O diagram and the level 1 functional decomposition.104 
6. Continue process decomposition to levels 1, 2, 3, and 4, as 
applicable. 
 
Figure 32.   Decomposition Process 
Step 3:  Address data or item that serve as inputs or outputs to 
functions of the functional architecture.  Coordinate item flow with the work being 
conducted by the C2 architecture task force. 
Step 4:  Develop MOEs to determine the effectiveness of each 
function. 
Step 5:  Show the functional architecture at a Steering Committee 
meeting in order to receive feedback and suggestions for improvement. 
4.1.2. Functional Architecture Overview and Summary 
4.1.2.1. Description 
This architecture is for the command and control of unmanned vehicles in year 
2030, including the interface between unmanned vehicles operating in all domains (air, 
undersea, surface, land, and space), C2 nodes, other operational units, and external 
systems.  The principal exchange of information is through a collaborative network 
which acts a data fusion network that is distributed across the forces.   
4.1.2.2. Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this architecture is to describe the integration of unmanned 
and manned vehicles in all domains into a collaborative knowledge sharing environment, 
                                                 
104 Buede, Dennis, M, The Engineering Design of Systems (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 
66. 
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allowing for unity of effort amongst all the warfare tools in the battlespace.  The 
architecture is focused toward unmanned vehicles, but takes into account the integration 
of manned vehicles through the collaborative network.  Knowledge sharing via the 
collaborative network is a principle way that manned and unmanned vehicles are 
integrated. 
The internal aspects of the system include the C2 assets, unmanned 
vehicles, manned vehicles, communication equipment, and the collaborative network.  
External to the system is the operational environment, threats, other coalition partners, 
local populations, higher command centers, and other elements not contained in the 
system. 
4.1.2.3. Mission 
The primary mission that the functional architecture accomplishes is C2.  
C2 is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over 
assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.  C2 functions are 
performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, 
and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.105 
4.1.3. Functional Description 
4.1.3.1. Manage UV Operations 
The top level function, Manage UV Operations, includes the operation of 
unmanned vehicles, the command and control of the unmanned vehicles, and the 
collaborative communication and interface between system nodes.  The function is 
described showing various figures and tables to show the hierarchy, functional flow, and 
input/outputs.  Figure 33. shows the hierarchy relationship of these functions and Figure 
34. shows the functional flow of these functions.  Figures 35. and Figure 36. show the 
inputs to and the outputs from the top level function. 
                                                 
105 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, October 2009. 
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Figure 33. shows how the top level function is decomposed to the first 
level.  Manage UV operations includes the operation of unmanned vehicles, the 
command and control of the unmanned vehicles, and the communication and interface 
between architecture nodes.  Provide C2 is the means and methods by which a 
commander recognizes what needs to be done in any given situation and sees that the 
appropriate actions are taken.  Collaboration is the communication and knowledge 
sharing between operational nodes in order to increase each node's understanding of the 
current operational situation.  Operate UVs is the performance of operational activities by 
UVs in the ballet space.  Activities include sensor operation, communication, and task 
execution. 
 
Figure 33.   Manage UV Operations Hierarchy Diagram 
The overall intent of the architecture is to manage unmanned vehicle 
operations in the 2030 battlespace.  In order to achieve the overall management of UV 
operations in the 2030 battlespace, the architecture enables the C2 of unmanned vehicles 
operating in an environment.  The function Collaborate allows knowledge sharing 
amongst UVs, manned vehicles, other interested entities such as coalition partners. 
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Figure 34. illustrates the functional flow of the functions which 
decompose the top level function Manage UV Operations.  Conduct UV Operations, 
Collaborate, and Provide C2.  The parallel structure indicates that the functions occur 
concurrently.  While the architecture is in the operational mode, the functions occur in a 
continuous loop.  Through the collaboration between UVs, manned vehicles, C2 nodes, 
and other external agencies, the architecture allows the C2 of operational UVs that are 

















(University) Manage UV Operations
 
Figure 34.   Manage UV Operations FFBD 
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Figure 35. represents the inputs to the system from the external 
environment.  Operational constraints include conditions that could hamper the C2 of 
UVs.  For example, emission control conditions, electronic warfare threats, air space 
management considerations, natural disaster considerations, and others.  Observables 
could be vibrations, electromagnetic radiation, acoustic waves, and many other 
observables.  These are sensed by UVs and this data is relayed to other UVs and the fused 
picture is relayed to the collaborative network.  Limiting constraints are an organized 
display of constraints that are limiting to a particular course of action or scenario.  
Constraints include conditions that could hamper the C2 of UVs.  For example, emissions 
control situations, electronic warfare threats, and kinetic threats from enemies.  Join 
Network Requests are requests made by external nodes to interface with the network.  
Information Requests are requests made by external nodes for information that is 
contained in the Collaborative Network.  Higher Command Data are orders and guidance 
sent by a command outside of the Collaborative Network. 
 
Figure 35.   Manage UV Operations IDEF A-0 Context Diagram 
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The inputs are received by the system and transformed as shown in Figure 
36.  The outputs that result are Information Transmittals and Join Network 
Confirmations.  Information Transmittals are the transmittals of information that was 
requested of the network. Joint Network Confirmations are the confirmations sent to 
external nodes by the Collaborative Network indicating that the request to join the 




Figure 36.   Manage UV Operations Input/Output Diagram 
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Figure 36. illustrates how the inputs from the external environment are 
transformed internally by the system, which result in internal transfers of information and 
outputs to the external environment.  This diagram provides the overall view of how the 
inputs are transformed to outputs.  Inputs from the external environment enter all three 
first level functions with the vast majority entering the system at the Collaborate function.  
The inputs are transformed by the first level functions, with resulting outputs being 
transferred to both the external environment and internally amongst the system. 
Table 15, provides a comprehensive functional decomposition of Manage 
UV Operations.  Each first level function, Provide C2, Collaborate, and Conduct UV 
Operations, including their decomposition, inputs, and outputs are described in more 




TABLE 15.   MANAGE UV OPERATIONS HIERARCHY. 
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Table 16 contains a list of all the functions and information items and their 
associated definitions.  The definitions are as close to the definitions found in Joint 
Publication 1-02 with tailoring where appropriate.  These definitions assist the 
understanding of the functional and input/output descriptions for Manage UV Operations 
and its subordinate functions. 
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 Element  Definition 
Function 
0 Manage UV 
Operations 
This function includes the operation of unmanned vehicles, the command and 
control of the unmanned vehicles, and the communication and interface between 
architecture nodes.   
1 Provide C2 The means and methods by which a commander recognizes what needs to be 
done in any given situation and sees that the appropriate actions are taken. It 
subsumes the process of building situational awareness.   Intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance activities thus support command and control. 
Command and control likewise encompasses combat direction, the real-time 
management of weapons systems. Command is the exercise of authority and 
control is the information returning to the commander about the results of the 
action taken - which informs subsequent command action. The commander 
decides what needs to be done and directs the actions of others. Feedback reveals 
the difference between intended outcomes and the situation as it actually 
develops. Feedback thus allows the commander to adapt to changing 
circumstances. Control is a state the entire system achieves based on feedback 
about the developing situation.  
1.1 Observe To watch the operational situation carefully taking into account details of a 
situation.  The main goal of this function is to be able to process enough 
information to make sound judgments regarding an operational situation.   
1.1.1  Monitor 
System 
To obtain information on the mission, enemy forces, neutral/non-combatants, 
friendly forces, terrain, and weather.  
1.1.1.1  Monitor 
Internal Factors 
Identifying and considering force readiness, including assets available, asset 
operational status, communication status, and resource requirements.  
1.1.1.2  Monitor 
External Factors 
Identifying and considering elements external to the system.  Examples include 
weather factors, enemy activities, limits on electromagnetic radiation, and 
guidance from higher commands.   
 
1.2 Orient To acquaint with the current situation and environment.  The goal of the function 
Orient is to compare mission criteria to the current situation and identify ways to 
ensure the mission is being accomplished.   
1.2.1  Understand 
Situation 
To acquaint with the current situation and environment.   
1.2.1.1  Assess 
Friendly 
Capability 
Identify the capabilities that the friendly forces can employ in a situation.  For 
example, are there enough UVs to conduct effective surveillance of an 
operational area? 
 
1.2.1.2  Assess 
Threat 
Given contacts and engageable tracks, classify, type, identify, and evaluate the 
threat posed to friendly assets and areas. 
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1.2.1.3  Analyze 
Environment 
Take into account the physical environment and the effects on the UV missions. 
For example, barometric pressure, temperature, humidity, visibility, salinity of 
water, and wind. 
 
1.2.2  Identify 
Mission Success 
Gap 
Identify gap between the desired state and the current situation.  This could also 
involve measuring the gap between enemy capability and friendly capability. 
 
1.3 Decide To make a final choice on a course of action (COA).   
1.3.1  Determine 
COAs 
The function of choosing a COA.  This function includes the process of choosing 
a COA. 
 
1.3.1.1  Develop 
COAs 
Develop a couple of alternative solutions to the impending problem. 
 
1.3.1.2  Analyze 
COAs 
Taking the nominative COAs and weighing these COAs against the criteria of 
risk and timing. 
 
1.3.1.2.1  Assess 
Risk 
Analyze the COAs and compare against possible enemy courses of actions.  Take 
into account mission criteria, limitations, and time criticality. 
 
1.3.1.2.2  Analyze 
Timing 
Understand how fast a decision and action must be rendered.  Less time critical 
events allow more analysis where time critical events require very rapid decision 
making and subsequent action. 
 
1.3.1.2  Select 
COA 
Determine courses of action that best meets mission objectives, while 
minimizing risk when appropriate. 
 
1.4 Act The decision maker puts the decision into action, which may involve 
disseminating the decision to others for execution, supervising that execution, 
and monitoring results through feedback. The Collaborative Network concept 
envisions that immediate dissemination of dynamic plans across the entire 
network, to any node or echelon desired. These plans would update automatically 
in real time, decreasing the need to publish changes and eliminating the time 
required to do it. 
1.4.1  Command 
Assets 
Command is the exercise of authority, including assigning missions, directing 
UVs, and providing resources. 
1.4.1.1  Assign 
Mission 
After an analysis and decision are rendered, the system must be able to process 
the decision and give mission tasking to required assets. 
1.4.1.2  Direct 
UVs 
Unmanned vehicles must be directed as required given UV level of autonomy.  
The level of autonomy of the UV will vary given the particular mission and 
  125
environment; thus the system must be able to direct UVs in low to high 
autonomy situations. 
1.4.1.3  Provide 
Resources 
Provide required assets, fuel, and support as dictated by the operational 
environment, friendly capability, and time criticality. 
1.5 Share to  
Network 
The passing of C2 Node information to the Collaborative Network in order to 
enhance collaboration. 
2 Collaborate To communicate and share knowledge with other operational nodes in order to 
increase each node's understanding of the current operational situation. 
2.1 Operate in  
Network 
The ability to exploit all human and technical elements of the force and its 
mission partners by fully integrating collected information, experience, 
knowledge, and decision making via a collaborative network.  Data and 
information are securely shared via the network, enhancing each individual 
node's awareness.  The network will connect all nodes including UVs that condu 
ct operations, manned assets and C2 nodes that provide the Command and 
Control to operational assets.  The goal is a seamless integration between 
manned and unmanned assets across all domains with the appropriate C2 node. 
2.1.1  Establish 
Capability 
Interface 
Establish Capability Interface is the sharing of needed operational information 
when information is entered via a user capability interface or through a sensor 
transduction capability interface. 
2.2 Manage Data Given information, ensure decision makers have ready access to the information 
they want and need while minimizing the risk of information overload. 
2.2.1 Organize 
Data 
The filtering, prioritizing, and manipulating to present observable reports.  The 
goal is to present information to C2 nodes that is useful and manageable, not 
overwhelming. 
2.2.2 Share Data Operational nodes must be able upload information to a Collaborative Network 
in order to increase each internal operational node's understanding of the 
situation and also to inform external stakeholders that interface with the network.  
2.3 Collect Data The system must be able to receive information from external stakeholders, such 
as unmanned vehicles, targets, and external agencies.   
2.4 Secure 
Network 
Information in the operational nodes and network must protect information from 
information attacks carried out by hackers and enemies.  
3 Conduct UV 
Operations 
Carrying out operational missions via unmanned vehicles.  Missions could 
include force protection and reconnaissance missions.  This set of functions will 
focus on the functions that allow the navigation and task completion by UVs, as 
well as the communication to and from the collaborative network and the C2 
nodes.   
3.1 Operate 
Sensors 
The utilization of sensors onboard UVs, such as optical, IR, acoustic, weather 
reading, RADAR, temperature, CBR, and other sensors that are utilized by 
vehicles.   
3.1.1  Sense 
Environment 
Identifying, reading, and exploiting of observables in the environment.  
Observables could be vibrations, electromagnetic radiation, acoustic waves, and 
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many other forms of stimuli.   
3.1.2  Share Raw 
Sensor Data 
Sending sensor data to other vehicles in the vicinity for greater situational 
awareness amongst operational nodes.  These other vehicles could be other UVs 
or manned vehicles.    
3.1.3  Fuse 
Sensors 
Taking many different sensor feeds and combining them to create a situational 
picture or sensor picture.  For example, an optical target could be correlated to an 
acoustic or radar target, thereby giving the type of target, and the course and 
speed of target.   
3.1.4  Share 
Sensor Picture 
The sending of the fused sensor picture to the collaborative network and other 
vehicles. 
3.2 Operate UVs The performance of operational activities by UVs in the battlespace.  Activities 
include navigation, planning, task execution, and reporting.  
3.2.1  Formulate 
Tactics 
Utilizing the artificial intelligence capabilities of UVs, the sensor picture from 
UVs, and inputs from C2 nodes, a tactical plan is formulated.  The tactical plan 
includes maneuver information, sensor usage, weapon usage, and other relevant 
tactical tasks for a given situation. 
3.2.2  Schedule 
and Allocate 
Tasks 
Given a tactical plan, the determination of specific tasks required to accomplish 
the plan.  The tasks are scheduled and allocated to different assets. 
 
3.2.3  Navigate 
and Execute 
Tasks 
Maneuver in a given environment and the carrying out of tasks. 
 
3.2.4  Report 
Position Status 
Provide the collaborative network and required operational assets updates on 
position and the status of the task completion.  This provides situational 





Identify elements of the UVs and required equipment that may hinder the 





Requests made by external nodes to interface with the network. 
Information 
Requests 




The confirmation sent to the external node by the Collaborative Network 
indicating that the request to join the network has been confirmed, thus 
establishing a network connection. 
Information 
Transmittal 
The sending of information that was requested of the network. 
UV Status The data detailing where a UV is operating, where it can be available to operate, 
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/Location and where it is in terms of tasking completion. 
Resources 
Available 
Data specifying resources available for UV operations.  For example, how much 
fuel is available to sustain UVs for a particular operation?  How many reserve 
UVs are available given casualties to UVs in the AO? 
Higher Command 
Data 
Orders and guidance sent by a command outside of the Collaborative Network. 
Operational 
Constraints 
Operational constraints include conditions that could hamper the C2 of UVs.  For 
example, emission control conditions, electronic warfare threats, air space 
management considerations, natural disaster considerations, and others. 
Communication 
Errors 
Failures in the communications between nodes in the system.  For example, this 
data would indicate a loss of communications to a UV. 
Collected Data Data that is received by a node in the C2 network. 
Secured Data Data that has been secured by the network. 
Organized Data Organized Data is the data which has been filtered, prioritized, and manipulated 
into an observable and understandable form. 
UV Control  Data 
(Telemetry) 
Automatic measurement and transmission of unmanned vehicle data by wire, 
radio, or other means from remote sources, as from unmanned aerial vehicles, to 
receiving stations for recording, analysis, and control purposes. 
Asset Availability An organized report specifying which UV's and other assets such as manned 
vehicles are available for specific mission. 
Communication 
Status 
An organized report specifying whether or not a UV or other communication 
asset has positive communication. 
Environmental 
Report 
An organized report displaying data input to the Collaborative Network that 
specifies environmental parameters such as temperature, barometric pressure, 
wind speed, and level of humidity. 
Friendly Force  
Report 
An organized report specifying the operational capability of the forces assigned 
to a particular commander.  This report can specify different levels of force 




Direction and orders input to the network from higher commands that alter the 




An organized display of limitations to a particular course of action or operational 
configuration.  Constraints include conditions that could hamper the C2 of UVs.  
For example, emissions control situations, electronic warfare threats, and kinetic 
threats from enemies. 
Threat Report An organized display of the threat or enemy. The report details the nature of the 
threat such as the platform type, number of enemy forces, weapon system 





An organized display of the resources required by internal nodes of the system. 
Observed Reports Reports  
that have been filtered by the network in the Manage Data function and are now 
observed in a manner that facilitates comprehension in the least amount of time 
possible. 
Force Picture The Force Picture assimilates the Observed Friendly Force Report, Observed 
Higher Command Guidance, Observed Limiting Constraints, Observed Asset 
Availability, Observed Resource Requirements, and Observed Communication 
Status.  The Force Picture provides the situation in a manner that allows follow-
on decision making. 
Environmental 
Picture 
A representation of the environmental situation, including parameters such as 
temperature, barometric pressure, wind speed, level of humidity,  in a manner 
that allows follow on decision making. (barometric pressure, wind speed, and 
level of humidity) 
Threat Picture A representation of the threat that allows follow on decision making. 
Mission Gap 
Picture 
The mission gap picture is the result of the Force Picture, Threat Picture, and 
Environmental Picture.  The threat is compared against the friendly forces in a 
given environment.  The result is the indication of whether what is expected to be 
happening is actually occurring.  This is a key element of the Control aspect of 
C2. 
COAs COAs that the commander developed to meet mission objectives.  A couple of 
feasible options are generally generated in order to decide which option is best 
through analysis   
Analyzed COAs COAs that have been assessed and analyzed for their time criticality.   
Selected COA The selected COA is the COA that the decision maker has chosen after weighing 
factors such as the gap between the desired state and the actual state, risk, and 
timing factors. 
Mission Tasking Mission tasking is direction specifying the selected course of action and 
associated orders to a particular node. 
Resource Orders Required assets, fuel, and support as dictated by the operational environment, 
friendly capability, and time criticality. 
UV Control 
Orders 
UV control orders are orders given by the C2 node indicating a particular action 
to be taken by a UV.  The level of control data will vary from a mission update to 
an autonomous UV to more consistent stream of control orders to less 
autonomous UVs. 
Observables Observables could be vibrations, electromagnetic radiation, acoustic waves, and 
many other observables.  These are sensed by UVs and this data is relayed to 
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TABLE 16.   FUNCTIONS AND INPUT/OUTPUTS DEFINITIONS. 
other UVs and the fused picture is relayed to the collaborative network. 
 C2 Information Information shared by C2 nodes from each stage of the OODA process in order 
to maximize the collaborative efforts of the network. 
UV Tactical Plan A plan detailing how the UVs will accomplish a particular mission.  For 
example, the plan could indicate which sectors different UVs will need to 
monitor while conducting a force protection mission. 
Tasking Order A Tasking Order gives specific direction to assets in order to execute a plan. 
UV Navigation/ 
Task Status 
The UV Navigation/ Task Status is an update on the navigational information 
such as location, course, and speed of the UV and the completion progress of the 
tasks it was assigned to complete. 
UV System Status The information which allows the assessment of the UVs operational status, 




Sensor data that is transmitted from one vehicle to other vehicles in order to 
enhance situational awareness. 
Shared Sensor 
Picture 
Shared Sensor Picture is sensor data that has been fused by the master UV and 
then shared to the C2 network.  A manned asset can also send sensor data.  The 
sensors could include any relevant mix such as IR, Optical, RADAR, SAR, 
Acoustic, Radiological, etc. 
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4.1.3.2. Provide C2 
Provide C2 is the function which commands and controls the operational 
UVs.  The model chosen to describe C2 is a modified Boyd’s’ OODA loop as discussed 
in Section 3.1.  C2 is defined as the means and methods by which the appropriate actions 
are taken. Feedback reveals the difference between intended outcomes and the situation 
as it develops.  Feedback thus allows the system elements to adapt to changing 
circumstances.  Control is a state the entire system achieves based on feedback about the 
developing situation.106 
The architecture products for Provide C2 are shown below in the same 
sequence as Manage UV Operations.  Figure 37. shows the hierarchy, Figure 38. shows 
the functional flow.  Table 17 and Figures 39. through Figure 46. show the input/output 
of each function. 
 
                                                 
106 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, October 2009. 
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Figure 37.   Provide C2 Hierarchy Diagram 
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Figure 37. is the functional decomposition of Provide C2.  Provide C2 is 
described using the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, of Boyd’s OODA loop with the 
addition of Share to Network.  The black squares located on the upper left hand corner of 
the level three functions indicate that the level three functions are broken down to a 
further level as shown in Table 17.  The next several paragraphs detail the hierarchy of 
Provide C2 by defining each function and explaining the functional decomposition. 
Observe entails watching the operational situation carefully taking into 
account details of a situation.  The main goal of this process is to be able to handle 
enough information to make sound judgments regarding an operational situation.  
Observe is decomposed by Monitor the Situation. Monitor the Situation allows the 
commander to obtain information on the mission, enemy forces, neutral/non-combatants, 
friendly forces, terrain, and weather.  Monitor the Situation is decomposed by Monitor 
Internal Factors and Monitor External Factors.  Monitoring Internal Factors involves 
identifying and considering force readiness, including assets available, asset operational 
status, communication status, and resource requirements.  Monitoring External Factors 
involves identifying and considering elements external to the system.  Examples include 
weather factors, enemy activities, limits on electromagnetic radiation, and guidance from 
higher commands. 
Orient allows the commander to acquaint with the current situation and 
environment.  The goal of Orient is to compare mission criteria to the current situation 
and identify ways to ensure the mission is being accomplished.  Orient is decomposed by 
Understand the Situation and Identify Mission Success Gap. 
Understand the Situation involves becoming familiar with the current 
situation and environment.  Understand the Situation is decomposed by Assess Friendly 
Capability, Assess Threat, and Analyze Environment.  Assess Friendly Capability is the 
identification of the capabilities that the friendly forces can employ in a situation.  For 
example, are there enough UVs to conduct effective surveillance of an operational area?  
Assess Threat involves the identification, classification, and evaluation of a threat posed 
to friendly assets and areas.  Analyze Environment takes into account the physical 
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environment and the effects on the UV missions, for example, barometric pressure, 
temperature, humidity, visibility, salinity of water, and wind. 
Identify Mission Success Gap identifies the gap between the desired state 
and the current situation. 
Decide is to make a final choice on a course of action (COA).  Decide is 
decomposed into Determine COA.  Determine COA includes the actions involved in 
choosing a COA.  Determine COAs is decomposed into Develop COAs and Analyze 
COAs.  Develop COAs involves the development of a couple of alternative solutions to 
the impending problem.  Analyze COAs involves taking the nominative COAs and 
weighing these COAs against the criteria of risk and timing.  Analyze COAs is 
decomposed further into include Assess Risk, and Analyze Timing, and Select COA.  
Assess Risk involves the analysis of COAs with a comparison against possible enemy 
courses of action. The analysis takes into account mission criteria and limitations.  
Analyze Timing is to understand how fast a decision and action must be rendered.  Less 
time critical events allow more analysis where time critical events require very rapid 
decision making and subsequent action.  The final process of Decide is Select COA.  
Select COA is to determine COAs that best meets mission objectives, while minimizing 
risk when appropriate. 
Act is where the decision maker puts the decision into action, which may 
involve disseminating the decision to others for execution, supervising that execution, 
and monitoring results through feedback.  The Collaborative Network concept envisions 
the immediate dissemination of dynamic plans across the entire network, to any node or 
echelon desired.  These plans would update automatically in near real time, decreasing 
the need to publish changes and eliminating the time required to do it.  Act is 
decomposed by Command Assets which is further decomposed into Assign Missions, 
Direct UVs, and Provide Resources. 
Command Assets is the exercise of authority, including assigning 
missions, directing UVs, and providing resources.  Command Assets is decomposed to 
Assign Mission, Direct UVs, and Provide Resources.  Assign Mission is what is done 
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autonomously or by the commander or representative of the commander after an analysis 
and decision are rendered, the system must be able to process the decision and give 
mission tasking to required assets.  Direct UV’s includes the control of UVs.  Unmanned 
vehicles must be directed as required given UV level of autonomy.  The level of 
autonomy of the UV will vary given the particular mission and environment; thus the 
system must be able to direct UVs in low to high autonomy situations.  Provide 
Resources is the providing of required assets, fuel, and support as dictated by the 
operational environment, friendly capability, and time criticality. 
Share to Network is the final sub function of Provide C2.  Share to 
Network  is the passing of C2 node information to the Collaborative Network in order to 
enhance collaboration.  Sharing information to the network is critical in terms of enabling 
effective knowledge sharing and unity of effort amongst operation units in a battlespace. 
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Figure 38.   Provide C2 FFBD 
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Figure 38. is the FFBD for Provide C2.  The diagram shows that the 
functions OODA and Share to Network happen in parallel and in a continuous loop while 
the system is in operational mode.  The logic for placing the OODA steps in concert with 
Share to Network is to enable the sharing of information to the Collaborative Network at 
each stage of the OODA loop.  For example, in a force protection mission, the 
commander receives information from unmanned vehicles that are in the Collaborative 
Network.  The commander observes a Threat Report and the system communicates that 
the report has been observed.  The Observed Threat Report is then moved in to the Orient 
step where the commander gains an understanding of the situation and determines what 
needs to be done.  The commander’s assessment from the Orient step is shared to the 
Collaborative Network in order to enhance other units’ situational awareness.  The same 
sharing occurs after a COA is determined in the Decide function.  If there is a problem 
during in accomplishing the COA during the Act function, such as the C2 node being 
destroyed, another unit could assume command of the assets because there is a shared 
understanding of the problem. 
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Table 17 provides a tabular representation of the inputs and outputs to 
Provide C2.  This table will assist the understanding of the subsequent item flow 
diagrams. 
INPUT FUNCTION OUTPUT 




Higher Command Guidance 
Friendly Force Report 
Environmental Report 








Higher Command Guidance 




Observed Reports consisting of:   
Observed Threat Report 
Observed.Resource Requirements 
Observed Limiting Constraints 
Observed Higher Command 
Guidance 
Observed Friendly Force Report 




Higher Command Guidance 
Friendly Force Report 
Environmental Report 
 
1.1.1  Monitor Situation 
Observed Threat Report 
Observed Resource Requirements 
Observed Limiting Constraints 
Observed Higher Command 
Guidance 
Observed Friendly Force Report 
Observed Environmental Report  
 
Resource Requirements 
Friendly Force Report 
1.1.1.1 Monitor Internal 
Environment 
Observed Resource Requirements 
Observed Friendly Force Report 
Threat Report 
Limiting Constraints 
Higher Command Guidance 
Environment Report 
1.1.1.2  Monitor External 
Environment 
Observed Threat Report 
Observed Limiting Constraints 
Observed Higher Command 
Guidance 
Observed Environmental Report 
Observed Reports 1.2 Orient Force Picture Mission Gap Picture 
Observed Reports 




Observed Resource Requirements 
Observed Friendly Force Report 
Observed Limiting Constraints 
Observed Higher Command 
Guidance 
Observed Communication Status 
Observed Asset Availability 
 
1.2.1.1 Assess Friendly 
Capability 
Force Picture 
Observed Threat Report 1.2.1.2  Assess Threat  Threat Picture 
Observed Environmental Report 1.2.1.3  Analyze Environment Environmental Picture 
Threat Picture 1.2.2  Identify Mission Success Mission Gap Picture 
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TABLE 17.   PROVIDE C2 INPUT/OUTPUT. 
The next several figures, Figures 39. through Figure 46., depict the 
information flows of the sub functions of Provide C2.  These diagrams are intended to 
present a visual representation with corresponding discussion of the information found in 
Table 17. 
Figure 39. shows the information flow for the Monitor Situation, which is 
a sub function of Observe.  Monitor Situation is decomposed by Monitor Internal Factors 
and Monitor External Factors.  The inputs to Monitor Internal Factors are Friendly Force 
Report and Resource Requirements.  The Friendly Force Report is an organized report 
specifying the operational capability of the forces assigned to a particular commander.  
This report can specify different levels of force readiness, such as forces available for a 
specific tactical engagement or an operational campaign.  Resource Requirements is an 




Mission Gap Picture 1.3 Decide Selected COA 
Mission Gap Picture 1.3.1 Determine COA Selected COA 
Mission Gap Picture 1.3.1.1  Develop COAs COAs 
COAs 1.3.1.2  Analyze COAs Analyzed COAs 
Analyzed COAs 1.3.1.2.1  Assess Risk Risk Assessed COAs 
Risk Assessed COAs 1.3.1.2.2 Analyze Timing Analyzed COAs 
Analyzed COAs 1.3.1.3 Select COA Selected COA 
Selected COA 
UV Control Data (Telemetry) 
Force Picture 
1.4  Act 
Mission Tasking 
UV Control Orders 
Resource Orders 
UV Control Data (Telemetry) 
Selected COA 
Force Picture 
1.4.1  Command Assets 
UV Control Order 
Mission Tasking 
Resource Orders 
Selected COA 1.4.1.1 Assign Mission Mission Tasking 
UV Control Data (Telemetry) 1.4.1.2 Direct UVs UV Control Order 
Force Picture 1.4.1.3 Provide Resources Resource Orders 
Selected COA 
Observed Reports 








Figure 39.   Monitor System Item Flow 
The inputs to Monitor External Requirements are: Environmental Report, 
Higher Command Guidance, Limiting Constraints, and Threat Report.  The 
Environmental Report is an organized report displaying data input to the Collaborative 
Network that specifies environmental parameters such as temperature, barometric 
pressure, wind speed, and level of humidity.  Higher Command Guidance contains orders 
and direction input to the network from higher commands that alter the command and 
control of the systems.  Limiting Constraints are an organized display of limitations to a 
particular course of action or operational configuration.  Constraints include conditions 
that could hamper the C2 of UVs.  For example, emissions control situations, electronic 
warfare threats, and kinetic threats from enemies.  The Threat Report is an organized 
display of the threat or enemy.  The report details the nature of the threat such as the 
platform type, number of enemy forces, weapon system characteristics, any hostile 
actions, and tracking, targeting information. 
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The outputs of Monitor Internal Factors and Monitor External Factors are 
Observed Reports, which are reports that have been filtered by the network in the 
Manage Data function and are now observed in a manner that facilitates comprehension 
in the least amount of time possible.  Observed Reports is an overarching term that 
represents: Observed Friendly Force Report, Observed Resource Requirements, Observed 
Environmental Report, Observed Higher Command Guidance, Observed Limiting 
Constraints, and Observed Threat Report.  Each of these Observed Reports are vital 
inputs to the Orient function. 
 
Figure 40.   Orient Item Flow 
Figure 40. details the item flow to Orient.  Orient is broken down to two 
sub functions, Understand Situation and Identify Mission Success Gap.  Understand the 
Situation is broken down into its sub functions and analyzed in more detail in Figure 41.  
The inputs to Understand Situation are the Observed Reports as discussed in the previous 
discussion on Monitor the Situation’s Item Flow.  The outputs from Understand Situation 
are:  Environmental Picture, Force Picture, and Threat Picture.  Environmental Picture is 
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a representation of the environmental situation, including parameters such as temperature, 
barometric pressure, wind speed, level of humidity,  in a manner that allows follow on 
decision making.  The Force Picture assimilates the Observed Friendly Force Report, 
Observed Higher Command Guidance, Observed Limiting Constraints, Observed Asset 
Availability, Observed Resource Requirements, and Observed Communication Status.  
The Force Picture provides the situation in a manner that allows follow on decision 
making.  The Force Picture provides the situation in a manner that allows follow on 
decision making.  The Force Picture is output to both Identify Mission Success Gap 
under the Orient function and to Command Assets under the Act function to assist the 
commander in directing forces.  The Threat Picture is a representation of the threat that 
allows follow on decision making. 
The outputs from Understand Situation are inputs to Identify Mission 
Success Gap.  Identify Mission Success Gap’s output is the Mission Gap Picture.  The 
Mission Gap Picture is the result of the transformation of the Force Picture, Threat 
Picture, and Environmental Picture.  The threat is compared against the friendly forces in 
a given environment.  The desired state is also compared to what is actually occurring in 
the battlespace.  The result is the indication of whether what is expected to be happening 




Figure 41.   Understand Situation Item Flow 
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Figure 41. decomposes Understand Situation into the sub functions:  
Assess Friendly Capability, Assess Threat, and Analyze Environment.  The inputs to 
Assess Friendly Capability are:  Observed Friendly Force Report, Observed Limiting 
Constraints, Observed Command Guidance, Observed Communication Status, Observed 
Asset Availability, Observed Resource Requirements, and Observed Reports.  As 
discussed in Monitor Situation’s item flow (Figure 39.) discussion, the Observed Reports 
are reports that have been transformed in the Observe function.  The output from Assess 
Friendly Capability is the Friendly Force Picture.  The output from Assess Threat is the 
Threat Picture.  The output from Analyze Environment is the Environmental Picture.  
The definitions of each of these outputs were described in Orient’s item flow (Figure 40.) 
discussion. 
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Figure 42. shows Decide’s sub function, which is Determine COA.  
Determine the COA is further broken down and defined in Figure 43.  The input to 
Decide is the Mission Gap Picture, which was an output from Orient.  The Mission Gap 
Picture allows the determination of the COA by showing what areas to focus on.  Upon 
completing the Decide function, a Selected COA is output from the Decide function.  The 
Selected COA is the COA that the decision maker has chosen after weighing factors such 
as the gap between the desired state and the actual state, risk, and timing factors. 
 
 




Figure 43.   Determine COA Item Flow 
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Figure 43. shows the decomposition of Determine COA.  Determine COA 
is decomposed by: Develop COA, Analyze COA, and Select COA.  Figure 44. will 
further decompose Analyze COA. The input to Develop COA is the Mission Gap Picture 
which was discussed previously in Figure 40.’s discussion.  Develop COA outputs are the 
different COAs that the commander developed to meet mission objectives. The candidate 
COAs are then input to Analyze COA, which takes the nominative COAs and weighing 
these COAs against the criteria of risk and timing.  The outputs are the Analyzed COAs 
which are input to Select COA.  In this function, a final COA is chosen which the 
commander feels will give the highest probability of success given the limitations and 
resources the commander is faced with.  The output from Decide is the Selected COA 
which is the COA that the decision maker has chosen after weighing factors such as the 
gap between the desired state and the actual state, risk, and timing factors. 
 
Figure 44.   Analyze COA Item Flow. 
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Figure 44. is the decomposition of function Analyze COA. The inputs to 
this function are the candidate COAs which were generated in the Develop COA 
function.  The COAs are risk assessed where possible enemy courses of action and 
reactions are taken into account.  Also, such items as mission criteria, limitations, and 
time criticality were considered.  The resulting outputs are the Risk Assessed COAs 
which are then specifically analyzed for timing considerations in the function Analyze 
Timing.  During Analyze Timing, the commander assesses how fast a decision and action 
must be rendered.  Less time critical events allow more analysis where time critical 
events require very rapid decision making and subsequent action.  The resulting outputs 
are the Analyzed COAs as discussed in terms of risk and timing analysis in the discussion 
on Figure 43. 
 
Figure 45.   Act Item Flow 
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Figure 45. shows the item flow for the Act function.  Act is decomposed 
by the function Command Assets which are decomposed further in Figure 46.  The inputs 
to Command Assets are:  Selected COA, UV Control Data (Telemetry) and the Force 
Picture.  Selected COA is the chosen COA as discussed in Figure 43.’s discussion.  UV 
Control Data (Telemetry) is output from UVs operating in the environment and is the 
automatic measurement and transmission of unmanned vehicle data by wire, radio, or 
other means from remote sources, as from unmanned aerial vehicles, to receiving stations 
for recording, analysis, and control purposes.  The Force Picture assimilates the observed 
friendly force report, observed higher command guidance, observed limiting constraints, 
observed asset availability, observed resource requirements, and observed 
communication status.  The intent of the Force Picture is to enhance the director of the 
unmanned vehicles situational awareness. 
The outputs from Command Assets are UV Control Orders, Resource 
Orders, and Mission Tasking.  UV Control Orders are an order given by the C2 network 
indicating a particular action to be taken by a UV.  The level of control data will vary 
from a mission update to an autonomous UV to more consistent stream of control orders 
to less autonomous UVs.  Resource orders are orders which provide resources operating 
assets.  An example of a resource order would be to direct a refueling asset to refuel a 
UAV or direct another UAV to replace a UAV needing to leave a surveillance post.  
Mission Tasking is the issuing of the selected course of action and associated orders to a 
particular node.  For example, C2 may order a UUV to detonate an identified underwater 
mine, or other similar task. 
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Figure 46.   Command Asset Item Flow 
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Figure 46. is the decomposition of Command Assets.  Command Assets is 
broken down into Assign Mission, Direct UVs, and Provide Resources.  The definitions 
of these sub functions are found in the discussion under Figure 43.’s discussion.  The 
input and output definitions are the same as discussed under Figure 45.’s discussion. 
4.1.3.3. Collaborate 
Collaboration is vital to achieving a shared situational awareness.   Below 
are the architectural products of the function Collaborate.  Figure 47. illustrates the 
hierarchical structure and Figure 48. depicts the functional flow.  Table 18, Figure 49. 
and Figure 50. represent the input/output of each function. 
 
Figure 47.   Collaborate Hierarchy 
Figure 47. is the functional decomposition of Collaborate.  Collaborate is 
decomposed into four functions:  Operate in Network, Manage Data, Collect Data, and 
Secure Network. 
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Operate in Network is the ability to exploit all human and technical 
elements of the force and its mission partners by fully integrating collected information, 
experience, knowledge, and decision making via a collaborative network. 107  Data and 
information are securely shared via the network, enhancing each individual node's 
awareness.  The network will connect all nodes including UVs that conduct operations, 
manned assets and C2 nodes that provide the Command and Control to operational assets.  
The goal is a seamless integration between manned and unmanned assets across all 
domains with the appropriate C2 node.  Operate in Network is further broken down to 
Establish Capability Interface.  Establish Capability Interface is the sharing of needed 
operational information when information is entered via a user capability interface or 
through a sensor transduction capability interface. 
Manage Data ensures, given information, that decision makers have ready 
access to the information they want and need while minimizing the risk of information 
overload.  Manage Data is decomposed into two sub functions: Organize Data and Share 
Data.  Organize Data is the filtering, prioritizing, and manipulating to present observable 
reports.  The goal is to present information to C2 nodes that is useful and manageable, not 
overwhelming.  Share data is the uploading of information to a collaborative network in 
order to increase each internal operational node's understanding of the situation and also 
to inform external stakeholders that interface with the network. 
Collect data is the receiving of information from all necessary internal 
system nodes such as UVs, manned vehicles, and C2 centers, as well as required data 
from external agencies. 
Secure network is the function which ensures information assurance. 
Information in the operational nodes and network must be protected from information 
attacks by hackers and enemies. 
                                                 
107 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated 










































Figure 48.   Collaborate FFBD 
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Figure 48. is the FFBD for Collaborate.  The figure illustrates that Operate 
in Network occurs concurrently with Secure Network.  The network must be secured at 
all times while the system is in operation.  The figure also shows that Collect Data and 
Manage Data occur in parallel.  The system must be able to receive data and filter data at 
the same time. 
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Table 18 provides a tabular representation of the inputs to and outputs 
from Collaborate.  This table will assist the understanding of the subsequent item flow 
diagrams. 
TABLE 18.   COLLABORATE INPUT/OUTPUT. 
 
INPUT FUNCTION OUTPUT 










Shared Sensor Picture 
2  Collaborate 
Join Network Confirmations 
Information Transmittal 
Environmental Report 
Friendly Force Report 




Join Network Requests 2.1 Operate In Network Join Network Confirmations 
Join Network Requests 2.1.1 Establish Capability Interface Join Network Confirmations 
Secured Data 
Information Requests 
2.2 Manage Data 
Environmental Reports 
Friendly Force Report 





Secured Data 2.2.1 Organize Data Organized Data 
Organized Data 
Information Requests 
2.2.2 Share Data 
Environmental Reports 
Friendly Force Report 






Shared Sensor Picture 
Resources Available 
Operational Constraints 





2.3 Collect Data 
Collected Data 








































Figure 49.   Collaborate Item Flow 
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Figure 49. displays the item flow for the Collaborate function.  The first 
point of discussion are the two inputs that do not go directly to collect data.  Join 
Network Requests are requests made by external nodes to interface with the network. The 
requests are processed in the function Operate in Network through the sub function 
Establish Capability Interface.  If the request is verified and approved, the function 
outputs Join Network Confirmations.  Information Requests are specific requests by 
entities that have established an interface for information contained in the network.  The 
request is processed by the Manage Data function where the request is processed and a 
request is sent via the output Information Transmittal. 
The majority of the inputs to the system flow into the Collect Data 
function. The inputs to Collect Data are:  Operational Constraints, Resources Available, 
Shared Sensor Picture, UV Status/Location, Asset Availability, C2 Information, 
Communication Errors, Communication Status, and Higher Command Data.  Operational 
constraints include conditions that could hamper the C2 of UVs and manned assets.  For 
example, emission control conditions, electronic warfare threats, air space management 
considerations, natural disaster considerations, and others.  Resources Available is data 
specifying resources available for operations.  For example, how much fuel is available to 
sustain UVs for a particular operation?  How many reserve UVs are available given 
casualties to UVs in the AO?  Shared Sensor Picture is sensor data that has been fused by 
the master UV and then shared to the C2 network.  A manned asset can also send sensor 
data.  The sensors could include any relevant mix such as IR, Optical, Radar, Synthetic 
Aperture Radar, or Acoustic.  UV Status/Location is the data detailing where a UV is 
operating, where it can be available to operate, and where it is in terms of tasking 
completion.  Similar data is collected for manned assets operating in the environment.  
Asset Availability is an organized report specifying which UV's and other assets such as 
manned vehicles are available for specific mission.  C2 Information is information shared 
by C2 nodes from each stage of the OODA process in order to maximize the 
collaborative efforts of the network.  Communication Errors are failures in the 
communications between nodes in the system.  For example, this data would indicate a 
loss of communications to a UV.  The Communication Status is an organized report 
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specifying whether or not a UV or other communication asset has positive 
communication.  Higher Command Data orders and guidance sent by a command outside 
of the Collaborative Network. 
The output from the Collect function is summarized by Collected Data, 
which is all the data that is collected by the Collect function.  This Collected Data is input 
to the function Secure Network where the data is protected from exploitation by hackers 
and other enemies.  The Secured Data is then sent to Manage Data.  Manage Data 
transforms the Secured Data into several outputs including:  Higher Command Guidance, 
Friendly Force Report, Environmental Report, Threat Report, Resource Requirements, 
Limiting Constraints, and Information Transmittals.  All of these outputs, except for 
Information Transmittals, are inputs to the Observe function and were described in the 
description of Figure 40.  Information Transmittals were described earlier in this 
description of Figure 49. 
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Figure 50.   Manage Data Item Flow 
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Figure 50. is the item flow illustration for the functions which decompose 
Manage Data.  All of the inputs and outputs have been discussed previously with the 
exception of the output Organized Data.  Organized Data is the data which has been 
filtered, prioritized, and manipulated into an observable and understandable form.  The 
goal of the Organized Data is to present information to C2 nodes that is useful and 
manageable, not overwhelming.  Share data is the uploading of information to a 
collaborative network in order to increase each internal operational node's understanding 
of the situation and also to inform external stakeholders that interface with the network. 
4.1.3.4. Conduct UV Operations 
Conduct UV Operations entails the mission accomplishment that is carried 
out by unmanned vehicles and other assets in the battlespace, such as manned vehicles.  
This functional breakdown will focus on the UVs, however, the information exchange 
between UVs and manned vehicles is a critical component and are discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.2.  The concept of operations envisions the UVs as operating with one 
UV as a “Master” and the other UVs as the “Subordinates.”  The master UV 
communicates with the subordinate UVs and also communicates with the Collaborative 
Network.  Each UV can assume the role as master if the current master is unable to 
perform the role.  The “Master” and “Subordinate” role is discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.2. 
Below are the architectural products for the function Conduct UV 
Operations.  Figure 51. will shows the hierarchy, Figure 52. shows the functional flow.  




Figure 51.   Conduct UV Operations Hierarchy 
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Figure 51. shows the functional decomposition of Conduct UV 
Operations.  This function is broken down to two primary sub functions, Operate Sensors 
and Operate UVs. 
Operate Sensors is the utilization of sensors onboard UVs, such as optical, 
infrared, acoustic, weather reading, RADAR, temperature, other sensors that are utilized 
by vehicles.  Operate Sensors is decomposed by: Sense Environment, Share Raw Sensor 
Data, Fuse Sensors, and Share Sensor Picture.  Sense Environment is the identifying, 
reading, and exploiting of observables in the environment.  Observables could be 
vibrations, electromagnetic radiation, acoustic waves, and many other forms of stimuli.  
Share Raw Sensor Data is the sending of sensor data to other vehicles in the vicinity for 
greater situational awareness amongst operational nodes.  These other vehicles could be 
other UVs or manned vehicles.  Fuse Sensors is the combining of many different sensor 
feeds to create a situational picture or sensor picture.  For example, an optical feed of a 
target from a UV could be correlated to an acoustic or RADAR target from a UV or 
manned vehicle, thereby giving the type of target, and the course and speed of target. 
Share Sensor Picture is the communication of the fused sensor picture to 
the collaborative network and other vehicles.  The objective of the Operate Sensors and 
its sub functions is to create a shared awareness of the operational environment that can 
be acted upon. 
Operate UVs is the performance of operational activities by UVs in the 
battlespace.  Activities include navigation, planning, task execution, and reporting.  
Operate UVs is decomposed to:  Formulate Tactics, Schedule and Allocate Tasks, 
Navigate and Execute Tasks, Report Position Status, and Assess and Report Operational 
Availability.  Formulate Tactics utilizes the artificial intelligence capabilities of UVs, the 
sensor picture from UVs, and inputs from C2 nodes, to formulate a tactical plan.  The 
tactical plan includes maneuver information, sensor usage, weapon usage, and other 
relevant tactical tasks for a given situation.  Schedule and Allocate Tasks is, given a 
tactical plan, the determination of specific tasks required to accomplish the plan.  The 
tasks are scheduled and allocated to different assets.  Navigate and Execute Tasks is the 
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actual maneuvering in a given environment and the carrying out of tasks such as 
surveillance.  Report Position Status is the sharing to the collaborative network and 
required operational assets updates on position and task status.  This provides situational 
awareness to the nodes in the network.  Assess and Report Operational Availability is the 
identification of potential problems with the UVs and other equipment and asset that may 
hinder operational availability.  These functions accomplish the required missions and 

































(University) Conduct UV Operations
  
Figure 52.   Conduct UV Operations FFBD 
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Figure 52. illustrates that functions Operate Sensors and Operate UVs 
occur in parallel.  The sensor suites could be collocated with the UV, thus both functions 
will occur concurrently.  In order to operate UVs to conduct military missions, the use of 
sensors are almost always required.  For example, a UV conducting a surveillance 
mission sends sensor data such as video feeds to required C2 nodes. 
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Table 19 provides a tabular representation of the inputs to and outputs 
from Conduct UV Operations.  This table will assist the understanding of the subsequent 
item flow diagrams. 
TABLE 19.   CONDUCT UV OPERATIONS INPUT/OUTPUT. 
INPUT FUNCTION OUTPUT 











Shared Sensor Picture 
UV Control Data (Telemetry) 
UV Status/Location 
Observables 3.1 Operate Sensors Shared Sensor Data Shared Sensor Picture 
Observables  3.1.1 Sense Environment Sensor Data 
Sensor Data 3.1.2 Share Raw Sensor Data Shared Sensor Data 
Sensor Data 3.1.3 Fuse Sensors Sensor Picture 
Sensor Picture 3.1.4 Share Sensor Picture Shared Sensor Picture 
UV Control Order 
Shared Sensor Picture 
Shared Sensor Data 
Resource Orders 
Mission Tasking 





UV Control Data  
UV Status/Location 
UV Control Order 
Shared Sensor Picture 
Shared Sensor Data 
Resource Orders 
Mission Tasking 
3.2.1 Formulate Tactics 
UV Tactical Plan 
UV Tactical Plan 3.2.2 Schedule and Allocate Tasks Tasking Order 
 
UV Control Order 
Tasking Order 
 
3.2.3 Navigate/Execute Task 
UV Navigation/Task Status 
UV Navigation Task Status 
3.2.4 Report Position/Status 
UV Control Data (Telemetry) 
UV Status/Location 
UV System Data 
UV System Data 







Figure 53. illustrates the information item flow into and out of the sub 
functions of Conduct UV Operations.  Observables are input to Operate Sensors.  
Observables could be vibrations, electromagnetic radiation, acoustic waves, and many 
other stimuli.  These stimuli are sensed by UVs and this data is relayed to other UVs or 
manned vehicles as Shared Sensor Data.  Shared Sensor Data and Shared Sensor Picture 
are outputs of Operate Sensors.  Shared Sensor Data is sensor data that is transmitted 
from one vehicle to other vehicles in order to enhance situational awareness.  Shared 
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Figure 53.   Conduct UV Operations Item Flow 
 
The inputs to Operate UVs are Mission Tasking, Resource Orders, and 
UV Control Orders, as well as the previously mentioned Sensor Data.  Mission Tasking is 
an input from a C2 node.  Mission tasking is direction specifying the selected course of 
action and associated orders to a particular node.  Resource Orders required assets, fuel, 
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and support as dictated by the operational environment, friendly capability, and time 
criticality.  UV control orders are orders given by the C2 node indicating a particular 
action to be taken by a UV.  The level of control data will vary from a mission update to 
an autonomous UV to more consistent stream of control orders to less autonomous UVs. 
The outputs of Operate UVs were defined in Figure 49.’s discussion of the 
Collaborative Network item flow. 
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Figure 54.   Operate Sensors Item Flow 
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Figure 54. is a more detailed view of Operate Sensor’s item flow.  All of the items 
and functions have been previously defined.  This figure shows that after Observables are 
transformed by Sense Environment, the Sensor Data enters the functions Share Raw Sensor Data 
and Fuse Sensors.  Shared Raw Sensor Data’s output is Shared Sensor Data which is sent to 
other operational vehicles to enhance their situational awareness.  The output from Fuse Sensors 




Figure 55.   Operate UV Item Flow 
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Figure 55. shows a more detailed breakdown of Operate UV’s item flow.  
The input UV Control Order is input to both Formulate Tactics and Navigate/Execute 
Task.  The UV Control Order provides the Formulate Tactics function an indication of 
where and what the UVs are doing.  The UV Control Order is the C2 node’s direction for 
the UV.  The level of detail of the order will vary based on the level of autonomy of the 
UV.  The output from Formulate Tactics is the UV Tactical Plan, which is a plan 
detailing how the UVs will accomplish a particular mission.  For example, the plan could 
indicate which sectors different UVs will need to monitor while conducting a force 
protection mission.  The UV Tactical Plan is the input for Schedule and Allocate Tasks.  
The output from Schedule and Allocate Tasks is the Tasking Order which gives specific 
direction to assets in order to execute a plan.  For example, the order would assign a 
specific location for a UV to proceed to.  The Tasking Order is the input for 
Navigate/Execute Task which results in the output UV Navigation/Task Status.  The UV 
Navigation/ Task Status is an update on the navigational information such as location, 
course, and speed of the UV and the completion progress of the tasks it was assigned to 
complete.  The UV Navigation/Task Status is input to Report Position/Status.  The 
outputs of Report Position/Status are the UV System Data, UV Status/Location, and UV 
Control Data (Telemetry).  UV Status/Location and UV Control Data (Telemetry) were 
discussed earlier when discussing inputs to the Collect sub function of Collaborate.  UV 
System Data is input to Assess/Report Operational Availability and is the information 
which allows the assessment of the UVs operational status, including communication 
status, communication errors, resource levels, and asset availability.  The outputs of 
Assess/Report Operational Availability were defined earlier as inputs to the Collect sub 
function of Collaborate.  Assess/Report Operational Availability’s outputs assist in the 
C2 nodes’ understanding of what the operational assets level of readiness and resource 
requirements. 
4.1.3.5. Functional Measures of Effectiveness 
Table 20 shows each function’s MOE and unit of measure.  The MOE is a 
measure of successful performance of a function.  The performance of the function 
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should contribute to overall mission performance. The units of measure are specific ways 
that the MOEs are evaluated, such as percentages, seconds, and numerical values.  




Function MOEs Units of Measure 
1 Provide C2   
Link/communications 
(comms) availability 
Percent comms availability 




Percent info availability 
(lowest comms availability of 




to identification to 
availability of 
information on 
network  (time target 
information is 
uploaded on network – 
time detected)] 
Seconds 
Capability of sense 




considerations for HFE 
in interface design, 
etc.) 
Percent target correlated 
(targets correlated / total 
target tracks) 
1.2 Orient 
Capability of analysis 




Percent correct estimate 
(correct predicted situation / 
updated situation) 
Competency of 
decision makers in 
setting/formulation of 
clear goals/objectives 
Percentage of orders issued 




Ability to propose 
COAs that improve 
situation which is 
difference between 
desired state and actual 
state 
Numerical scale (i.e. 5 equals 












OA (possibly computer 



































Percentage of COAs that 












 comms availability  
(network uptime / total 
operation time)  
 
Operator competency Numerical scale (i.e. 5 equals 
high competency, 1 equals 
low competency) 
1.4 Act 
Clarity of mission, 
clarity of 
goals/objectives 
Mission accomplishment rate 
(successful missions / total 
missions) 
1.5 Share to  Network Link/comms 
availability 
Percent comms availability 
(network uptime / total 
operation time) 
2 Collaborate   
2.1 Operate in  Network Link/comms 
availability 
Percent comms availability 




Percent info availability 
(lowest comms availability of 
all network nodes) 




2.3 Collect Data Ease of 
storage/retrieval of 
data (HMI design 
issue) 
Numerical scale (i.e. 5 equals 
simple, 1 equals difficult) 
Security policies set in 
place 
Percentage of successful 
attacks (successful 
attacks/total attacks) 
2.4 Secure Network 
Number of network 
attacks (time 
normalized) 
Number of outages per time 
period (e.g. per month) 
3 Conduct UV Operations   
3.1 Operate Sensors Operator competency  
 
Numerical scale (i.e. 5 equals 
high competency, 1 equals 
low competency) 
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TABLE 20.   FUNCTIONAL MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS. 
Number of targets 
detected 
False target rate (Wrong 





Mission accomplishment rate 




Sensor availability (sensor 




Sensor failures per sensors 
operating 
Asset availability UV availability (asset 




Defect repair time Seconds 
Defect rate Defects per unit time, e.g. per 
100,000 operational hours 
3.2 Operate UVs 
Ground crew 
competency (in 
identifying and fixing 
defects) 
Numerical scale (i.e. 5 equals 
high competency, 1 equals 
low competency) 
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4.2. COMMAND AND CONTROL ARCHITECTURE 
4.2.1. C2 Architecture Considerations in Unmanned Platform 
Unmanned platforms are “edge entities” within the Global Information Grid. On 
its own, it possesses knowledge of local situational awareness and contributes to mission 
objectives in a known and pre-established manner.  According to Network Centric 
Warfare principles, this knowledge can be disseminated to a robustly networked force to 
realize the benefits of Metcalfe’s Law108.  There are a number of challenges to fully 
realizing such a concept. This section highlights key considerations in formulating a 
Command and Control (C2) architecture for supporting unmanned vehicles and its 
operations. 
In most organizations, it is generally difficult to realize Gilder’s Law109 without 
significant infrastructural investments.  This is especially true for tactical 
communications in the field where it is infeasible to upgrade equipments on a frequent 
basis.  As such, other alternatives need to be considered to better utilize the bandwidth. 
One potential alternative is the use of a cognitive radio that is able to alter its 
transmission and reception parameters in response to environmental factors for effective 
communication.  Most unmanned platforms also have power constraints that limit 
sustainability and thus, the use of energy efficient waveforms via software defined radio 
is a potential research area. 
Another candidate for improving bandwidth utilization is through the 
development of a Tactical IP communications protocol. This should be interoperable with 
traditional TCP/IP for communication to platforms on fixed infrastructure.  Traditional 
TCP/IP protocol assumes a relatively stable networking environment with low latency.  
Hence, it tends to have high overheads (e.g. TCP 3-way handshake) and is generally not 
optimized for low bandwidth tactical communications.  The new protocol should be 
developed to incorporate security mechanisms right from the start that limit identity 
spoofing, data modification and other attacks on confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
These concepts were previously discussed in Section 3.5.2. 
                                                 
108 Metcalfe's Law states that the value of a network is proportional to the square of the number of nodes in the network. 
109 Gilder's Law states that the total bandwidth of communication systems triples every 12 months. 
  177
Having a networked force is insufficient to realize the benefits of Metcalfe’s Law 
unless they are able to communicate with one another effectively.  A set of common data 
standards is needed to facilitate interoperability among the disparate C2 systems. There 
are two levels to interoperability: 
At the syntactic level: 
• All systems shall adopt standardized data & messaging formats.  With a 
set of normalized schema, it eliminates the need to perform data 
conversion (and thus, no loss of accuracy or granularity) during inter-C2 
exchanges. 
• Data shall be tagged to indicate sensitivity and integrity markings.  Hosts 
are to support the common use of digital signatures and cryptographic 
algorithms. 
• All systems shall adopt an IP-based protocol.  This reduces the need for 
dedicated gateway nodes for bridging communications and hence, 
resulting in faster OODA cycle. 
At the semantic level: 
• This refers to systems having the ability to interpret exchanged 
information in a meaningful and accurate manner.  To accomplish 
this, it is essential to have an information exchange reference 
model where information exchange requests are unambiguously 
defined. 
• Inadvertently, this information exchange is often tied to doctrinal 
and operational procedures and it may be relevant to assess 
whether they should be further refined. 
After the C2 systems are able to communicate with one another, they need a 
mechanism to facilitate sense making.  This may be accomplished by having a common 
operating picture that can be achieved by aggregating information from various 
networked sensors and presenting them in a cognitive manner.  The use of Bayesian 
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network techniques can be deployed to infer likelihood of compromised host or 
performing data fusion when multiple sensors are reporting the same target.  To reduce 
information overload, C2 systems may adopt a “publish and subscribe” technique on their 
area of interest instead of being presented with every piece of incoming information. 
4.2.2. OV-1 High Level Operational Concept Graphic 
The followings are the key capabilities of the UV fighting forces that the 
proposed C2 architecture addressed.  Figure 56. shows graphically the concept of the 
system. 
• Self-protection - With the advent of more intelligent unmanned platforms 
being used in the theater and the advancement in artificial intelligence, 
these unmanned platforms could be used as a part of self-protection 
tactics.  They could either be used as 'shields' for high value assets due to 
their relative cost in terms of monetary value or human lives or used as 
forward sensors to detect external threats such as high speed, low 
probability of detection missiles.  The sensor range could be extend 
beyond typical radars, even into dangerous zones where there is a high 
probability of detection and risk of being taken down by enemy fire. 
• Self-forming / self-healing networks - When squadrons of unmanned 
platforms are being sent into the combat zones where they are within the 
range of enemy sensor detection and fire, they bear the risk of being 
destroyed by low cost interceptors, such as improvised rockets that are 
being used in asymmetric warfare.  In such scenarios, the concept of self-
healing and self-forming networks is critical to ensure that the mission 
could still be carried out despite one of the leading platforms are being 
destroyed.  Mechanisms to ensure proper succession to the being the 
master node is necessary.  Adaptive routing of networks paths would be 
also required to ensure critical information/data can still be transmitted 
back to headquarters. 
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• Cross-medium rebroadcast - The operational environment comprises of 
several mediums, including space, air, land and sea, both surface and 
underwater.  In order for optimal reach of data communications and 
network redundancy, there is a need to develop cross-medium rebroadcast 
capabilities.  This would not only extend the range of communications but 
also the survivability of the networks.  When a particular medium is 
jammed and denied, the network should remain functional by using 
another medium for communications using intelligence bandwidth 
allocation and rebroadcast capabilities. 
• Sensor / platform diversity - To ensure maximal detection, a suite of 
different sensors being used with different angles of perspectives would be 
necessary.  Hence, there is a need for different platforms and sensors to 
work collaboratively to ensure maximum sensor coverage and complete 
situational awareness.  This would also mean that the unmanned platforms 
must be able to communicate and command with one another to 
collaboratively work towards the common mission. 
The current C2 architectures would be unable to support these kinds of 
capabilities because most of them are too focused on specific missions to allow 
effective flow of commands and information among different nodes.  A robust 
architecture such as the one proposed would need to be built to support the 




Figure 56.   OV-1 High Level Operational Concept Graphic 
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4.2.3. OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Description 
The Operational Node Connectivity Description shows the connectivity and 
information flow between operational nodes. 
4.2.3.1. Protective Operation 
Objective of this operation: to form a protective physical shield around an 
asset to block kinetic attacks.  The interactions are showin in Figure 57. 
A potential strategy for use of the UV drones would be maneuver the 
drone if possible, due to speed restriction, in the path of the incoming ASCM to absorb 
the destructive energy. 
 
Figure 57.   Protective Operation 
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4.2.3.1.1. Activities at the Master Drone: 
The Master Drone is responsible for the processing of the threat track (location, 
altitude, velocity, and  heading) from an external source, such as a sensor node.  If 
the threat is within proximity of the swarm, the master drone takes responsibility 
to identify the threat and to query it, comparing it to its own repository of known 
threats, or with higher echelon of command.  Once the threat track has been 
established, the Master Drone has to formulate a protection plan to be 
disseminated to the sub-ordinates under its command.  The plan would include the 
number of sub-ordinate UVs to call upon, and the instructions to be given to each 
sub-ordinate to move into position (lat-long and altitude) with the precise timing 
to intercept the attack.  The Master Drone will need to be able to broadcast the 
protection plan to the selected sub-ordinates, and ensure the sub-ordinate UVs are 
responding and moving according to the plan.  The Master Drone will need to use 
its own sensors, together with situational awareness from sub-ordinate UVs or 
higher echelons to navigate the surrounding environment, taking into 
consideration both geographical features as well as strategic boundaries such as 
no-fly zones or political borders.  It also has to determine the general heading and 
speed of the UV swarm it is responsible for. 
4.2.3.1.2 Activities at the Sub-ordinate Drone: 
The Sub-ordinate drone processes protection plans from the Master drone, and 
adjusts its heading and speed according to the instructions received.  It must 
simultaneously be able to navigate the environment using its own sensors, in 
order to avoid collisions with other drones and geographic features.  The Sub-
ordinate Drone will have the ability to take-over and perform all Master drone 
activities, should there be a catastrophic loss of the Master drone.  The Sub-
ordinate drone also functions as a communications node to re-broadcast messages 
from the Master drone to drones that may have temporarily lost direct 
communications with the Master drone. 
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4.2.3.2. Search Operation 
Objective of this operation: To collectively and synergistically search 
for and track targets in an area of operations, using a combination of sensors distributed 
over the UV swarm.  Different types of sensors (for instance, radar, electro-optical / 
infra-red, hyper-spectral imaging) have varying effectiveness in finding targets in 
different terrain.  With a mix of sensors looking at the same area of operations, there is 
higher chance of finding elusive targets.  The interactions are showin in Figure 58. 
 
Figure 58.   Search Operation 
The UV drones receive command intent, including the area to search and a list of 
possible targets, from the command node (could be the headquarters), and will send 
target update reports back to the command node regarding the targets that have been 
detected. 
The UV drones synchronize among themselves to determine search regions within 
their area of operations that have not been searched yet.  Search regions are prioritized by 
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age of the last scan, the oldest region receiving the highest priority, since there could 
have been fresh target movements that have not been detected since the last scan of the 
region.  A search plan is formulated (by the Master drone) and one (or more) Sub-
ordinate UVs are tasked with searching a region.  Targets may require several scans by 
different sensor types before being identified (for instance, a radar track indicating a 
target will need to be further examined by EO/IR sensors for classification and 
identification), so the UV drones will co-ordinate among themselves for the need to 
relocate the required sensors to further scan the tracks that have been found.  Once targets 
are are identified, the threat location (co-ordinates and heading) is reported to the 
command node. 
4.2.4. OV-3 Operational Information Exchange Matrix 
The Operational Information Exchange Matrix (OV-3) shows the information 
exchanged between nodes, the relevant attributes of that exchange such as media, quality, 
quantity, and the level of interoperability required. 
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4.2.4.1. Information Exchange Model 
An Information Exchange Model was derived to aid in the creation of the 
OV-3 matrix. Figure 59. illustrates this Information Exchange Model, and the typical 
flow of information between three types of nodes in an operational setting: a 
Headquarters (HQ), Manned System (MS) and Unmanned Vehicle (UV). 
 
Figure 59.   Information Exchange Model for Command and Control 
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4.2.4.2. Categories of Information Exchange 
The various types of information exchanged in a typical operational 
setting can be grouped into the following categories: 
• Information type – defines the origin and type of information 
source. 
• Data type – defines the type of data to be transmitted. 
• Bandwidth – defines the amount of resources that a Command and 
Control system needs to devote to transmit the information. ‘High’ 
refers to a range of more than 80kbps, ‘Medium’ refers to the 
range of 10 – 80kbps, and ‘Low’ refers to a range of less than 1- 
kbps. 
• Timeliness – defines how timely urgent the information needs to 
be sent to a recipient node. 
• Triggering events – defines the events that will trigger the sending 
of such information. 
• CIA – defines the amount of Information Assurance required to 
protect the information, in terms of its Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability. 
o Confidentiality is defined as ensuring that information is 
accessible only to those authorized to have access. 
o Integrity refers to the condition that data cannot be created, 
changed, or deleted without proper authorization. 
o Availability is defined as having timely and reliable access 
to data and information services for authorized users. 
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4.2.4.3. MS/ UV (Master)-to-HQ Information Exchange 
Table 21 below shows the types of information that a MS or UV (Master) 
needs to send to HQ. 
 
TABLE 21.   MS / UV (MASTER)-TO-HQ INFORMATION EXCHANGE. 
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In a typical swarm network concept of operations, the UV-Master will 
collate all relevant information from their UV-Subordinates and transmit only the 
necessary information back to HQ.  The UV Master does not need to send all the 
information.  Each element in the system sends only the relevant portions of data 
necessary to synchronize the common picture, resulting in a smaller bandwidth 
requirement. 
The implications are that the C2 architecture is expected to be loaded the 
most especially if this involves the transmission of live video sensor feeds, which 
requires the highest bandwidth and lowest latency in the order of milliseconds. 
Thus, for concepts of operations involving swarm operations and video 
feeds transmission, it is recommended that Operational Research (OR) tools be exploited 
to determine the optimal force numbers that the C2 architecture can handle, and yet not 
be overwhelmed by the bandwidth required. 
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4.2.4.4. HQ-to-UV (Master) Information Exchange 
Table 22 below shows the types of information that a HQ will send to a 
UV (Master). 
 
TABLE 22.   HQ-TO-UV (MASTER) INFORMATION EXCHANGE. 
HQ-to-UV (Master) information exchanges are typically command-and-
control in nature.  Hence, the key is to guarantee the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of such information exchange, so as to ensure that commanders are able to 
command and control the assets and platforms in their areas of operations. 
The C2 architecture must provide the framework for assuring that mission 
tasking orders and approval of requests have been sent to the correct UV, and that HQ 
staff are controlling the correct payloads and sensors. In providing this CIA assurance, it 
must be recognized that overheads will have to be incurred and this will increase the 
system’s overall bandwidth requirements and must be taken into account. 
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4.2.4.5. HQ-to-MS Information Exchange 
Table 23 below shows the types of information that a HQ will send to a 
MS. 
 
TABLE 23.   HQ-TO-MS INFORMATION EXCHANGE. 
Similarly, HQ-to-MS information exchanges are typically command-and-
control in nature, and thus should focus on achieving confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. 
4.2.4.6. UV (Master)-to-UV (Subordinate) Information Exchange 
Table 24 below shows the types of information that a UV (Master) will 
send to a UV (Subordinate). 
 
TABLE 24.   UV (MASTER)-TO-UV (SUBORDINATE) INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE. 
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In a swarm operation, UV-Master-to-UV-Subordinate information 
exchanges play a crucial role as the UV-Master is in command and control of all UV-
Subordinates under their charge, and thus is responsible for issuing command orders and 
redirecting them for tasking during operations. 
Without the man-in-the-loop element, there must be a secure mechanism 
for guaranteeing that issued mission orders are genuine and valid.  Again, this can be 
done by focusing on the confidentiality, integrity and availability of such information 
exchanges. 
4.2.4.7. UV (Subordinate)-to-UV (Master) Information Exchange 
Table 25 below shows the types of information that a UV (Subordinate) 
will send to a UV (Master). 
 
TABLE 25.   UV (SUBORDINATE)-TO-UV (MASTER) INFORMATION 
EXCHANGE. 
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In a swarm network, the bandwidth of such information exchanges will 
depend on the ratio of UV-Subordinates to UV-Masters in the network, as well as the 
nature of the mission. 
Concepts of operations that will load the C2 architecture the most are 
swarm operations with a high UV-Subordinate to UV-Master ratio and Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions involving the transmission of live video 
sensor feeds, which requires the highest bandwidth and lowest latency in the order of 
milliseconds. 
4.2.4.8. Concluding Remarks 
The OV-3 Informational Exchange Matrix will allow planners of the C2 
architecture to gain insights into which aspects of the architecture are subjected to the 
most loading, as well as the types of operational scenarios that will cause the loading.  
Through that, the optimal force composition and numbers can be determined via the use 
of appropriate OR simulation tools to stress-test the architecture. 
 
4.2.5. OV-5 Operational Activity Model 
The Operational Activity Model (OV-5) shows the activities, relationships among 
activities, inputs and outputs of the different system nodes. 
The OV-5 models for force protection and reconnaissance operations are being 
constructed. 
  193
4.2.5.1. OV-5 Force Protection 
 
Figure 60.   Operational Activity Model (OV-5) for Force Protection 
Figure 60. shows the Operational Activity Model (OV-5) for Force Protection 
scenario. UV will exchange data with External Sensors and send Assets and Threats 
information to the Collaboration Net. The Collaboration Net sends Threats information to 
HQ where HQ will use it in mission planning. Activities for UV include sense 
environment, assess friendly capability, assess threats and risks, analyze environment, 
develop COA, carry out assigned mission, navigation and update mission status. For the 
External sensors, their main activities are sense environment and update mission tasks 
status. Collaboration Net basically publish Assets and Threats information which is send 
to HQ for mission planning. HQ will make use of Assets and Threats information for 
planning. Commands are then send to UV by HQ. HQ will also receive tasks status 
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updates from Collaboration Net which receive the status information from both external 
sensors and UV. 
4.2.5.2. OV-5 Reconnaissance  
 
Figure 61.   Operational Activity Model (OV-5) for Reconnaissance 
The Operational Activity Model (OV-5) for the Reconnaissance scenario is shown 
in Figure 61.  In the diagram, the UV exchanges information with External Sensors and 
send data to Collaboration Net.  The Collaboration Net processes the input data from UV 
and send a sensor picture to HQ so that HQ can make use of the processed sensor picture 
in planning.  The HQ will then interact with the UV by sending commands to UV. 
Activities carried out by UV are Sense environments, develop COA, navigate and update 
position and status.  External sensors sense the environment for potential threats.  
Collaboration net will process data to useful information for HQ. HQ will further analyze 




Figure 62.   High Level Conceptual System View 
A layered approach for building the system is proposed.  Figure 62. illustrates the 
structure.  The system will consist of: 
• Operating Systems & COTS  This layer contains the operating 
system and the required communication’s stack.  Items included on this 
level would be customized operating systems or firmware, depending on 
the application, or device drivers for low level communication.   
• Security Infrastructure A layer of security infrastructure is built to 
provide the necessary information assurance.  This layer isolates the 
Operating Systems. 
• Service Infrastructure  This layer provides services such as process 
engines, messaging, connections to legacy systems and directory lookup 
for applications to invoke.  By isolating the raw communication stack 
from the applications, it improves portability, modularity and 
maintainability. 
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• Data Services  This layer  provides a standard interface for the 
various disparate data forms/format.  Additionally, this data layer serves 
the enterprise applications to form a service-oriented framework. 
• Enterprise Applications The final layer allows custom built 
applications to support different environments and missions.  Unlike the 
previous layers, the enterprise application layer can be installed on the 
platform itself. 
4.2.6. Communications and Network 
The Communications and Network (CN) systems provide the transport 
mechanism to deliver information between blue-force entities in a timely and organized 
manner.  In the C2 process, the CN systems link geo-dispersed sensor information to 
form a live common operational picture.  The live common operational picture allows 
commanders to react in a timely fashion and make well-informed decisions in response to  
changing events.  CN systems support efficient and effective dissemination of orders to 
the nodes which execute the counter measures.  The aim is to shorten the "sensor-to-
shooter" time in the OODA cycle. 
In general, the ideal CN systems will fulfill operational demands in the following 
aspects: 
Connectivity:  To connect entities that requires exchanging information 
during the operation.  For wireless communications, direct connectivity is determined by 
the range of CN systems deployed in the mission.  If the information source is not within 
range of information sink, then multiple hop connectivity may be required to bridge the 
gap. 
Range: The communication range is expected to be as large as possible to 
allow dynamic of force projection with minimum need of deploying intermediate re-
broadcast stations. 
Channel capacity: To provide adequate channel capacity to deliver 
information at the rate required by the C2 applications.  Types of data traffic may vary 
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from lightweight track information packets to heavyweight streaming traffic like video 
teleconferencing (VTC) sessions. 
Latency & Jitter: Time-critical application traffic, e.g. targeting information 
to guide missile to fast moving target, requires near real-time end-to-end latency in order 
to be effective.  Time-sensitive application, e.g. video / audio streaming are sensitive to 
jitter. 
Information Assurance:  here is a need to denying adversaries from 
exploiting the information that was transmitted in the common exposed medium and turn 
it against our blue forces. 
Link Reliability: Communications on-the-move in a multi-path environment 
suffers multipath fading that disrupts communications connectivity 
Resource optimization: To meet the growing demand of channel capacity, 
there is a need to optimize the spectrum utilization efficiency.  Dynamic assigned 
multiple access (DAMA) schemes should be employed whenever possible to ensure that 
every subscriber station access the transmission medium only when it has data to 
transmit. 
Low Probability of Interception/ Detection (LPI/LPD): To increase the 
survivability probability of our blue-forces operating in the tactical environment, there is 
a need to deny adversaries from exploiting our wireless transmission with their electronic 
warfare (EW) capability. 
High Service Availability: To provision systems redundancy and avoid 
designing single-point of failure in CN architecture.  Service recovery process has to be 
rapid and responsive to minimize service downtime. 
4.2.6.1. Communications & Network Topology 
The CN topology and concepts support Unmanned systems (UMS) which 
operate in the air, land and sea domains. 
UMS (Air/ Surface) Operation 
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Satellite communications (SATCOM) offer global area coverage that 
enables beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) communications between forces.  By the year 2030, 
UMS technology will have achieved high levels of autonomy for executing missions.  
UMS operators will no longer need to assert direct control of the UMS platforms. 
For large-scale clustered UMS operating at BLOS range (>1000km), it is 
difficult to connect every UMS to their command center, in terms of SATCOM RF 
spectrum.  The Master-Subordinate operation concept was introduced to reduce the 
reach-back traffic demand by the UMS cluster.  This transforms a STAR-topology to a 
TREE topology for the tactical wireless network. This is shown in Figure 63. 
 
 




Figure 64.   Local Coverage 
For example, in UMS air operations, UAVs operating in the same vicinity 
can form a local tactical network cluster.  In each cluster, one of the UMS shall be 
nominated as the Conditionally Self-Appointed Master, relaying traffic to the HQ on 
behalf of its subordinates via long range link.  On-board processing in the Master can be 
employed to filter out repeated tracks from the reach-back traffic, hence optimizing 
traffic exchange through the reach-back link.  This is shown in Figure 64. 
The local tactical network can be formed by a tactical datalink network or 
a Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET).  MANET features self-forming and self-healing 
routing capability, and is highly reliable and easily deployed without the need to set up a 
central access point or infrastructure.  They are sometimes referred to as "wireless mesh 
networks", which employ similar concepts of having every node in the network being 
capable of routing information through the network.  The network changes dynamically 
and frequently due to the mobile nature of each radio node.  Traditional routing 
algorithms developed for the internet with fixed infrastructure will not work in 
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environments where nodes can join and leave the network at any time.  The routing may 
pass through several heterogeneous links with different capabilities.  Therefore, self-
forming and self-healing networks are evolving areas of research for finding efficient 
routing protocols and optimizing the channel utilization with minimal packet collision 
and idle time.110 
During operation, if the Master is destroyed or isolated from the cluster, 
the tactical network shall re-nominate a new Master within the cluster.  This approach 
eliminates single point of failure to assure high availability. 
UMS (Land) Operation: 
For large-scale, land-based UMS platforms, the direct ground-to-ground 
communications links are generally subjected to lateral foliage penetration attenuation 
and terrain blockage.   This reduces the range of direct communications link between 
land based UMS and other nodes.  While SATCOM offers a quick solution for coverage, 
connecting large number of UMS platforms via global SATCOM coverage may deplete 
SATCOM resources. 
 
                                                 
110 Motorola Technology Position Paper, Mesh Networks, Motorola Inc. 
http://www.motorola.com/staticfiles/Business/Products/Wireless%20Broadband%20Networks/Mesh%20N
etworks/_Documents/_static%20file/wp_technology_position_paper.pdf (accessed June 4, 2010) 
Wikipedia, Wireless mesh network, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wireless_mesh_network(accessed 
June 4, 2010);  




Figure 65.   High Altitude Platform Stations (HAPS) 
 
  
Figure 66.   Access HAPS 
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An alternative to SATCOM is the use of an aerial communications node 
(ACN).  These utilize a relay concept using high-altitude, high-endurance surrogate 
satellite platforms, such as High-Altitude Platform Stations (HAPS), as shown in Figure 
65.  HAPS is an intermediate alternative that provides additional link capacity while 
overcoming foliage and terrain challenges faced by the UMS operation.  The UMS can be 
linked to Access HAPS, as shown in Figure 66., which cover their region.  Potential 
technologies today for access network are Tactical Datalink and WiMax.  The high 
elevation-angle reduces foliage penetration and lowers the probability of terrain 
blockage.  The link of  cellular base-station to the Access HAPS or HAPS form a multi-
tier core network backbone to extend the coverage of the wide area communications over 
land theater. 
UMS (Underwater) Operation 
In addition to acoustic waves there are other means for wireless 
transmission of signals under water.  Very low frequencyradio waves (30Hz - 300Hz) 
will propagate through conductive sea water, but require large antennas and high 
transmitter power.   Optical waves do not suffer so much from attenuation, but they are 
affected by scattering.  While laser technology is still being perfected for practical use, 
acoustic waves remain the optimum solution for communicating under water in 
applications where tethering is unacceptable. 
The achievable data throughput and the reliability of underwater acoustic 
communication systems are measured by the bit error probability.  This probability varies 
from system to system, but is always subject to bandwidth limitations of the ocean 
channel.  In the existing systems, there are usually four kinds of signals that are 
transmitted: control, telemetry, speech and video signals. 
During the past few years, significant advancements have been made in 
the development of underwater acoustic communication systems in terms of their 
operational range and the data throughput.  Acoustically controlled robots have been used 
to replace divers in performing maintenance of submerged platforms.  High quality video 
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transmission from the bottom of deep ocean trenches (6500m) to surface ships and data 
telemetry over-the-horizon has been demonstated. 
The emerging communication scenario in which the modern underwater 
acoustic systems will operate is that of an underwater data network consisting of both 
stationary and mobile nodes.  These nodes can be located on UUVs, bouys, or permenant 
nodes mounted on the sea bed.  This network is envisioned to provide exchange of data 
such as control, telemetry and video signals between multiple network nodes.  Remote 
users will have access to the network via radio link connecting to a central node based on 
a surface station.111 
Despite its long range performance, propagation velocity of acoustic 
waves in water (~1500m/s) is 200,000 times slower that RF propagation (3 x 108m/s).  
This effect will have an impact regarding the speed of transmission.   If the signal is 
transmitted across long range acoustic communications, the application will suffer 
significant end-to-end latency.  For example, a 3km acoustic link has a latency of two 
seconds.  Hence the range of the "last-mile" acoustic link is limited by the most latency 
requirement that the UMS requires to operate effectively for its mission.  This depends on 
the type of applications that the acoustic communications link needs to support.   
Interactive control using live video feedback, sensor feed, and telemetry data are 
examples of these applications.  Also, medium access schemes supporting the multiple 
user access within the local area network needs to have sufficient guard interval or back-
off time to avoid transmission collision between different mobile stations. 
SATCOM or surrogate satellites can be used to bridge the long range gap 
between the C2 center and large number of remote UMS while maintaining long stand-
off distance. 
                                                 
111 Milica Stojanovic, Underwater Acoustic Communication, Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, Northeastern University. Wiley Encyclopedia of Electrical and Electronics Engineering.  
http://web.mit.edu/people/millitsa/resources/pdfs/ency.pdf  (assessed on June 4, 2010) 
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The cluster concept can be applied to UUVs, with a Master undertaking 
the role of RF-to-Acoustic communications relay and utilizing acoustic communications 
to facilitate the cluster local area network.  If the tactical mission allows, a surface ship 
could be used as both the C2 center and the Master for the cluster network.  This is 
shown in Figure 67. 
 
 
Figure 67.   Underwater Application of System 
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5.0. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS / FLEET-SIZING 
5.1. OBJECTIVE AND APPROACH 
5.1.1. ASCM Threat Scenario 
In 2030, the US military will continue to rely heavily on its Navy to conduct a 
wide spectrum of operations such as: keeping sea lanes open to maintain the flow of trade 
and commerce around the world during peacetime, deployment of humanitarian 
assistance in the form of personnel and logistics while conducting a disaster relief 
operation, and projecting its air and ground forces into the theater of operations during a 
time of war.  While the US Navy has maintained its dominance of the high seas for 
several decades now, new and rising threats such as the development of advanced ASCM 
must be addressed in order for the Navy to safeguard its high-value assets such as its 
Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) while conducting these operations in the high seas. 
Currently, ASCMs such as the Brahmos112 can travel up to speeds of Mach 3 and 
perform intelligent sea-skimming maneuvers to reduce its detection probability after 
being launched.  In the near future, more advanced ASCMs are expected to travel up to 
Mach 4 or even Mach 5, further reducing the reaction time the CVBG has to detect and 
destroy the threat.  While one missile may not be sufficient to sink a large ship such as a 
cruiser or a carrier, any hit would likely reduce its operational effectiveness and prevent it 
from fully achieving its mission.  Present ASCM tactics also call for the weapons to be 
fired in salvos in an attempt to overwhelm the defensive screen.  The logic behind any 
protection system, therefore, would be to provide detection of the hostile ASCM as early 
as possible, so that the CVBG’s own countermeasures such as its anti-missile missiles or 
other close-in protection measures can be activated to neutralize the threat in time. 
Amidst the CVBGs of today, early warning screens that detect incoming hostile 
aircraft are established by tactical warning aircraft such as the E-2C Hawkeye operating 
several hundred miles away from the carrier.  However, there is a limitation of early 
                                                 
112 The Brahmos was co-developed in India and Russia in 2006, and has an operational speed of 3675 
km/h, range of 290 km and carries a 300kg payload. 
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warning for ASCMs to about 30 miles. The C2 architecture proposed in this report will 
enable the use of unmanned systems to provide a more persistent screen deployed at 
distances further away from the CVBG to extend the range and improve the detection 
probability of ASCMs.  This persistent surveillance mission can be achieved with the 
projected future capabilities of a Group 4, as described in Section 3.3.2., unmanned 
system with advanced algorithms that allow collaboration on search operations yet have 
collision avoidance, as well as the miniaturization of aerial surveillance radars for smaller 
platforms than a large manned aircraft like the E-2C. 
5.1.2. Determine UAV Fleet Size for ASCM Early Warning Screen 
The determination of UAV fleet size was performed to address the specific 
operational scenario whereby a squadron of unmanned aerial systems is deployed to 
enhance the protection of a CVBG with a continuous early ASCM warning screen.  The 
purpose of deploying the unmanned systems is such that as a system, the CVBG’s 
effective screening radius and reaction time is improved by a certain threshold / objective 
value versus the CVBG’s current capability against the threat of incoming ASCMs.  The 
specific outcome of this analysis is a notional fleet size and force effectiveness of a fleet 
of unmanned systems required to enable the warning screen. 
5.2. OPERATIONAL SCENARIO: DEFENSE OF CARRIER BATTLE GROUP 
The scenario modeled in this study consists of a large-scale conflict with a near 
peer adversary in the year 2030.  A CVBG is en route to a potential engagement area.  It 
has been established that the adversary’s ASCM capability imposes such a significant 
threat that continuous 100% area coverage of the threat axis is necessary.  The manned 
early warning aircraft does not have the endurance or coverage area capacity to perform 
such a task.  Present day technology registers ASCM speeds of Mach 3 which equates to 
about 1 km/sec.  The models used here assume that technology will only continue to 
develop and that ASCM speeds could reach Mach 4+ (1.4 km/sec) by the year 2030.  
This only reduces the CVBG’s response time to intercept such threats before the High 
Value Unit is impacted by such an adversary’s weapon.  UAVs are used in this model to 
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provide expanded radar coverage, which increases the response time for engagement of 
ASCMs. 
Detection ranges for ASCMs must be greater than what currently provided the 
CVBG organic sensors.  The enhanced detection range will lengthen the response time in 
order for the battle group’s anti-ASCM capabilities to be more effective in protecting the 
High Value Unit.  Current capabilities used in this study assume 50 seconds from first 
detection of an incoming ASCM until impact of the High Value Unit.  ASCM defense 
procedures use a shoot-shoot-look strategy that takes approximately 15 seconds per cycle.  
Time of last launch to successfully interdict the incoming weapon is 10 seconds out, 
which puts the ASCM 12-15 km away from the High Value Unit when the last defensive 
weapon is away.  The UAV early warning screen effectively gives the battle group two 
full engagement cycles, with sufficient time to perform a second shoot-shoot-look 
engagement after the first, giving the CVBG the opportunity to launch up to four 
weapons to intercept the incoming provide for its own defense.  This study will show 
how a persistent screen of unmanned systems with ASCM detection capability will 
enable an increased battle group response time with the capability to counter-shoot more 
defensive weapons. 
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Figure 68. illustrates a notational CVBG as well as the desired ASCM radar 
coverage of each sector. 
 
Figure 68.   Typical CVBG Formation with associated Threat Axes and ASCM Radar 
Overage Area 
5.3. DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT 
The deployment concept of utilizing unmanned systems as part of CVBG 
protection, while detailed, is articulated here so as to give the reader a better 
understanding of the “states” that the system are envisaged to be in.  These states are 
subsequently used to compose the Discrete Time Markov Chain during the formulation of 
the problem. 
As mentioned in the previous section as part of the Operations Concept, the 
CVBG will begin deploying the UAV protective screen of unmanned systems after 
leaving safe harbor.  Whether transiting across the high seas or within its theater of 
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operations, the threat protection level as well as the axis of threat focus (thereby 
determining the level of coverage desired), is a decision left to commander of the CVBG.  
Whether the unmanned systems are launched from a single ship (specially commissioned 
to launch, recover and maintain the unmanned systems), or are launched from multiple 
ships (each ship within the CVBG today is modified to house part of the system), is also 
not prescribed here as part of the problem formulation – the solution can take either form. 
As such, a single unmanned aerial platform can be in one of the following states: 
State of Ingress - The unmanned platform is launched from its host ship or 
airbase, and flies enroute toward its designated patrol orbit.  This includes the time it 
takes for final operational checks and safety checks to be performed on the platform, the 
time it takes to taxi towards the designated runway, time waiting on deck, takeoff time, 
and finally flight time towards the holding pattern.  Out of all these, the flight time 
towards the holding pattern is envisaged to be the longest.  During ingress, there is a 
probability that the platform will malfunction and be required return to the host ship 
without ever reaching the pattern. 
Time on Station – Whether as part of the orbiting patrol screen and actively 
searching for ASCM or as a “hot standby”, the platform has now reached the designated 
patrol orbit and forms part of the overall defensive screen.  This is the useful mission 
time of the platform.  Since there are an optimal number of unmanned platforms in the air 
around the CVBG, the new platform that has just completed its ingress to the pattern is 
actually replacing another platform that has run low on fuel or has malfunctioned and is 
now leaving the pattern.  The new platform is effectively performing a one-for-one 
replacement of the exiting platform to cover the gap it has left behind.  While on station, 
the platform is employing its radar to actively search for ASCMs and other airborne 
threats in its designated area of search.  Any anomalies detected in its area of search are 
reported back to the CVBG (the information possibly routed through other platforms).  
For each time interval on station, there is a probability that the platform will malfunction, 
requiring it to leave the holding pattern for an emergency return to the host ship. 
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State of Egress – The state in which the unmanned is exiting its designated patrol 
orbit because it has run low on fuel, or has encountered a malfunction.  Either way, it is 
now flying back toward its host ship or airbase, and the state of egress includes flying 
time, landing time, recovery time, time to taxi and being stowed-away back in the hanger 
of the host ship.  Again, the flight time is expected to be the longest amongst all of these. 
Turnaround Time –Upon completion of a mission, the platform, if not in need of 
repair, will be refueled and prepared for its next mission in the hanger deck of the host 
ship.  This includes time for preventive maintenance tasks, downloading of its mission 
data, software and diagnostic checks, and readied for taking on another mission. 
Repair Time – The unmanned platform goes into a state of repair in the hanger 
deck of the host ship if it has encountered a malfunction while performing its mission.  
Repair time implies corrective maintenance but not preventive maintenance tasks. The 
time it takes for a platform to  be repaired is modeled as a binomial process, meaning that 
with each time step, the platform will either (1) be repaired with certain probability; (2) 
or continue to remain in a state of repair at the next time step.  This is to account for the 
fact that repair times are variable depending on the severity of the malfunction 
encountered. 
5.4. MOES & MOPS 
The measure of effectiveness (MOE) of the defensive screen is the ability to 
improve the detection and engagement times against ASCMs. Supporting measures of 
performance (MOP) are: 
1. Probability of successfully maintaining the required number of UAVs in 
orbiting stations, given mission failures. 
2. Fleet Size. The total number of UAVs required in a fleet to provide the 
defensive screen. 
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5.5. RADAR CONSIDERATIONS 
5.5.1. Today’s Technological Limitations 
Currently there are no known sensors onboard UAVs that can detect sea 
skimming missiles.  The current employment of sensors onboard the UAV includes 
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR). Detection of at 
least 30km is not uncommon.  The challenge is to be able to detect a sea skimming 
missile travelling at hypersonic speed at that distance.  The difficulties involved in the 
detection of a sea skimming missile are associated with the signal to clutter ratio and the 
multipath returns. 
Target to Clutter Ratio (TCR). Figure 69. shows the fluctuation of the TCR 
with range at sea states 0, 2 and 3.  All else being equal, it can be seen that as the sea state 
increases the TCR decreases.  Radar echoes from sea decreases with reduction in 
frequency.  
If the target of interest is small, higher microwave frequencies are preferred (X-
band). Higher frequencies also offer better range and angle resolution.  Over the sea, 
horizontal polarization at low and moderate sea states results in less sea clutter then 
vertical. 
Unlike receiver noise, clutter echoes are generally correlated from pulse to pulse, 
and sometimes even from scan to scan.  The techniques of rapid antenna scan for 
detection of small targets in the sea, and time compression for detection of moving 
targets in sea clutter are examples of detection techniques that can be worked on to take 




Figure 69.   TCR plot (Range Resolution 3.3m, UAV=5000ft, Missile=30m, X band, (SS 
0,2,3)) 
Multipath. Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) techniques have been well 
studied in communications offering advantages where multipath environments can cause 
fading.  Radar waveform rejection of multipath requires that the range resolution cell be 
smaller than the range difference (range resolution) between the direct and multipath 
echoes.  The majority of MIMO radar configurations have focused on multistatic arrays 
that have sufficient spatial separation to decorrelate the target’s RCS scintillation.  These 
networks combine the received data non-coherently to average out the scintillation.  
Another form of MIMO radar uses multiple orthogonally coded waveforms from 
individual transmitter elements of a phased array which are then combined coherently 
upon receive to form multiple beams.  This concept holds huge potential and can be 
exploited by a swarm of UAVs in the detection of sea skimming missile. 
Multi Function Radar. With the miniaturization, lowering cost of 
processing and the pressing need for extreme beam agility the goal is to have a radar 
which will perform multiple functions in one system.  As such it is envisaged that the 
Sea state 0
Sea state 2 
Sea state 3 
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sensor which will be mounted on the UAVs will be a phased array multi function radar 
capable of providing surveillance and tracking a fast moving target. 
Key Specifications. For an operating height of 5000ft trying to detect a sea 
skimming missile (supersonic speed) travelling at a height of 30m above sea level the 
range resolution needed is 3.3m.  Using a frequency of 9.3GHz with an aperture diameter 
of 2m, the 3dB beamwidth is given by 1.20. 
 
Range Resolution α t
2h h 2(1666)(30)
ΔR = = = 3.3m
R 30000  
3-dB Beamwidth 3dB
α
λθ °= 1.25 = 1.2
d
 
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
τRT
RC 0i 3dB τ
σP 1SNR = TCR = =
P σ ΔR(θ )R
 
Where στ is the RCS of the target 
and σ0i is the backscatter coefficient for sea state i (i-0-4) 
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Figure 70. shows a plot of the sea backscatter coefficients as a function of grazing 
angle.  It can be seen that the sea backscatter coefficient increases as the sea state 
increases. 
 




Figure 71.   TCR vs Range (Range Resolution 3.3m, UAV=5000ft, Missile=30m, X band, 
(sea state 2) 
 
Based on current receiver design and signal processing techniques, the TCR 
needed for detection is at least 20dB. To achieve a detection range of 30km at sea state 3, 
the TCR will need to improve to below 10dB Figure 69.  This is good for a target RCS of 
1-10m2.  Variation of TCR vs range is plotted for RCS 0.1, 1 and 10m2 in Figure 71.. It 
can be seen that the TCR increases as the RCS increases.  
5.6. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
From the technical considerations enumerated in Section 5.5, some key 
assumptions need to be made for the analysis: 
1. ASCM RCS of 0.1 to 1 m2. 
2. Assume Sea States are between 0 to 3.  The radar is only effective for this 
range, and the UAVs are able to land and take-off from the deck of the carrier. 
RCS 10 m2 
RCS 1.0 m2 
RCS 0.1 m2
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3. Detection to Firing Time.  The time between detection to firing, a factor 
determined by human Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) cycle, is taken to be a 
constant 10 sec in this analysis. 
4. Track Handling.  A capability to continuously track the incoming ASCM 
with sufficient accuracy to guide the interceptor missile(s) from the CVBG to the 
incoming ASCM is assumed. 
5.7. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
5.7.1. A Two Phase Model 
In order to determine the UAV fleet size, modeling was conducted in two phases. 
Modeling Phase I derived the number of UAV’s required to ensure sufficient radar 
coverage of the circumferential perimeter of the early warning screen.  Each position that 
is required to be filled by a UAV is termed an aerial picket station, denoted by k. 
Modeling Phase II is a discrete event simulation takes Modeling Phase I further by 
considering the finite endurance and failure rates of the UAV platform and sensors, and 
outputs the UAV fleet size required to support the mission. 
5.7.2. Modeling Phase I: Derive Required Number of Aerial Picket Stations 
5.7.2.1. Overview 
Modeling Phase I is a geometric model formulated to cover the given 
perimeter based on a ring of UAVs, assuming each UAV’s detection range as a cookie 
cutter with a given effective radius.  The model can also be applied for a non-circular 
protection pattern, for example when the region in front of the CVBG is given a larger 
alert time than that behind the CVBG, the sterns if the expected major threat axis is from 
the front.  However, in this example, the threat is expected to be omni-directional, 
necessitating a circle for the early warning screen. 
5.7.2.2. Description 
For a given CVBG, with an existing detection radius R, the model 
calculates k UAVs, equidistant from each other, in a circle with radius Ruav.  As shown in 
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Figure 72., each UAV in the early warning screen is modeled to have a side-scanning 
radar with a scanning angle of θ, and a detection radius Rd. 
 
Figure 72.   Early Warning Screen of UAVs 
Engagement Sequence. The engagement takes place as follows: 
1. Enemy missile enters UAV early warning screen perimeter with 
speed Vm . 
2. Enemy missile stays in UAV detection region for at least Tmin,1 in 
order for the UAV to detect the missile (T1). Neighboring radar coverages must overlap 
for Tmin,1. 
3. Command center at CVBG completes the OODA loop for the 
engagement in an additional Tmin,2 from T1.  The interceptor missile flies out from the 
aircraft battle group and travels at speed Vamm (assume instantaneous acceleration) 
towards the incoming enemy ASCM. 
4. Interceptor missile engages enemy missile at R.  The Command 
Center at the CVBG performs a battle damage assessment (BDA) and, if there are 
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surviving ASCMs, proceeds to engage with a second salvo of interceptor missiles, if 
necessary. 
Geometric Analysis. Based on the geometry of the early warning screen, 
k can be determined through the equations that follow based on Figure 73. 
 
Figure 73.   Geometric Analysis of Early Warning Screen 
Key Variables 
k Number of UAVs required 
φ Angle between each UAV 
Ruav Radius of circle that each UAV orbits around the ABG 
Rper Radius of circle for effective detection of the UAV system 
 
  220




jθs in ( 9 0 ° - ( - ) )s in ( 9 0 ° ) 2 2=
α β
jθβ = α s in ( 9 0 ° - ( - ) )2 2
jθβ = α c o s ( - )2 2
 
2 2
2 2 d 1
1 d 2
jθs in (1 8 0 ° - ) s in ( )2 2=
α β
js in ( )2β = α = R - β
θc o s ( )2
js in ( )2β = R - α
θc o s ( )2
 
1 m m i n ,1
2 m i n , 2 m
a m m
α = V T
Rα = R + ( + T ) VV
 
φ
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
3 6 0k = R o u n d U p  
Parameters Used 
Vamm, Vm Mach 4 
R  60 km 
Rd  30 km 
θ  1000 
Tmin,1  1 second 
Tmin,2  15 second 
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5.7.2.3. Results and Sensitivity Analysis 
Numerical methods were used to solve for k, yielding k = 15 for the 
baseline Rd of 30 km and Tmin,1 of 1 sec.  Further sensitivity analysis was conducted to 
vary Rd and Tmin,1. Rd was varied from 20 to 40 km, while Tmin given a range of 1 to 4 
secs.  The results are presented in Table 26. k ranges from a low of 12 to 27. This range 
of k is used for Modeling Phase II to determine the UAV fleet size. 
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
20 23 24 24 25 26 26 27
22.5 20 21 22 22 23 23 24
25 18 19 19 20 20 20 21
27.5 17 17 18 18 18 18 19
30 15 16 16 16 16 17 17
32.5 14 15 15 15 15 15 16
35 13 14 14 14 14 14 15
37.5 12 12 13 13 13 13 14




TABLE 26.   VARIATION OF K UAVS WITH RD AND TMIN,1. 
5.7.3. Modeling Phase II: Determine Fleet Size 
5.7.3.1. Overview 
Model II is a discrete event simulation taking the finite endurance and 
failure rates of the UAV platform and sensors into consideration when determining the 
fleet size. A fleet scheduling methodology is called upon to determine the minimum fleet 
size required. 
5.7.3.2. Description 
In order to have a persistent early warning screen of UAVs, flight 
operations will need to take into account several key events.  Each UAV has a finite 
endurance, and will need to land to refuel and be readied for the next mission (a 
“turnaround”, which also includes the necessary preventive maintenance tasks).  During 
flight, if a failure of a mission critical component occurs, the UAV will need to cut its 
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time of station and return to base to have the failed component fixed or replaced.  The 
repair requires additional time which consequently extends the turnaround time to be 
ready for the UAV’s next mission.  The turnaround time will vary with the workload of 
the ground-crew and repair times will vary with the complexity of the task.  Model II 
accounts for both variations.  Figure 74. illustrates the operating schedule required to 
sustain a single aerial picket station. 
 
Figure 74.   Sample Scheduling of UAVs for a Single Aerial Picket Station 
5.7.3.3. Formulation 
The schedule from Figure 74. is extended to k UAVs (determined in 
Model I), and the events were simulated in SimKit using the event graph depicted in 
Figure 75. 
A description of which is as follows: 
1. UAVs are launched at intervals of one hour (the travel time). The 
time of launch is recorded and the remaining operation time is calculated to determine if 
the UAV will fail during flight on route to the patrolling position. 
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2. Patrolling starts, and another UAV is scheduled to replace the 
current UAV. 
3. Turnaround (refuel and regular maintenance) is scheduled upon 
return to carrier, with the maintenance time assigned randomly from a triangular 
distribution. 
4. The UAV is ready for launch, with clocked operation hours 
recorded. 
5. If the UAV encounters a mission critical failure at any point of the 
mission, it will immediately return to the carrier for repairs, triggering an immediate 
launching of a mission replacement. 
6. The repairs are carried out immediately with a random (triangular 
distribution) repair time, followed by the turnaround. 
7. Repaired UAVs are added to the standby storage with all 
parameters reset as in a new UAV. 
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Figure 75.   Event Graph for the Scheduling Model in SimKit 
 
Parameters and Variables 
• k – number of aerial picket stations from Model I 
• s – container representing a spare storage of the ready-to-launch 
UAVs in standby 
• M – number of UAVs required to support the whole operations 
sequence 
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• P – counter to keep track of the number of UAVs in active patrol 
mission. (This provided a means to measure the up time of the 
detection circle.) 
• R – counter to keep track of the total repairs made throughout a 
operation cycle 
• fT – flight time of a UAV from the launching platform to patrolling 
station. (Fixed as flight to position is the radius of the patrolling 
circle. Currently, assumed as 113.5km ÷ 217km/h = 0.523hr) 
• TD – record of time that the UAV is launched for mission. 
• Pt – maximum patrol time. (Calculated based on 46 hours of max 
endurance of the UAV and 0.523hr of single way flight time to 
patrol position. Pt = 46 – (2x0.523) = 44.954hr) 
• Tclocked – Cumulative time that the UAV have operated in flight. 
• R1 – Calculation of the remaining time before failure occurs. (This 
value is used to determine if UAV will fail during flight to 
position. Calculated based on R1 =TTF - Tclocked ) 
• R2 – Calculation of the remaining time allowed for the rest of the 
patrolling mission. (This value is used to determine if UAV will 
fail during patrol mission. Calculated based on R2 = TTF - Tclocked – 
fT) 
• tr – Randomly generated repair time of the UAV on failure. 
Assuming a triangle distributed time between a range of 4hours to 
8hours with a mode of 5hours. 
• tm – Randomly generated maintenance time of the UAV after each 
mission completion. Assuming a triangle distributed time between 
the range of 0.8hours to 2hours with a mode of 1hr 
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• TTF – The cumulative total time of flight before the UAV 
encounters a non-catastrophic failure.  Assuming a normal 
distribution of mean 200hours and standard deviation of 60.79.  
This will provide us a targeted mean time between failure (MTBF) 
of 200 to be achieved by 2030 and a 5% probability that the Time 
To Fail (TTF) will be below 100hours of operation. 
5.7.3.4. Results 
Modeling Phase II determined that a fleet size of 21±1 UAVs is required 
to achieve the persistent early warning screen, given Rd of 30km and Tmin,1 of 1 sec.  This 
result is summarized together with sensitivity analysis for Rd of from 20 to 40 km and 
Tmin,1 from 1 to 4 sec in Table 27. 
Figure 76. shows a surface plot of the same sensitivity analysis, while the 
box plots in Figure 77. and Figure 78. show the means and standard deviations of the 
fleet size for Tmin,1 of 1 and 4 sec, with Rd ranging from 20 to 40km taken over 1000 
simulation runs.  The deviations from the mean are small (approximately 1) due to the 
fact that the endurance of the platform is long and the system is reliable (less than 5% 
failure rate), leading to small variations in the final fleet size. Intuitively, more UAVs are 
required if the coverage overlap Tmin,1 is increased. 
In conclusion of the analysis and for further discussions of the C2 
architecture, a baseline UAV fleet size can be taken to be 21.  For a conservative fleet 
size estimate, given the uncertainties of the coverage overlap and radar detection range, a 
fleet size of 35 can be used. 
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20 30 40
1 30 21 18
2 31 22 18














 Rd= 20km Rd=30km Rd=40km 
   Tmin,1 of 1 sec 




  Rd= 20km Rd=30km Rd=40km 
   Tmin,1 of 4 sec 
Figure 78.   Box Plots of Fleet Size Means and Standard Deviations Size 
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5.8. COMMUNICATION AND NETWORK ANALYSIS 
In this operation scenario, the communications and network (CN) systems need to 
fulfill the following requirements: 
• Uplink113(UL): Air-to-surface platform 
o Data rate: Low, periodic and short 
o Traffic Type:  
 Sensor tracks   
 Telemetry signals 
• Downlink (DL): Surface-to-Air platform 
o Data rate: Low, random short-burst 
o Traffic Type:  
 Command & Control signal 
• Bi-directional Range: Up to 100km 
The current technologies capable of meeting the above requirements are tactical 
datalink and SATCOM systems. 
Tactical datalinks (e.g. Link 16) were built to support real-time collaboration 
between tactical sensor and shooters in the tactical environment.  Link 16 operates on 
ultra high frequency line-of-sight UHF-LOS band (960-1215MHz).  It operates on Time-
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) scheme which offers 1536 time-slots per 12 sec 
frame.  The time slots in each frame are partitioned into functional groups called NPGs, 
e.g. surveillance, air control, fighter-to-fighter net, etc. They are dynamically assigned to 
user on-demand based on a predefined format.114 
                                                 
113 This definition is based on Star-topology setup: “Uplink” refers the link from mobile stations to 
central base station; “Downlink” refers to the link from central base station to mobile stations. 
114 Tadil J: Introduction To Tactical Digital Information Link J And Quick Reference Guide, Fm 6-
24.8/ Mcwp 3-25c/ Nwp 6-02.5/ Afttp(I) 3-2.27, June 30, 2000, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-24-8/tadilj.pdf (accessed June 4, 2010) 
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To estimate115 the maximum number of sensors that one tactical datalink net can 
support, the following assumptions were made: 
• Let the average data size of sensor-feed data be D bytes/track; 
• For each target track, let the average track update rate be T 
tracks/second/missile; 
• Let the system throughput capacity of link-16 that is reserved for sensor 
feed  be Cb bits/sec; 
• Let the number of maximum concurrent missile attacks expected be M 
missiles; 
• There are maximum of 2 sensors covering and airspace at any instant 
(overlapped detection zone); 
• Assuming there are n sensors operating in the AO in ring orbit, the maximum 
number of sensors datalink can support is: 
( )
Capacity reserved for sensor data transmission
2 M Datarate demand per unit per track detected
( / )
2 8 / ( / ) ( / )
  bC bit s
M bit byte D byte track T track s
n × ×
× × × ×
⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦




For example, assuming the following values for T, Cb, D, and M; n =15 
sensors/net. 
• T = 1 track/sec 
• Cb = 2400bps 
• D = 10bytes/track 
• M=1, the number of sensors supported 
                                                 
115 This estimation shall be based on generic perspective, given the fact that the detailed format for 









From link budget assessment, the tactical datalink is able to support 
communications link between carrier battle group and the aerial UMS operating 100km 
range.  Hence there is no need to form multi-hop network to relay the track message back 
to the C2 center.  This is displayed in Figure 79. 
 
Figure 79.   Data traffic generated for every missile entering the Detection Zone 
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However, if the scenario requires extending the sensor ring radius, as shown in 
Figure 80., beyond the range of terrestrial communications coverage, SATCOM offers an 
alternative reachback link from the orbiting UMS sensor ring to the C2 centre.  Despite 
the fact that SATCOM link has higher latency (approximately 250-300msec for GEO 
stationary satellite relay) than terrestrial communications system, it is still suitable for 
transmitting advance warning information detected by the first-line sensors. 
 
Figure 80.   Unmanned Sensor Network Topology (Extended Range) 
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5.9. RANGE ASSESSMENT: LINK BUDGET FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR 
COMMUNICATIONS LINK 
The tactical class UAV operates at altitudes of 10,000 feet (3.05km) above mean 
sea level (AMSL) for the payload’s ISR capabilities to function optimally within electro-
optical (EO) sensor range.  In general, the datalink range is limited by the transmission 
power of the UAV’s onboard antenna.  Therefore the values of UAV transmission powers 
is used as a constraints for link margin calculations.  Figure 1 shows the fade margins1 
considered at a distance of 100km with transmission powers, Pt of 10, 20, 50 and 100 
watts in the line-of-sight (LOS).  In the scenario of datalink between the carrier and 
UAV, as the distance between them increased the fade margin decreases.  At the lowest 
transmission power of 10W the fade margin was at 15dB above the minimum threshold.  
This suggests that there is sufficient link margin to meet the surface-to-air and air-to-
surface duplex link for a single UAV to carrier scenario. 
Lacking the technical specifications of radio transmitter and receiver system, the 
link budget calculations were based on the following estimated assumptions: 
• RF carrier frequency, fc = 1215MHz. (Link-16 Max frequency for UHF-
LOS band) 
• Receiver system noise temperature of, Tsys = 410K; 
• Channel Bit-rate, Rb = 2400bps;  
• Omni directional antennas with gain, Gt, Gr = 1dBi;  
• Transmitter Power, Pt = 10W, 20W, 50W, 100W 
• Digital Signal-to-Noise ratio (assume QPSK @ BER <10-5), Eb/N0, min ≈ 
10dB (See Figure 2);   
• Other system losses, Lsys = 3dB;  
• Channel Loss Model: Free space path loss model, Lchannel 21R∝  ; 
• Boltzmann Constant, k = 231.38 10−× Joules 
• Speed of Light, c = 83 10−× m/s 
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Link budget formula: 
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The fade margin is plotted against range, R, to extrapolate the link performance 
over distance.  This graph can be found in Figure 81. 
Fade margin represents the received RF power above the minimum threshold 
level at a specified bit-error rate (BER) performance.  This graph can be found in Figure 
82. 
In the ideal environment, the received power derived from the link budget is  
deemed adequate (given that fade margin > 0dB) to maintain a reliable link (BER < 10-5) 
at 100km range.  However, in the real environment, the link is subjected to multipath 
fading, e.g. the ship superstructure presents multiple reflection surfaces to the radio wave 
that is emitted from omni-directional antenna.  The random mix of multiple signals 
arriving at the receiver via different reflection paths results in random construction and 
destruction of RF wave at the receiver.  The signal level at the receiver drops when the 
resultant waves are destructive.  Additional fade margin has to be factored into the link 
budget requirement to maintain the desired the link quality.  The mitigation methods to 
reduce multipath fading are as follow: 
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• Raise the height of the antenna on the ship:  This reduces the multipath fading 
caused by the planar surfaces of the ship superstructure. 
• Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) technology:  Space-time coding 
leverages on spatial diversity and time diversity to reduce the effect of multipath 
fading. 
• Increase transmission power to increase the fade margin:  This approach is limited 




Figure 81.   Fade Margin (dB) is inversely proportional to R2 as the R between Transmitter & Receiver increases 
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Figure 82.   Probability of bit error (BER) vs Eb/N0 
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6.1. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
A Command and Control Architecture that integrates manned and unmanned 
systems will be necessary by 2030.  The proposed architectural concept is meant to be a 
guide towards realizing this capability.  The key will be to develop technology and 
doctrine promotes timely, accurate, and appropriate information is available to the 
warfighter.  This information must cross all mediums to be available to the force 
elements that would benefit from that data, whether they are in the local area, or 
operating remotely through a global interface. 
Integrated Project Teams and specialized Track Teams conducted studies on 
several factors, specifically outlining levels of systems autonomy, examining the roles of 
humans and machines in systems, examining critical information assurance 
considerations, and technical evolution of unmanned vehicle technology. 
A functional architecture was developed along with several command and control 
architecture products.   The functional architecture, described in terms of Boyd’s OODA 
Loop, describes the actions that must be taken by the system to conduct operations.  The 
High Level Operational Concept Graphic illustrated the general operation of the system 
and highlighted its features within the 2030 battlespace.  The Operational Node 
Connectivity Description showed the connectivity and information flow between 
operational nodes for Force Protection and Reconnaissance.  The Information Exchange 
Model showed the typical flow of information between nodes in an operational setting.  
Information Exchanges for the system were identified through several matrices.  The 
Operational Activity Models showed the activities, relationships among activities, inputs 
and outputs of the different system nodes.  The High Level Conceptual System View 
presents a layered approach for building the system. 
Architecture concepts were applied to one of the innumerable potential 
operational applications for unmanned vehicles.  Our model depicted the deployment of 
unmanned vehicles to provide the carrier battle group with early detection of an ASCM.  
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The force needed to complete the layout of forces was geometrically evaluated to provide 
necessary stations given overlapping coverage, and a discrete event simulation was used 
to determine the need for 21 unmanned vehicles to maintain operation of these stations 
given the assumed parameters.  To relate this model to the architecture capacity, the 
relationship between the number of vehicles and network requirements was determined. 
6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Loop the Functional 
Decomposition of Command and Control was developed to provide (1) the basic 
functions required for UMS and (2) an extensive assessment of UMS mission domain. 
To satisfy the needs for the battlespace of 2030, recommendations for technology 
developments and changes in the organization and joint doctrine were posed. 
6.2.1. Actions Needed Prior to 2030 
Technology development: 
• Radar Receiver Technology - Improvements in detection range and detection 
of Sea Skimming Missiles. 
• Signal Processing Technology - Improvement in detection range and detection 
of Sea Skimming Missiles. 
• Improvement in Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) technology - 
Improvement in processing power. 
• Materials Research - Light weight materials to reduce the weight of UVs. 
• Power Generation - Improvement in power generation per unit weight. 
• Prevention of Electromagnetic Interference - EMI will be an issue as more 
sensors are packed into an integrated payload. More research is required to 
minimize this effect & prevent the jamming of own forces' signals. 
• Common Sensor Data Format - With the advent of more sensor types on a 
single UMS, a common sensor data exchange format needs to be standardized 
in order to optimize the amount of information exchange between unmanned 
& manned platforms & prevent incompatibility. 
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• Sensor Fusion- Majority of the sensor fusion is currently done after raw data 
are sent back to HQ. An improvement in digital signal processing speed will 
allow such sensor fusion to take place at the front end (UMS). This will 
minimize the amount of sensor data to be sent back & hence reduce 
bandwidth requirements. 
• Increase the Size of Imaging Array—to increase the capacity of EO sensors to 
have sufficiently broad fields of view and resolution. This will then allow 
detection of entities at long ranges so that sophisticated image interpretation 
techniques can perceive and “understand” the key elements in the 
environment.  
Required organizational actions: 
• Generate an official Joint Operational Concept in accordance with Chairman 
Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, Joint Operations Concept 
Development Process. 
• Develop doctrine, in coordination with coalition forces, for operations 
involving integrated manned and unmanned systems. 
• Parallel technology development with coalition forces.   
• Promote common standards for interoperability between US and allied 
nations. 
• Encourage industry to develop common control console for unmanned 
vehicles of all mediums. 
• Invest in information systems personnel to develop a technically savvy force. 
• Continue to improve the transfer of data through enhancements to tactical data 
networks. 
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6.3. FUTURE AREAS OF STUDY 
Many of the concepts for future battlespace engagements are in their infancy 
today. This research project helped identify some of these concepts. Below are listed a 
few that were deemed essential next steps to further the interactions between unmanned 
and manned vehicles as well as their overall joint operations. 
• Optimal balance between manned and unmanned systems to accomplish 
future missions. 
• Self healing, self forming networks.  
• Required organizational changes in the DoD to manage the increase usage of 
unmanned systems.  
• Logistics required to support future manned and unmanned system force 
structure. 
• Maintenance concept for future unmanned force.  
• Suitability of unmanned systems being deployed from the expected military 
platforms of 2030. 
• Legal issues arising from use of unmanned vehicles. 
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7.0. GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS 
7.1. GLOSSARY 
Architecture:  “a framework or structure that portrays relationships among all the 
elements of the subject force, system, or activity.”116 
Capability:  the ability to execute a specified course of action.  (A capability may or may 
not be accompanied by an intention) 
Capability Based Assessment:  the portion of the JCIDS analysis that identifies 
capability and supportability shortfalls, gaps, and redundancies on specific capability 
needs.  CBAs generally consist of three parts:  the Functional Area Analysis (FAA), 
Functional Needs Analysis (FNA) and the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA).  Results 
of FAA and FNA are documented in the Joint Capabilities Document. 
Capstone:  the crowning achievement, point, element, or event.117 
Collection Management Authority:  Constitutes the authority to establish, prioritize, 
and validate theater collection requirements, establish sensor tasking guidance, and 
develop theater collection plans.  
Collection Operations Management: The authoritative direction, scheduling, and 
control of specific collection operations and associated processing, exploitation, and 
reporting resources. 
Condition:  a variable of the operational environment that may affect task performance.  
Physical conditions pertain to the material environment:  weather, climate, geography, 
and terrain.  Military conditions are those characteristics of the equipment upon which the 
performance of desired military functions depend 
                                                 
116 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
Joint Publication 1-02 (12 April 2001, as amended through 19 August 2009).   
117 Capstone, available from http://dictionary.reference.com/, accessed 17 February 2010. 
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Data:  Data will incorporate the following items under the name “Data”:  Data, Voice, 
and Video information that is transmitted between a Control Center and an Unmanned 
System. 
Discipline:  a branch of knowledge; as used in this document, discipline refers to a 
particular type of intelligence:  HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, OSINT, etc.   
Domain:  a location environment; as used in this document, domain refers to either 
maritime, aerospace, terrestrial, etc. 
Intelligence Community:  a federation of executive branch agencies and organizations 
that conduct intelligence activities necessary for conduct of foreign relations and 
protection of national security including:  CIA, DIA, NRO, NSA, NGA, State Dept, 
Treasury, DHS, DEA, FBI, Energy, Service Intel Organizations (Army, Navy, Air Force, 
Marines, Coast Guard). 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR):  an activity that synchronizes 
and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, 
and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations, an 
integrated intelligence and operations function. 
Integrated:   
1. combining or coordinating separate elements so as to provide a harmonious, 
interrelated whole: an integrated plot; an integrated course of study 
2. organized or structured so that constituent units function cooperatively: an 
integrated economy. 
3. having, including, or serving members of different racial, religious, and ethnic 
groups as equals: an integrated school.118 
Integrated Management:  Creation of a military force that operates by engaging as a 
whole through processes including, but not limited to:  strategic planning, setting 
                                                 
118 Integrated, available from http://dictionary.reference.com/, accessed 17 February 2010. 
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objectives, managing resources, deploying human and technical assets needed to achieve 
objectives, and measuring results. 
ISR Enterprise:  Those defense organizations, resources, and personnel assigned 
responsibilities for executing any part of the intelligence mission.  The ISR Enterprise 
includes a core set of organizations and resources that have intelligence as a primary 
function.  The ISR Enterprise may include other resources providing information of 
intelligence value under command and control arrangements specified by the Combatant 
Commander, JFC, or subordinate/component commander. 
ISR Resource:  Any asset that collects, processes, exploits, analyzes, or manages data 
that is used within the intelligence process.  These resources are not necessarily 
"intelligence" resources, and may have a primary mission other than intelligence. 
Joint Force Commander:  A general term applied to a Combatant Commander, sub-
unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant 
command or operational control over a joint force.   
Low Density/High Demand:  LD/HD assets are defined as certain limited assets/forces 
with unique mission capabilities stressed by continual high OPTEMPO because of JFC 
requirements. Assets are governed by steady-state and surge capabilities defined in the 
Global Military Force Policy (GMFP). Steady-state is defined as the maximum peacetime 
deployment capability that can be sustained indefinitely with no adverse impact. Surge is 
defined as an additional level of deployment that can be sustained for a limited period 
with some adverse impact. (After a period of surge, a defined recovery period at or below 
steady-state is required.)  The SECDEF must approve any deployment that forces an 
LD/HD asset into surge status. 
Persistence:  the length of time a sensor can provide continuous coverage of a location, 
target, or activity of interest.  The JFC's desire for persistence is founded upon his 
inability to satisfy CCIRs, PIRs, or EEIs, with the current ISR Enterprise due to problems 
or obstacles generated by friendly and/or adversary actions or capabilities.  What 
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constitutes persistence varies significantly dependent upon JFC mission objectives, 
operating environment, and target type. 
Standard:  quantitative and qualitative measures for specifying the levels of performance 
of a task. 
System:  is a “set of components (subsystems, segments) acting together to achieve a set 
of common objectives via the accomplishment of a set of tasks.”119 
Systems Engineering:  Systems Engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means 
to enable the realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and 
required functionality early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, then 
proceeding with design synthesis and system validation while considering the complete 
problem: 
Operations Cost & Schedule 
Performance  Training & Support 
Test Disposal 
Manufacturing  
Systems Engineering integrates all the disciplines and specialty groups into a team effort 
forming a structured development process that proceeds from concept to production to 
operation. Systems Engineering considers both the business and the technical needs of all 
customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user needs120 
Systems Architecture:   An architecture deals with a top-level system structure 
(configuration), its operational interfaces, anticipated utilization profiles (mission 
                                                 
119 Buede, Dennis M., The Engineering Design of Systems: Models and Methods.  John Wiley & 
sons, New York, NY, 2000, p. 440. 
120 Systems Engineering, available from https://www.incose.org, accessed 14Jan 2010 
  248
scenarios), and the environment within which it is to operate; then it describes how these 
various requirements for the system interact.121 
Task:  an action or activity (derived from an analysis of the mission and concept of 





AAI Aircraft Armaments, Inc 
ACN Aerial Communications Network 
AIP Air Independent Propulsion 
AO Area of Operations 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
AFO Advance Force Operations 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
ALFUS Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems 
AOE Automated Ordnanace Excavator 
AOR Area of Responsibility 
ASCM Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASTM American Society of Tests and Materials 
ATDC After Top Dead Center 
AUV Autonomous Unmanned Vehicle 
AUVS Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems 
AUVSI Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International 
                                                 
121 Blanchard, 2006. 
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BA Battlespace Awareness 
BAE British Aerospace Systems 
BDA Battle Damage Assessment 
BFT Blue Force Tracking 
BIT Built in Test 
BLOS Beyond Line of Sight 
BPAUV Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle 
BPD Barrels per Day 
BTDC Before Top Dead Center 
BULS Bottom (UUV) Localization System 
C2 Command and Control 
C2AFT Command and Control Architecture Task Force 
C3 Command, Control, and Communications 
C4 Command, Control, Communications and Computers 
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
CARACaS Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and 
Sensing 
CAT Crew-Integrated and Automation Test-bed 
CBA Capabilities Based Assessment 
CBP Capabilities Based Planning 
CBR Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
CCDD Cover, Concealment, Deception, Denial 
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 
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CCJO Capstone Concept for Joint Operations 
CDS Common Data Standards 
CES Commander’s Estimate of the Situation 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CIA Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availabiity 
CIO Chief Information Officer 
CN Communications Network 
CNS Communications, Network, and Sensors Track 
COA Course of Action 
COBRA Combine Operations Battlefield Robotic Asset 
COCOM Combatant Command 
COIN Common Operator Interface Navy 
COLREGS Coast Guard International Rules for Avoiding Collisions at 
Sea 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COTS Commercial Off the Shelf 
COUGAR Cooperative Unmanned Ground Attack Robots 
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue 
CVBG Carrier Battle Group 
CVC Constant Volume Combustion 
D.Sc. Doctor of Science 
DAMA Dynamic Assigned Multiple Access 
DARPA Defense Advanced Reaserch Projects Agency 
DBA Dominant Battlespace Awareness 
DEA Drug Enforcement Agency  
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DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
DNI Director of National Intelligence 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDD Department of Defense Directive 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOS Department of State 
DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 
Education, Personnel, Facilities 
EC Environmental Complexity 
EO Electro-Optical 
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
EEI Essential Elements of Information 
EM Electromagnetic 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
ESM Electronic Support Measures 
EW Electronic Warfare 
F-T Fischer-Tropsch 
FA Force Application 
FAA Functional Area Analysis 
FAA United States Federal Aviation Administration 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FCB Functional Capabilities Board 
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram 
FINDER Flight Inserted Detection Expendable for Reconnaissance 
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FL Focused Logistics 
FM Force Management 
FNA Functional Needs Analysis 
FOPEN Foliage Penetration 
FSA Functional Solution Analysis 
GH GLOBAL HAWK 
GMFP Global Military Force Policy 
GSEAS Naval Postgraduate School Graduate School of Engineering 
and Applied Sciences 
GSOIS Graduate School of Operations and Information Sciences 
GWOT Global War on Terrorism 
HADR Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief 
HALE High Altitude Long Endurance 
HAPS High Altitude Platform Station 
HDF High Definition Format 
HDW Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft 
HECC High Efficiency Clean Combustion 
HFE Hidden Field Equations 
HI Horizontal Independence 
HI Human Integration 
HLS Homeland Security 
HMCDM Human Machine Collaboration Decision Making 
HQ Headquarters 
HRI Human Robot Interface 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
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HVU High Value Unit 
HWV Heavy Weight Vehicle 
IA Information Assurance 
IC Intelligence Community 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IED Improvised Explosive Devices 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
IMINT Imagery Intelligence 
IPL Integrated Priority List 
IPR In-Process Review 
IPT Integrated Project Team 
IR Infared  
ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperature Radar 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance 
I&W Indications and Warning 
JAUS Joint Architecture for Unmanned Systems (NASA 
developed used on the Mars Rovers.  Intelligent Autonomy Engine) 
JCA Joint Capability Area 
JFC Joint Force Commander 
JIATF Joint Interagency Task Force 
JIC Joint Integrating Concept 
JIPOE Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational 
Environment 
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JOpsC Joint Operations Concepts 
JP Joint Publication 
JPL Jet Propulsion Lab 
JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JTF Joint Task Force 
LBSAUV Littoral Battlespace Sensing Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicle 
LCS Littoral Combat Ship 
LD/HD Low Density/High Demand 
LiFePO4 Lithium Iron Phosphate 
LOC Lines of Communication 
LOE Limited Objective Experiment 
LPD Low Probabilty of Detection 
LPI Low Probabilty of Interference 
LWV Light Weight Vehicle 
M-HLS/D Maritime-Homeland Security/Defense 
MANET Mobile Adhoc Network 
MASINT Measures and Signature Intelligence 
MATILDA Mesa Associates’ Tactical Integrated Light-Force 
Deployment Assembly 
MAV Micro Air Vehicle 
MC Mission Complexity 
MCM Mine Counter Measures 
MCO Major Combat Operations 
MDARS Mobile Detection, Assessment and Response System 
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MEDAL Mine Warfare and Environmental Decision Aids Library 
MEDAL-EA Mine Warfare and Environmental Decision Aids Library - 
Enterprise Architecture 
MESF Maritime Expeditionary Security Force 
MIMO Multiple Input Multiple Output 
MIW Mine Warfare 
MLS Multi-level Security 
MOE Measures of Effectiveness 
MOLLE Modular, Light Weight, Load Carrying Equipment 
MOOTW Military Operation Other Than War 
MOP Measures of Performance 
MOVES Modeling, Virtual Environments, and Simulation Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA. 
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 
MTRS Man Transportable Robotic System 
N8F Director of Warfare Integration 
N-UCAS Navy-Unmanned Air Combat System 
NARPV National Association of Remotely Piloted Vehicles 
NASA National Aeronautical and Space Agency 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command 
NCE Network Centric Environment 
NCOE Network Centric Operating Environment 
NECC Naval Expeditionary Combat Command 
NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
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NiMH Nickel Metal Hydride 
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmosphere Administration 
NPS Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, USA 
NRL Naval Research Lab 
NRO National Reconnaissance Office 
NSA National Security Agency 
NSAM Net-Centric Sensor Analysis for MIW 
NUS National University of Singapore 
NWDC Naval Warfare Development Group 
OMTF Operations Research and MOVES Task Force 
ONR Office of Naval Research 
ONIR Overhead Non-imaging Infrared 
OODA Observe, Orient, Decide,  and Act 
OPE Operational Preparation of the Environment 
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operation 
OPSIT Operational Scenario 
OPTEMPO Operating / Operations Tempo 
OR Operations Research 
OSINT Open Source Intelligence 
OV Operational View 
PDE Pulse Detonation Engine 
PEM Polymer Electrolyte Membrane 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PIR Prioritized Intelligence Requirement 
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy (China) 
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PMA Post Mission Analysis 
PMA Program Manager Air 
PMS Program Manager Surface 
PNT Positioning, Navigation, and Timing 
POTUS President of the United States 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
PWBS Project Work Breakdown Structure 
R & D Research and Development 
RCS Radar Cross Section 
REDCAR Remote Detection, Challenge, and Response System 
RF Radio Frequency 
RPV Remotely Piloted Vehicle 
RJ RIVET JOINT 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
ROMO Range of Military Operation 
RONS Remote Ordnance Neutralization System 
RTB Return to Base 
S & T Science and Technology 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SAR Synthetic Aperature Radar 
SATCOM Satellite Communications 
SECDEF Secretary of Defense 
SEAL Sea, Air, and Land 
SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information 
SD Strategic Deterrence 
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SE Systems Engineering 
SEA Systems Engineering and Analysis 
SEMP Systems Engineering Management Plan 
SEP Systems Engineering Plan 
SIGINT Signals Intelligence 
SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters 
SO Stability Operations 
SOF Special Operating Forces 
SRR Short Range Radar 
SSOC SEA-16 Organizing Committee 
SSTR Security, Stabilization, Transition and Reconstruction 
STANAG Standardized Agreement 
SV Systems View 
TCP/IP Tactical Communication Protocol/Internet Process 
TCR Target Clutter Ratio 
TDSI Temasek Defence Systems Institute 
TOC Tactical Operations Center 
TPED Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 
TREAS Department of the Treasury 
TSC Theater Security Cooperation 
TTF Time to Failure 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UJTL Universal Joint Task List 
UMS Unmanned Systems 
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UNCLOS United Nations Covention on the Laws of the Sea 
UOSV Unmanned Outer Space Vehicle 
USA United States Army 
USAF United States Air Force 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USN United States Navy 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
USD (I) Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence 
USSOCCOM United States Special Operations Command 
USSV  Unmanned Sea Surface Vehicle 
USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
UV Unmanned Vehicle 
UXO Unexploded Explosive Ordnance 
UWB Ultra Wide Band 
VPOTUS Vice President of the United States 
VTC Video Tele-Conference 
WBS Work Breakdown Structure  
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WWI World War 1 








ME4 Engineer (Singaporean Military Rank) 
ME5 Senior Engineer (Singaporean Military Rank) 
LT Lieutenant 
LTC Lieutenant Colonel 
LTJG Lieutenant Junior Grade 
RADM Rear Admiral  
USA United States of America 
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APPENDIX A NAVAL EXPEDITIONARY COMBAT 
COMMAND (NECC) RESEARCH 
A.1. OVERVIEW OF NECC 
A.1.1. Mission Overview 
 
Figure 83.   NECC Mission122 
                                                 
122 NECC Force Capabilities Fact Sheet. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command.  Accessed 
20May2010. 
  265
A.1.2. Force Capabilities 
There are ten primary force capabilities which are managed by NECC: 
• Riverine 
• Naval Construction (Seabees) 
• Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
• Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) 
• Expeditionary Intelligence 
• Expeditionary Logistics 
• Maritime Civil Affairs 
• Security Force Assistance 
• Combat Camera 
• Expeditionary Combat Readiness 
A.2. SCOPING FORCE CAPABILITIES FOR ANALYSIS 
The SEA-16 tasking statement originally proposed that the project focus the 
development of a joint systems concept and supporting architecture to integrate 
unmanned vehicles in the Navy fleet structure, using the NECC Mission Statement 
shown in Figure 83., and focused on NECC missions.123  Initial research made it 
apparent that the project would have to be scoped to a limited number of the force 
capabilities. 
NECC representatives discussed some initial needs in a video tele-conference 
(VTC) on 06 November 2009.  Mr. Jim Fowler and CDR Glenn Allen of NECC met 
with the SEA-16 cohort, Professor Gary Langford (Thesis Advisor), RADM (ret) Rick 
Williams, and CAPT (ret) Chuck Calvano to identify the preliminary areas of focus and 
state their organizational needs with regards to these capability areas, as shown in Figure 
84.  Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Riverine Forces, and Maritime Expeditionary 
                                                 
123 SEA-16 CAPSTONE PROJECT OBJECTIVES, 03 September 2009 
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were chosen to be those areas of study.  These three areas were assessed to benefit the 
most from the successful implementation of UMS in the near term. Each area was 
assigned to an Integrated Project Team for research and assessment.  The products of 
each of these areas are presented in Section A.3. 
 
Figure 84.   Stated Needs of NECC 
A.3. CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS OF SELECTED NECC CAPABILITIES 
A.3.1. Riverine Force Analysis 
A.3.1.1. Organization 
• Riverine Group One 
• Riverine Squadron 1 (RIVRON 1 >100 sailors) Deployed in Iraq 
from Apr – Oct 07 
Stated Needs of NECC 
o Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
 Need a man-portable human extraction vehicle 
 Explore mission delegation to UVs to counter manning issues. 
o Riverine Forces 
 Desire a UV that meets size limitations to be launched and 
recovered from manned platforms 
 Possible interest in unmanned RHIB (either 7m or 11m) 
o Maritime Expeditionary Security Force 
 Manning requirements extensive - could evolve tasking to UVs. 
 Reduce risk to personnel in hostile security environments. 
 Need ability to increase surveillance capabilities in high volume 
shipping areas to reduce small craft threat operating in close 
proximity to large merchants. 
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• Riverine Squadron 2 (RIVRON 2 >130 sailors) Deployed in Iraq 
from Oct 07 – Apr 08 
• Riverine Squadron 3 (RIVRON 3 >150 sailors) Deployed in Iraq 
from Apr 08 – Oct 08 
• Each squadron commanded by O-5 
• Each squadron is self sufficient 
• Squadrons may act individually or in a joint environment or with 
coalition partners  
A.3.1.2. Missions 
• Conduct Maritime Security Operations 
o Establish control of rivers in specific regions for specific 
periods of time 
o Protect lines of communication 
o Deny the enemy commercial and military use of rivers 
o Establish an area of operations for power projection ashore 
o Protect naval logistic support to forward deployed forces 
• Positively interact with local population to win public support 
o Patrol and Interdiction 
o Protect friendly lines of communication 
o Deny hostile forces the use of waterways 
o Collect intelligence information 
o Perform security missions 
o Enforce population and resources control 
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o Locate and destroy hostile forces, bases, and supplies 
within riparian area 
• Anti-Piracy 
o Employ Riverine craft to deny resources to an enemy and 
prevent piracy of pure criminal intent 
o Persistent presence to deter piracy 
• Law Enforcement 
o Boarding teams to board and search indigenous watercraft 
o Enforce population and resource control measures 
o Collect intelligence information 
o Protect critical infrastructure 
A.3.1.3. Operations 
• Riverine area control 
o Protect critical infrastructure along river 
o Provide secure area to conduct military operations 
o Support civil affairs efforts along or nearby river 
• Interdiction of river lines of communication 
o Impede, disrupt, eliminate enemy personnel and supply 
movement on rivers 
• Fire support 
o Provide fire support with crew service weapons 
• Insertion and extraction of conventional land forces 
o Insert between platoon and company size unit 
• Theater Security Cooperation 
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o Primary employment of Riverine forces during peacetime 
o Garner trust and cooperation of coalition nations 
A.3.1.4. Operational Capabilities 
• Command and Control 
• High Speed and Mobility 
• Firepower 
• Fire support 
• Intelligence and Surveillance 
• Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure 
• Insertion and Extraction of Conventional Ground Forces 
• Self Defense 
• Survivability 
• Expeditionary Logistics and Sustainment 
• Maintainability and Reliability in Expeditionary Environment 
• Medical Treatment and Evacuation 
• Rapidly Deployable  
• Support to Psychological Operations and Civil Military 
Operations 
• Information Operations Support 
• Support to Other Military Operations 
• Training of Partners and Coalition Forces 
• Aviation Support 
• UMS support 
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• Fire Support and Forward Observers 
A.3.1.5. Operational Limitations 
• Small units that cannot sustain during high intensity missions 
• Can only gain local control of river where actively patrolling 
• Limited fire power (need fire support) 
• Cannot conduct direct combat against a large organized armed 
force 
• Situational awareness (need ISR support) 
A.3.1.6. Environment 
• Rivers, Deltas, Harbors, Reservoirs, Lakes 
• Riverine Classifications 
o Type I:  One or more major rivers with branches of 
numerous smaller streams, canals, paddies that present on 
obstacle, but are not LOCs 
o Type II:  Several major waterways in addition to extensive 
network of small rivers, canals, irrigation ditches that 
present an obstacle , but are LOCs. 
o Type III:  Several major waterways in addition to 
extensive network of rivers, canals, irrigation ditches that 
do not present an obstacle and are LOCs. 
A.3.1.7. Threats 
• Expected to operate against up to a Level II threat 
• Many threats exist, including: 
o Water based mines 
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o Attack swimmers 
o Direct Fires 
o Indirect Fires 
o Suicide bombers and other terrorist activities 
o Criminals  
A.3.1.8. Utilization of UMS 
• USVs and UUVs used to support force in close space to conduct 
search and surveillance 
• UAVs provide persistent search and surveillance, 
communications relay, targeting 
• UAVs extend and improve Maritime Domain Awareness in 
riparian environment 
• Use drives up operational tempo of small force and reduces size 
of reaction force 
• Riverine Tactical Operation Center utilizes UV images to increase 
situational awareness 
A.3.2. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Analysis 
A.3.2.1. Organization124 
• Groups - There are two EOD Groups: EODGRU ONE in San Diego, 
California (Naval Amphibious Base Coronado), and EODGRU TWO at 
Norfolk, Virginia (Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek). 
• Mobile Units - Each Group has readiness responsibility for several 
subordinate EOD Mobile Units (EODMU).  EODMUs are trained and 
proficient in the use of various small arms and unit tactics for the 
                                                 
124 NECC “EOD Fact Sheet” 
http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/necc/Documents/04_EOD_FactSheet.pdf 
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prosecution of their core mission skill sets in a combat environment and 
for seamless integration with Navy and Army Special Operations 
Forces, and Marine Corps Expeditionary Units. 
• Company/Platoons and Detachments - EOD Mobile Units are 
responsible for several shore-based EOD Detachments supporting key 
naval installations.  EODMUs have readiness responsibility for 
deployable Mine Countermeasures Platoons (EOD MCM Platoons), 
multi-mission Mobile Company/ Platoons (EOD MOB 
Company/Platoons), and Marine Mammal System Companies (MMS 
Companies). 
• Mobile Diving and Salvage - EOD is also organized into ready units of 
specialized dive teams that conduct harbor and waterway clearance, 
emergent underwater repairs, and salvage operations in all 
environments In depths up to 300 feet. 
• Training and Evaluation - Specialized units located on both coasts 
train all EOD forces, develop and evaluate EOD tools, tactics, and 
techniques in preparation to deploy. 
Marine Expeditionary force is in direct operational control of NECC 
EOD assets.  These assets fall below the regiment level of a Ground Division for both 
operations and support. 
• MEF 
o Division (Ground) 
 Regiment 
• EOD Assets 
o Combat Service Support Group (CSSG) 
 Logistics Regiment 
• EOD Assets 
EOD Assets are often two to four man teams.  Up to two teams are 
assigned to a battalion and in each regiment there up to four battalions. 
  273
 
Figure 85.   EOD Team Deployment 
A.3.2.2. Mission125 
• EOD personnel are highly trained, skilled warriors who are 
experts in explosives, diving, parachuting, weapons, and small 
unit tactics 
• Render safe all types of explosive hazards, including conventional 
ordnance, improvised explosive devices, and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (chemical/biological, nuclear, and radiological 
weapons) 
• Conduct clandestine operations either independently, or as part of 
a larger combatant force 
• Support the most elite units of U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), to include direct action support of Navy SEALs 
                                                 
125 NECC “EOD Fact Sheet” 
http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/necc/Documents/04_EOD_FactSheet.pdf 
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and Army Special Forces 
• Conduct demolition of hazardous munitions, pyrotechnics, and 
retrograde explosives using detonation and burning technique 
• Support military and civilian law enforcement agencies by 
analyzing and handling foreign and domestic explosives 
• Work with the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. State Department, 
helping to protect the President of the United States (POTUS), 
Vice President (VPOTUS), as well as foreign officials and 
dignitaries 
• Support the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. 
Customs Office, and the FBI as well as state and local authorities 
A.3.2.3. Concept of Operations 
In Figure 86 an example of when EOD is used.  An infantry patrol 
visually detects an explosive device.  Regional battlespace commander is then notified 
and they deploy an EOD team to interdict.  EOD ensures the battlespace commander is 






























Figure 86.   EOD Land CONOPS 
A.3.2.4. Operational Limitations 
• Rely on accurate intelligence to avoid unnecessary casualties. 
• Can only gain local control of river where actively patrolling 
• Need support personnel to protect them during operations 
• Situational awareness (need ISR support) 
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A.3.2.5. Environment 
• EOD personnel are trained to operate in all land and sea 
environments.  The can be inserted by air, land or sea. 
A.3.2.6. Threats 
• Many threats exist, to EOD units beside the ordnance being 
disposed of the threats include: 
o Snipers 
o Proximity mines 
o Direct Fires 
o Indirect Fires 
o Suicide bombers and other terrorist activities 
o Incorrect assessment of ordnance disposal 
A.3.2.7. Utilization of UMS 
• UMS’s are used to support to conduct search and disarmaments 
• UMS’s extend EOD’s safety and longevity during missions 





























Figure 87.   EOD Land CONOPS 
A.3.3. Maritime Expeditionary Security Force Analysis 
A.3.3.1. Organization 
• Maritime Expeditionary Security Group (MESG)  
o 2 Active Groups 
• Maritime Expeditionary Security Squadron (MSRON)  
o 1 Active Squadron  
o 5 Blended Active/Reserve Squadrons  
o 4 Reserve Component Squadrons 
• Command and Control Divisions (C2DIV) 
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o 2 Active Component Units 
o 7 Reserve Component Units 
• Boat Divisions (BOATDIV)  
o 3 Active Component Units 
o 8 Reserve Component Units 
o 3 Blended Active/Reserve Units 
• Security Divisions (SECDIV) 
o 6 Active Component Units 10 Reserve Component Units 
• Helo, Visit, Board, Search and Seizure Detachments 
(HVBSSDET) 
o 2 Active Component Units 
A.3.3.2. Mission Decomposition 
“MESF’s primary mission is force protection. Anti-Terrorism Force 
Protection (ATFP) missions include harbor and homeland defense, coastal surveillance, 
and special missions.  Units conduct force protection of strategic shipping and naval 
vessels operating in the inshore and coastal areas, anchorages and harbors, from bare 
beach to sophisticated port facilities.  Specialized units work together with Maritime 
Expeditionary Security Squadron (MSRON) staffs providing intelligence and 
communications. MESF units deploy worldwide to detect, deter, and defend an area, 
unit, or High Value Asset.”126 
                                                 
126 MESF Fact Sheet. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command. Accessed 13January 2010. 
http://www.necc.navy.mil/NECC%20Fact%20Sheets/00195_NECC_SubCom_MESF_FactSheet_2.pdf  
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This mission is functionally decomposed in Figure 88., with the high-
level function of MESF as “Conduct Force Protection.” 
 
Figure 88.   Functional Decomposition of MESF Missions 
A.3.3.3. Operations 
• Maritime Surveillance 
• In-Shore Surveillance 
• Security Operations 
• Anti-Terrorism Force Protection 
• Ground Defense 
• Afloat Defense 
• Airfield / Aircraft Security 
• Detention Operations 
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• Law Enforcement 
A.3.3.4. Roles 
• Conducts scalable force protection and security for designated 
assets 
• Provides layered defense in an integrated coastal and landward 
security environment 
• Provides the NCC/JFMCC with adaptive force packages 
responsive to mission requirements 
• Provides integrated maritime expeditionary security capabilities 
including: 
o Mobile and fixed defensive operations 
o Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) Level III 
o Robust security in support of JFMCC operations across 
the spectrum of maritime engagement 
• Supports Partner Nation Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) 
operations 
• Provides training capability for partnering with other nations 
• Supports Host Nation Security, Stabilization and Reconstruction 
Operations (SSTRO) 
• Provides Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) Exploitation 
Teams 
• Supports Maritime Expeditionary Intelligence Operations 
A.3.3.5. Operational Limitations 
• Small units that cannot sustain during high intensity missions 
• Can only gain local control of river where actively patrolling 
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• Limited fire power (need fire support) 
• Cannot conduct direct combat against a large organized armed 
force   
• Situational awareness (need ISR support) 
A.3.3.6. Environment 
• Near Coast Area 
o Ground 
o Littoral Area 
A.3.3.7. Threats 
• Small Surface Crafts 
o Smugglers 
o Traffickers 
o Harassing State Actors 
• Small Aircraft 
o Single engine Propeller 
o Unmanned drones 
• Undersea and Submersibles 
o Smuggling submarines 
o Divers 
o Mines 
o Improvised Explosive Devices 
• Electronic Warfare 
o Friendly Communication Exploitation 
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o Frequency management 
A.4. POTENTIAL NECC APPLICATIONS TO 2030 JOINT UMS 
ARCHITECTURE 
A.4.1. Riverine Force 
Management of Assets 
Manned / unmanned vehicle cooperation 
Advance Scouts 
Unmanned Patrols 
Aerial or surface Fire Support 
Obstacle detection and avoidance 
Threat Assessment 
A.4.2. Naval Construction (SEABEES) 
Management of Assets 
Unit Area Defense 
Construction Assistance 
A.4.3. Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Management of Assets 
Identification of hazards 
Unmanned removal of explosives 




A.4.4. Maritime Expeditionary Security Force 
Management of Assets 
Manned / unmanned vehicle cooperation 
UV Swarm Capability and Countering 
Unmanned Patrols 
Aerial or surface Fire Support 
Threat Assessment 
A.4.5. Expeditionary Intelligence 
Unmanned Surveillance 
Cross-domain Threat Assessment 
Timely information distributed through network 
A.4.6. Expeditionary Logistics 
Management of Assets 
Identification of hazardous materials 
Unmanned vehicle cargo handling 
A.4.7. Maritime Civil Affairs 
Management of Civil Operations 
Unmanned Surveillance 
Area Defensive Perimeter 
A.4.8. Security Force Assistance 
Network training for coalition partners 
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A.4.9. Combat Camera 
Cross-domain Threat Information 
Timely imaging from Unmanned Systems 
Images quickly distributed through network 
A.4.10. Expeditionary Combat Readiness 
Management of Assets 
Images quickly distributed through network 
A.5. OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS 
A.5.1. OPSIT 1:  Oil Platform (OILPLAT) Protection 
The situation is based on the current day usage of a Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC) Maritime Expeditionary Security Force (MESF) securing an 
Oil Platform (OILPLAT) in the Arabian Gulf. 
 
Assumption: Routine day 
Initial set-up for the security forces are in place  
Unmanned Systems (UMS) are on a rotating basis to ensure 24/7 
coverage for the organic forces stationed on the OILPLAT. 
 





Manned MESF RHIB 




Initial Set-up is complete (assume normal day of operation) 
Combat Information Center (CIC) centrally located 
Perimeter establish IAW ROE to secure Oil Platform 
UAVs and USV Hand off complete for on coming and off going 
Off going proceed to maintenance, fuel, armament area.  Can be 
used in the event of emergency  
 
Phases of Mission:  In addition to the following list the breakdown is shown in 
Figure 89., Figure 90., Figure 91., and Figure 92. 
Surveillance Phase 
1. UAV establishes link with Combat Information Center (CIC) upon entry into 
battlespace  
2. CIC uploads mission tasking to UAV 
3. UAV confirms mission tasking with CIC 
4. UAV patrols region and provides real-time surveillance around OILPLAT 
5. USV establishes link with CIC  
6. CIC uploads mission tasking to USV 
7. USV confirms mission tasking with CIC 
8. USV patrols region and provides real-time surveillance around OILPLAT to 
CIC 
Detect Phase 
9. UAV transmits unknown surface contact data to CIC 
10. CIC initiates increased posture to MESF 
11. CIC initiates increased posture to USV 
12. CIC relays threat to MESF 
13. CIC relays threat to USV 
14. CIC alters mission tasking and maneuvers USV to intercept target vessel 
15. CIC transmits threat information to network 
Track Phase 
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16. CIC alters USV tasking to monitor threat 
17. UAV tracks targets and transmits updated video and data to CIC 
Engage Phase 
18. CIC transits warning via USV onboard communication gear to the target 
craft. 
19. CIC transmits updated threat information to network 
20. CIC authorizes USV to engages hostiles with onboard weapons 
21. CIC authorizes MESF to engage hostiles 
22. MESF transmits Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) data to CIC 
23. USV transmits BDA data to CIC 
24. UAV transmits BDA data to CIC 
25. CIC transmits downgraded protective posture to UAV 
26. CIC transmits downgraded protective posture to MESF 
27. CIC transmits downgraded protective posture to USV 
28. CIC transfers UAV to surveillance mode 
29. CIC transfers USV to surveillance mode 
30. MESF restored to stand-by posture by CIC 




Figure 89.   OILPLAT Input/Output Trace Diagram 1 
 
 
Figure 90.   OILPLAT Input/Output Trace Diagram 2 
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Figure 91.   OILPLAT Input/Output Trace Diagram 3 
 
 
Figure 92.   OILPLAT Input/Output Trace Diagram 4 
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A.5.2. OPSIT 2:  RIVERINE PATROL 
The situation is based on the current day usage of a Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC) Riverine Force performing a routine patrol in support of 
waterborne security.  
 
Assumption: Routine day 
Initial set-up for the security forces are in place  
Unmanned Systems (UMS) are on a rotating basis to ensure 24/7 
coverage for the organic forces. 
Patrol initiates from a secure US controlled area  
 
Threat:  Ambush from insurgents using watercraft 




Manned Riverine RHIB 
 
Background Info: 
Initial Set-up is complete (assume normal day of operation) 
Combat Information Center centrally located 
Perimeter establish IAW ROE to protect Riverine Patrol 
 
Phases of Mission:  In addition to the following list the breakdown is shown in 
Figure 93., Figure 94., and Figure 95. 
Launch Phase 
1. Riverine RHIB requests surveillance of patrol area 
2. Launch Riverine RHIBs 
3. UAV establishes link with Combat Information Center (CIC) upon entry into 
battlespace 
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4. CIC uploads mission tasking to UAV 
5. UAV confirms mission tasking with CIC 
6. UAV patrols region and provides real-time surveillance around Riverine 
Patrol Area to CIC 
7. USV establishes link with CIC upon entry into battlespace after turnover.  
8. CIC uploads mission tasking to USV 
9. USV confirms mission tasking with CIC 
10. USV patrols region and provides real-time surveillance around Riverine 
Patrol Area to CIC 
Detect Phase 
11. UAV transmits data of potential threat to CIC 
12. CIC initiates increased posture to UAV 
13. CIC initiates increased posture to USV 
14. CIC initiates increased posture to Riverine Patrol 
15. CIC relays threat to Riverine Patrol 
16. CIC relays updated threat information to network 
Track Phase 
17. CIC alters USV tasking to monitor threat 
18. USV tracks targets and transmits updated video and data to CIC 
19. UAV tracks targets and transmits updated video and data to CIC 
Engage Phase 
20. CIC authorizes USV to engages hostiles with onboard weapons 
21. CIC authorizes Riverine Patrol to engage hostiles 
22. Riverine Patrol transmits Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) data to CIC 
23. USV transmits BDA data to CIC 
24. UAV transmits BDA data to CIC 
25. CIC transmits downgraded protective posture to UAV 
26. CIC transmits downgraded protective posture to USV 
27. CIC transmits downgraded protective posture to Riverine Patrol 
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28. CIC authorizes Riverine Patrol return to base for re-supply and re-
deployment 
 




Figure 94.   RIVERINE Input/Output Trace Diagram 2 
 
Figure 95.   RIVERINE Input/Output Trace Diagram 3 
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APPENDIX B UNMANNED SYSTEMS RESEARCH 
Appendix B is a compilation of Unmanned Systems (UMS) that are either in use 
in the field, in testing, in the research and development phase, or future concepts or 
systems. 
Appendix B was used to assist in the development of the model and simulations 
in the project to assess the viability of the concept.  While the project used only open 
sources data on the Predator UAV, the model is functional enough that obtained data for 
many UMS could be used to run the model and test it for usefulness.  The Predator data 
was used as the baseline and reasonable extrapolations for future systems of a “Predator-
like” UAV for future use. 
Appendix B are broken up into the six sections.  The first section is a history of 
UMS, and the following five section are divided into the categories previously described 
in the paper; UAV, USV, UUV, UGV, and UOSV. 
B.1. HISTORICAL MILITARY USAGE OF UMS 
UMS are not a new development and can be traced back almost a century.  In 
World War I, the Imperial German Navy used FL-boats (Fernlenkboote) which were 
wired guided from shore and assisted by manned spotter aircraft to attack and destroy 
coastal shipping.127 
In the Winter War against Finland and in the early stages of World War II the 
Soviet Red Army employed remotely controlled teletanks.  While only capable of less 
than a mile of distance for control, they were still able to take the “man” out of the 
immediate battlefield.  The Red Army also employed remote controlled cutters and 
experimented with aircraft.128 
                                                 
127 Imperial Germany UMS, available from http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/, accessed January 
20, 2010. 
128Soviet Red Army UMS, available from http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/, accessed January 20, 
2010. 
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Similar to the Germans and Soviets, the US also experimented with unmanned 
vehicles in the early years of the 20th Century.  Prior to WWI the US Navy developed a 
sea plane that was capable of unmanned flight.  In WWII the Navy also used plywood 
UAV for attacking heavily defended targets.129 
Project Aphrodite was an Army Air Corps that used older B-17 Flying Fortress 
flown to altitude by a pilot, who would then eject.  The the B-17 would be piloted 
remotely from a second B-17 and crashed into the intended target to limit losses of 
aircraft and crews over difficult targets.  Another aspect of this was the use of drone B-
17’s during the atomic tests in the South Pacific.  Another Army project involved the 
development of a reconnaissance UAV from a drone.  Initially fitted with cameras they 
were later modified with television systems.130 
By 1964, an Air Force drone reconnaissance program, known as Buffalo Hunter, 
was under full development. A C-1 30D aircraft could carry up to four drones under its 
wings, flying out of Vietnam they would launch them like missiles on a preprogrammed 
flight over enemy held territory.  From the mid-1960s until the end of the Vietnam War, 
more than 3,000 missions were flown over North Vietnam and China. 131 
Another Vietnam ear UAV program run by the Navy involved helicopters 
equipped with television cameras and torpedoes, to attack supply barges in the Mekong 
Delta.  This program had limited success, mainly because of limited capability caused 
by the technology immaturity of the flight gyroscopes of the times.132 
Following Vietnam, it was noted that Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV) had the 
potential for added value in the modern battlefield and force structure.  A group called 
the National Association of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (NARPY) was established. Over 
several decades, research and development in UMS grew globally, and that group 
evolved to include the international community.  Now, this group is known as the 
                                                 





Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI). “AUVSI continues 
as the hub of the global unmanned systems community. Through communication, 
education, advocacy, awareness and leadership, the organization continues to promote 
and support unmanned systems.”133 
Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom both used UAV to provide 
intelligence gathering and fire support.  Operations in Afghanistan have also used UMS 
to detect IEDs and attack targets of opportunity and kill key personnel in the Taliban and 
Al Qaeda organizations. 
In addition to the United States many other countries are working to develop and 
integrate UMS into their force structures.  Use of UMS can help commanders make 
better and timelier decisions along with the potential of keeping personnel safer.  Using 
UMS for dangerous missions such as surveillance and IED detection can help to limit 
injury and death to our highly trained personnel.  Conceptually, UMS are not a new way 
of doing business, what is new is the equipment and technology that are going into 
modern UMS. 
B.2. UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES 
B.2.1. Current Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
B.2.1.1. MQ-1 Predator (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems) 
One of the most widely known UAV is the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator 
UAV.  The first Predators were used for surveillance but over the years and an 
exponential increase in usage the latest version are also armed with Hellfire missiles.  
They are used by not only the US military but also government agencies like the CIA for 
surveillance and precision attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.134 
                                                 
133 AUVSI, available from http://www.auvsi.org/, accessed January 20, 2010. 
134 MQ-1 Predator, available from http://www.ga.com/index.php, accessed January 10, 2010. 
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Figure 96.   General Atomics MQ-1 Predator UAV.135 
Habitat: The skies of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. 
Behavior: Predator, as shown in Figure 96.,  is one of only two major U.S. 
unmanned systems that carry weapons (in this case, two Hellfire air-to-ground missiles), 
the Predator bears the brunt of the hunter-killer role with its successor, the beefier MQ-9 
Reaper.  It has a range of 400 nautical miles, and an endurance of 40 hours.136 
Notable Features: The Predator was first drone system to see heavy use both 
as a reconnaissance platform and in an attack role, first seeing action in Bosnia in the 
mid 1990s.  The name "Predator" is now almost synonymous with hunter-killer UAVs.  
Configured with a satellite data link system, Predator is equipped with an EO/IR 
stabilized gimbal containing two color video cameras and a forward-looking infrared 
(FLIR) camera as well as a synthetic aperture radar (SAR).  The Predator has been 
configured with air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons as well as a laser designator. Since 
1995, Predator has logged over 405,000 flight hours, of which over more than half have 
been during combat area deployments to the Balkans, Southwest Asia, and the Middle 
East where Predator operates in support of U.S. and NATO forces. Based upon the 
                                                 
135 MQ-1 Predator, available from http://www.ga.com/index.php, accessed January 10, 2010. 
136 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones 
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success of the program, the U.S. Department of Defense transitioned the Predator 
program to full rate production in August 1997, marking it as the first Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program to be designated an Acquisition 
Category II Program. 
Predators are currently in production for the U.S. and Italian Air Force. Land-
based Predators have demonstrated the ability to support maritime forces including 
carrier battle groups, amphibious ready groups, and submarines.  Predator is the only 
reconnaissance system available in the U.S. inventory that can provide near real-time 
video imagery day or night in all weather conditions via satellite worldwide - without 
exposing pilots to combat fire. As the first successful unmanned aircraft surveillance 
program, Predator provides tactical and strategic intelligence to operational commanders 
worldwide.137 
Features: 
• Solid-state digital avionics 
• Remotely piloted or fully autonomous 
• SAR and EO/IR providing day/night and all-weather operations in one-
mission aircraft 
• GPS and INS 
• UHF/VHF voice 
• Extensive combat experience 
Capabilities: 
• Expanded EO/IR payload 
• SAR all-weather capability 
• Satellite control 
• GPS and INS 
• Endurance of 40 hours and a range 400 nmi 
• Deployed with the U.S. and Italian Air Force 
                                                 
137 General Atomics Aeronautical “Predator” http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php 
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• Operations to 25,000 ft (7620m) 
• 450 lb (204 kg) payload 
• Wingspan 48.7 ft (14.84m), length 27 ft (8.23m) 
B.2.1.2. MQ-9 Reaper (General Atomics Aeronautical Systems) 
 
Figure 97.   General Atomics Reaper MQ-9 UAV138 
Habitat: Hunting and killing insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 
Pakistan. Patrolling the U.S. Mexican Border out of Fort Huachuca, Arizona. 
Behavior:  Reaper, as shown in Figure 97., has a wingspan of 66 feet, 
it’s twice the size of its precursor MQ-1 Predator, and can loiter at 5,000 feet for up to 
24 hours.  Loaded with 3,000 pounds of munitions, including the GBU-12 laser-guided 
bomb and Hellfire tank-penetrating missiles, military commanders say it has become 
one of their most effective weapons in the current wars.139 
                                                 
138 General Atomics Reaper MQ-9 UAV, 
http://www.afrc.af.mil/photos/mediagallery.asp?galleryID=332, accessed May 15, 2010. 
139 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Notable Feature: After being launched by operators using radio-
control equipment, it’s flown via satellite link from pilots on safe soil in the U.S. 
B.2.1.3. ScanEagle (Insitu/Boeing) 
Another system that is gaining ground in the US Navy is ScanEagle.  Compact 
and lightweight ScanEagle can be operated from even the smallest naval ships; including 
the Mark V naval special warfare craft or flight deck of any surface ship with its catapult 
launching system and a patented “Skyhook” retrieval system.  ScanEagle is strictly a 
surveillance platform with either a stabilized electro-optical or infrared cameras for day 
and night surveillance.  The latest version being tested is capable of 22hours of flight 
time.140 
 
Figure 98.   Insitu/Boeing ScanEagle.141 
                                                 




Figure 99.   Insitu/Boeing ScanEagle.142 
Habitat: With Marine Corps troops in Iraq or aboard U.S. Navy 
ships anywhere in the world. 
Behavior: ScanEagle, as shown in Figure 98. and Figure 99., weighs 
40 pounds and is four-feet long with a 10.2-foot wingspan.  Powered by a gasoline 
engine for 15 hours.  Its catapult launch makes it ideal for tight spaces, like the deck of 
the ship that rescued Capt. Richard Phillips from Somali pirates last in April 2010.143 
Notable Feature: To land, the ScanEagle’s navigation points it 
toward a sky-hook that snares it out of the sky.  Developed in partnership with The 
Boeing Company, ScanEagle is highly stealth at very low altitudes enabled by a low 
acoustic, visual, and infrared range signature, an advanced muffler, and a mature 
modular design that enables carriage of electro-optic or infrared imaging payloads.144 
                                                 
142 Ibid. 
143 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
144 INSITU “Scan Eagle” http://www.insitu.com/scaneagle, accessed January 20, 2010. 
  302
B.2.1.4. RQ-11B Raven 
 
Figure 100.   RQ-11B Raven145 
Habitat: The Raven, as shown in Figure 100., is the most prevalent UAV 
on the planet, with more than 7,000 units in service.  The RQ-11B is currently being 
used in Iraq and Afghanistan by army brigades. 
Behavior: The RQ-11B not only provide situational awareness it also 
provide target information for Air Force Special Operations Command Battlefield 
Airmen and Air Force security forces. The Raven falls into the class of Air Force small 
UAS known as man-portable UAS.146 
                                                 
145 Air Force Official Site “RQ-11B Raven” 
http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=10446, accessed May 15, 2010. 
146 Ibid. 
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Spec: The Raven is typically fitted with an electronically stabilized color video 
camera or an infrared video camera for night missions, which pan, tilt and zoom 
digitally to provide ground troops with “situational awareness.”  The fleet is expecting a 
digital upgrade that turns the Raven into a communications relay, effectively extending 
its six-mile range. 
Features: The Raven back-packable system which features two air vehicles 
or AVs, a ground control unit, remote video terminal, transit cases and support 
equipment.  Two specially trained Airmen operate the Raven AV.  The AV can be 
controlled manually or can autonomously navigate a preplanned route.147 
Notable Feature: Light and durable design allows for easy replacement of 
wings upon a crash.  The Raven also includes a color electro-optical camera and an 
infrared camera for night operations.  The air vehicle is hand-launched. 
General Characteristics2 
Primary Function: Reconnaissance and surveillance with low altitude 
operation 
Contractor: Aerovironment, Inc. 
Power Plant: Electric Motor, rechargeable lithium ion batteries 
Wingspan: 4.5 feet (1.37 meters) 
Weight: 4.2 lbs (1.9 kilograms) 
Weight (ground control unit): 17 lbs (7.7 kilograms) 
Speed:  30-60 mph (26-52 knots) 
Range: 8-12 km (4.9-7.45 miles) 
Endurance: 60-90 minutes 
Altitude (operations): 100-500 feet air ground level ( to 152 meters) 




System Cost: approximately $173,000 (2004 dollars) 
Payload: High resolution, day/night camera and thermal imager 
Date deployed: 2004 
Inventory: 7000+ 
B.2.1.5. Wasp III (AeroVironment) 
 
Figure 101.   AeroVironment Wasp III.148 
Habitat: Deploys with U.S. Air Force Special Ops forces. 
Behavior: The Wasp III, as shown in Figure 101., weighs one pound 
and is launched by hand this flying wing is outfitted with a day and night camera and 
can be programmed to fly an autonomous mission between takeoff and recovery.  It flies 
20 to 40 mph up to 500 feet, and is meant to be expendable once it gets its eyes on a 
target.149 
                                                 
148 Wasp III (BATMAV) Micro UAV, http://defense-update.com/products/w/wasp3.htm, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
149 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Notable Feature: Electrically powered, two-bladed propeller makes 
it very quiet.  Its inventory is classified.  This UAV was developed under a DARPA 
Micro-UAV program.  Wasp III is equipped with forward and side looking color video 
cameras, as well as a modular forward or side looking electo-optical infrared payload.  
To maintain continuous coverage of a specific target, the Wasp automatically circles 
around it, maintaining the designated target in the side camera's field of view.  The 
system is packed in a small suitcase, rapidly assembled within few minutes and is 
launched by hand toss. 150 
B.2.1.6. Desert Hawk (Lockheed Martin) 
 
Figure 102.   Lockheed Martin Desert Hawk.151 
Habitat: Used by British and American troops in Afghanistan. 
                                                 
150  Defense Update “Wasp III Micro UAV”  http://defense-update.com/products/w/wasp3.htm, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
151 Lockheed Martin Desert Hawk., http://www.armybase.us/2009/05/lockheed-martin-successfully-
tests-signals-intelligence-capability-and-improved-wing-design-on-desert-hawk-iii-unmanned-aircraft-
system/, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Behavior: After manned launch the Desert Hawk, as shown in Figure 
102., follows pre-programmed coordinates to give troops an “over-the-hill” view, day or 
night, up to six miles away.  At two pounds (with a collapsible 4.5-foot wingspan), it’s 
easy to transport. 
Notable Feature: Built of injection-molded expanded polypropylene 
and fitted with Kevlar skids, the Desert Hawk is as durable as a Nerf.152  The Desert 
Hawk III is designed for portability, quick mission planning, hand launched and skid 
recovery, multi-mission versatility, enhanced day/night target detection, recognition, 
identification, greater operational range, endurance and covert operations.  Desert Hawk 
III provides persistent surveillance by the use of a gyro-stabilized 360-degree sensor 
turret, color and low light electro-optical plug-and-play payloads, and roll-stabilized 
infrared sensor payloads.  It consists of a rugged air vehicle and a lightweight, portable 
ground station, which provides operator training, autonomous pre-flight planning, in-
flight control of plug-and-play optical and infrared sensors, terrain avoidance measures, 
and the ability to provide real time dynamic in-flight mission and flight profile re-
tasking.153 
                                                 
152 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
153 Lockheed Martin “Desert Hawk III” 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/DesertHawk/index.html, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.1.7. MD4-200 (Microdrone) 
 
Figure 103.   Microdrone MD4-200154 
Habitat: Used by the police in Liverpool, UK as an Anti-social 
Behavior Task Force. 
Behavior: The Microdrone, as shown in Figure 103., is a four-rotor 
design of the battery-powered, carbon-fiber pod, which weighs just 2.2 pounds, allows it 
to take off and land vertically. Brushless, direct-drive electric motors keep the noise 
level below 64 decibels, according to the company. 
Notable Feature: If it loses signal or senses a low battery, it will land 
itself autonomously rather than crash.155  Drone has been designed completely in carbon 
fiber reinforced plastics, which makes it light and shields against electromagnetic 
interferences.  Depending on payload, temperature and wind the vehicle achieves up to 
20 minutes of flight time.156 
                                                 
154 Microdrone MD4-200, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
155 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
156 Micro Drones “MD4-200” http://www.microdrones.com/en_md4-200_introduction.php, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.1.8. T-Hawk/gMAV (Honeywell) 
 
Figure 104.   Honeywell T-Hawk/gMAV.157 
Habitat: Utilized by the U.S. Army infantry in Iraq. 
Behavior: T-Hawk, as shown in Figure 104., provides EOD the 
ability to view an EOD incident from a perspective other than that of a ground robotic 
system.158 
Notable Feature: VTOL T-Hawk weighs 16 pounds and can fly up 
to10,000 feet for up to 45 minutes. 
                                                 
157 Honeywell T-Hawk/gMAV. http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar. accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
158 BNET “Navy Buys 90 Honeywell Micro Air Vehicles for EOD Teams” 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6712/is_27_240/ai_n31060866/, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.1.9. Aerosonde (AAI Corporation) 
 
Figure 105.   AAI Corporation Aerosonde159 
Habitat: Stormy seas, or any other inhospitable or inaccessible spot 
scientific researchers want to study up close. 
Behavior: Aerosonde, as shown in Figure 105., was the first UAV to 
cross the Atlantic Ocean, back in 1998, the 9.8-foot, 28-pound research craft can fly up 
to 30 hours on a single tank of gas.  In 2007 it delivered unprecedented weather readings 
from Hurricane Noel, loitering as low as 300 feet above the surface, and streaming data 
for more than seven hours before it was ditched in the ocean. 160 
Notable Feature: The inverted V tail combines functions of what 
would be the horizontal and vertical parts of the tail wing, saving weight.  It has one 
horsepower. 
                                                 
159 AAI Corporation Aerosonde, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
160 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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With a full electro-optic/infrared payload, the Aerosonde aircraft can 
achieve more than 10 hours endurance.  It can land via belly or net capture using AAI’s 
proprietary launch and recovery trailer, or LRT, system with Soft Hands™ recovery 
technology. 
With these capabilities, the Aerosonde aircraft has accumulated several 
significant flight milestones including161: 
• The Aerosonde Mark 4.7 was showcased at the 2010 Bahrain Air 
Show, where the flight team conducted the system’s first flights in 
the Middle East region.  These included a flight during a driving 
sand storm, which displayed the aircraft’s rugged, all-weather 
capability. 
• In 2009, the Aerosonde Mark 4.7 system was introduced to 
provide expeditionary intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance.  Including the novel Soft Hands net recovery 
technology, the system rounded out the year with a successful 
shipboard launch and recovery demonstration off the M-80 
Stiletto ship. 
• In 2007, an Aerosonde was the first unmanned aircraft to 
penetrate the eye of a hurricane.  Under a program administered 
by NASA and the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the Aerosonde aircraft flew a mission of more 
than 17 hours, a record 7.5 of which were spent navigating 
Hurricane Noel’s eye and boundary layer. 
• During 2006, the aircraft set a world flight endurance record in its 
class by remaining in flight without refueling for more than 38 
hours. 
                                                 
161 Aerosonde “Products and Services” http://www.aerosonde.com/products/products.html, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.1.10. FINDER (Naval Research Laboratory) 
 
 
Figure 106.   NRL FINDER162 
Habitat: The wing-mounted weapons pylons beneath Predator 
drones, from which it is launched. 
Behavior: The Flight Inserted Detection Expendable for 
Reconnaissance (FINDER) is 5ft 3in long and weighs 58 pounds.  It can be flown via 
the Predator controls and directed to a smoke plume to sniff out chemical weapons or 
under a cloudbank to get a closer view of a potential target. 163 
Notable Feature: It launches like a rocket from the predator, and then its 
wings unfold. 
The goal is to exhibit a capability to determine the presence of chemical 
agents following an attack on a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) facility.  The 
                                                 
162 NRL FINDER, http://www.nrl.navy.mil/research/nrl-review/2003/simulation-computing-
modeling/cross/, accessed May 15, 2010. 
163 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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FINDER will autonomously fly to a designated recovery site, at which it will 
autonomously land and be recovered by friendly forces.  The FINDER has a propulsion 
system that used Predator aviation fuel and is able to sustain flight for 8 to 10 hours at 
70 km/h airspeed which translates into an operational range of more than 350 nm. 
Summary: FINDER supports the European Command requirements for a 
chemical battle damage assessment tool.  The vehicle and current payload provides real 
time or near real time: local area meteorological data, integration with the existing 
Predator infrastructure, Predator stand-off capability, critical sample collection, return of 
sample to a safe area, and extended range egress. 
As technology evolves, FINDER possesses the flexibility to accept a 
wide variety of modular payloads and deployment options. Figure 106. shows a 
demonstrated deployment alternative that was a fallout of the normal vehicle 
development.  Future growth capabilities are already being discussed as follow-on 
options164: 
 
• Toxic chemical/precursors sensing  
o IMS detectors reprogrammable to add new signatures; 
• Biological detection capability  
o Preliminary study of mature technologies  
o Flexibility for future payload integration options; 
• NAVY at-sea base option  
o Rail launch future capability is feasible; 
• Radiological hazard sensing  
o Flexibility for future payload integration options. 
                                                 
164 Navy Research Laboratory “ Finder UAV: A Counterpoliferation Asset” 
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/research/nrl-review/2003/simulation-computing-modeling/cross/, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
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B.2.1.11. RQ-7 Shadow (AAI) 
 
Figure 107.   AAI RQ-7 Shadow165 
Habitat: Iraq and Afghanistan, where Army battalions need tactical 
surveillance. 
Behavior: The Shadow, as shown in Figure 107., is launched from a 
catapult, stays aloft for five to six hours up to 14,000 feet, and lands autonomously on 
wheels, with the help of a net.  It’s a little more than 11 feet long, weighs 375 pounds 
and has a wingspan of 14 feet. 
Notable Feature: With its infrared illuminator, it can laser-pinpoint 
targets for laser-guided missiles and bombs.  The most critical element of the system is 
its electro-optical/infrared real-time relay camera held underneath the fuselage.  The 
camera is gimbal-mounted and digitally-stabilized.166 
                                                 
165 AAI RQ-7 Shadow, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 15, 
2010. 
166 Militray Factory, “AAI Corporation RQ-7 Shadow 200 Tactical”, 
http://www.militaryfactory.com/aircraft/detail.asp?aircraft_id=326 , accessed May 15, 2010. 
  314
B.2.1.12. Heron (Israeli Aerospace Industries) 
 
Figure 108.   Israeli Aerospace Industries Heron167 
Habitat: Watching over Israel, patrolling India’s borders with 
Pakistan and China, looking for drug traffickers in El Salvador, and dozens of other 
missions around the globe, where the unarmed surveillance craft is used by countries 
importing it from Israel. 
Behavior: With a 54-foot wingspan and max altitude ceiling of 
30,000 feet, the Heron, as shown in Figure 108., uses an advanced collection of sensors 
to stream data to its handlers. It can stay aloft for 52 hours. 
Notable Feature: The Herron can take off and land autonomously, 
even in poor weather conditions168: 
The HERON I main features and capabilities are: 
• Multiple operational configurations 
• Adverse weather capability 
• Safe, reliable and easy operation 
                                                 
167 Israeli Aerospace Industries Heron, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
168 Israeli Aerospace Industries “Heron” http://www.iai.co.il/18900-16382-
en/BusinessAreas_UnmannedAirSystems_HeronFamily.aspx?btl=1, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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• Simultaneously 4 sensors use capability 
• Satellite communication for extended range (SATCOM) 
• Two proven simultaneous Automatic Takeoff and Landing 
(ATOL) systems for maximal safety 
• Fully redundant, state-of-the-art avionics 
• Retractable landing gear  
B.2.1.13. Hermes 450/Watchkeeper (Elbit Systems) 
 
Figure 109.   Elbit Systems Hermes 450/Watchkeeper169 
Habitat: Providing target coordinates over Israeli battlefields, and 
reconnaissance for British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Behavior: It can loiter for about 20 hours on its 34-foot wing, up to an 
altitude of 18,000 feet, providing real-time surveillance to battlefield commanders. 
Notable Features: The odd, torpedo-on-a-popsicle-stick design give 
the craft a high payload to weight ratio: one third of its 992 pounds. It has two gimbals, 
fore and aft, for surveillance gear.  The UAV is equipped with sophisticated 
                                                 
169 Elbit Systems Hermes 450/Watchkeeper, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-
ucaklar, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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communication systems transmitting imagery in real time to ground stations.  Selected 
as the base line for the UK WATCHKEEPER program, Hermes® 450, as shown in 
Figure 109., is recognized as the leading long endurance tactical UAV in its class, 
having flown in U.S. operations and history-making flights in UK civil airspace.  To 
date, the Hermes® 450 has accumulated more than 65,000 flight hours.170 
B.2.1.14. MQ-5 Hunter (Northrup Grumman) 
 
Figure 110.   Northrup Grumman MQ-5 Hunter171 
Habitat: Flown by the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Behavior: The Hunter, as shown in Figure 110., has been in service 
since just before the Balkans war, and was recently retrofitted in the MQ variant to run 
on heavy fuel and carry Viper Strike munitions.  It has a 34-foot wingspan and can fly 
18 hours, up to 18,000 feet. 
Notable Feature: It can be flown with the same ground control 
station as the Shadow and the Army’s version of the Predator.172 
                                                 
170 Elbit Systems “Hermes 450” http://www.elbitsystems.com/lobmainpage.asp?id=161 accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
171 Northrup Grumman MQ-5 Hunter, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-
ucaklar, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.1.15. RQ-4 Global Hawk (Northrop Grumman) 
 
Figure 111.   Northrup Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk173 
Habitat: High above Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan—or anywhere 
else the U.S. Central Command wants to keep under watch. 
Behavior: Soaring at 65,000 feet with an endurance of 36 hours, the 
Global Hawk, as shown in Figure 111., can keep watch over 40,000 nautical square 
miles per mission.  Carrying a full suite of electro-optical, infrared and synthetic 
aperture radar sensors, it can operate day and night in all weather conditions.  The larger 
variation has a 130-foot wingspan. 
Notable Feature: The fact that it can take off and land autonomously 
greatly reduces the potential for crashes, which have handicapped the Predator and 
Reaper.  
The Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Block 10 Global Hawk is currently 
supporting the U.S. Air Force in the global war on terrorism.  The Global Hawks are 
                                                                                                                                                
172 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones  accessd May 15, 2010. 
173 Northrup Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-
ucaklar, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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operated overseas by USAF pilots from a mission control element stationed at Beale Air 
Force Base in Northern California.  A launch and recovery element and a combined 
USAF and Northrop Grumman team are forward deployed with the air systems.  The 
Global Hawk is equipped with electro-optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar 
sensors to provide high-quality real-time imagery.174 
B.2.2. Future Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
B.2.2.1. Phantom Ray (Boeing Company) 
 
Figure 112.   Boeing Phantom Ray175 
Habitat: Edwards Air Force Base, Lancaster, California 
Behavior: Dervied from the Boeing Phantom Works’ defunct X-45C.  
The prototype Phantom Ray, as shown in Figure 112., jet-powered flying wing has 
morphed into a test bed for advanced UAV technologies, including electronic warfare 
tools like radar jamming, autonomous aerial refueling, air-missile defense and 
                                                 
174 Northrup Grumman “Global Hawk” 
http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/ghrq4a/index.html  accessed May 15, 2010. 
175 Boeing Phantom Ray, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
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surveillance.  Engineers expect it to fly at up to 40,000 feet. With an anticipated cruising 
speed of up to 610 mph, the Phantom Ray will be one of the fastest UAVs on record.176 
Notable Feature: Its unusual shape allows it to evade radar.  For 
Boeing, Phantom Ray and other prototyping projects are keeping a small cadre of 
engineers focused on designing next-generation concepts and engaged in flight-test 
efforts.  They are also forcing the design team to be as lean as possible because of 
limited funding, and allowing the company to experiment with operational use of an 
aircraft built using some unconventional manufacturing processes.177 
                                                 
176 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
177 Aviation Week “The Phantom Ray” 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/PHANTOM0508
09.xml&headline=Boeing%20Unveils%20Phantom%20Ray%20Combat%20UAS, accessed May 15, 
2010. 
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B.2.2.2. Demon BAE Systems 
 
Figure 113.   BAE Systems Demon178 
Habitat: BAE Systems laboratory in London 
Behavior: The Demon, as shown in Figure 113., flies with no fins 
and almost no moving parts, so it rarely needs repairs. Software makes it partially 
autonomous. 
Notable Features: The entire body of the craft is shaped like a wing. 
Dozens of thrusters situated on its top and bottom shape airflow, replacing the work 
typically done by tail fins and ailerons.  Onboard software varies the strength of each 
thruster to control pitch, side-to-side movement (yaw) and roll.   Its major focus is to 
develop the technologies needed to build a low-cost, low maintenance UAS with no 
                                                 
178 BAE Systems Demon, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
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conventional control surfaces, such as wing flaps and without losing any performance 
compared to conventional aircraft.179 
B.2.2.3. Vulture Jim (Lockheed Martin) 
 
Figure 114.   Lockheed Martin Vulture Jim180 
Habitat: A belt of relatively calm air around 55,000 feet 
Behavior: The Vulture Jim, as shown in Figure 114., can stay aloft 
for five years, turning lazy circles above any patch of ground that needs continuous 
monitoring. A suite of day-and-night cameras can scan a 600-mile swath, sending data 
back to handlers on the ground.  The craft will have to beat out species from a Boeing-
led consortium and Virginia-based Aurora Flight Sciences for a second round of 
funding. 
                                                 
179 BAE Systems “Demon” 
http://www.artisan3d.co.uk/Capabilities/Technologyinnovation/NewTechnologies/Demon/index.htm, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
180 Lockheed Martin Vulture Jim, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
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Notable Feature: The craft’s semi-flexible structure bends instead of 
breaking when winds cause the long span to oscillate violently.181 
B.2.2.4. RQ-170 Sentinel (Lockheed Martin) 
 
 
Figure 115.   Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinal182 
Habitat: Migrating from its suspected home base at Kandahar 
Airfield, Afghanistan, this top-secret military spy drone makes classified sorties into 
enemy terrain. 
Behavior: An offspring of Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works 
program, the RQ-170 Sentinel, as shown in Figure 115., flies via satellite link from a 
base in Tonopah, Nevada, but little else is know about it. 
Notable Feature: Sensor pods built into the edge of its wings 
probably give it surveillance capabilities, and the absence of a wing-mounted weapons 
payload likely keeps it light and off the radar.183 
                                                 
181  Wired Magazine “War Drones of Now and Tomorrow” 
http://www.wired.com/beyond_the_beyond/2010/03/war-drones-of-now-and-tomorrow/, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
182 Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinal, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
  323
B.2.2.5. Embla (Aesir) 
  
Figure 116.   Aesir Embla184 
Habitat: Afghanistan and disaster zones.  About the size and shape 
of a spare tire, the Embla lifts straight up from the ground without the need for a 
runway, making it more useful to combat soldiers stationed in rough terrain.  Its 
diminutive size lets it zoom down urban canyons to find hard-to-reach enemy hideouts, 
and it can send video to a remote PDA-size controller, revealing potential ambushes. 
Loaded with explosives, it could even enter an enemy compound on a suicide mission. 
185 
                                                                                                                                                
183 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
184 Aesir Embla, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 15, 2010. 
185 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Behavior: The Embla, as shown in Figure 116., can change direction 
on a dime, fly at 50 mph, and climb to 10,000 feet.  It also has the ability to hover in 
place to, for instance, transmit encrypted HD video. 
Notable Feature: Whereas a ducted fan funnels air straight down to 
generate lift, the Embla’s turbine sucks air in through its top and forces it out through a 
skirt-like wing.  This design bends the flow toward the ground.  This makes Embla 
strong enough to carry cameras, weapons and sensors on its belly, oriented toward the 
terrain it’s watching.186 
B.2.2.6. Ion Tiger (Naval Research Laboratory) 
 
Figure 117.   NRL Ion Tiger187 
Habitat: European airfields, potentially, from which it could reach 
the Middle East, once the Navy perfects the fuel-cell technology inside.  It could fly as 
low as 1,000 feet without being heard on the ground, or as high as 14,000 feet.188 
                                                 
186 Aesir “News” http://www.aesir-uas.com/news.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 2010. 
187 NRL Ion Tiger, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 15, 2010. 
188 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Behavior: Its ability to stay aloft for 24 hours allows the Ion Tiger, as 
shown im Figure 117., to encroach on the terrain of much bigger birds, such as the 
Predator, and its small size lets it get closer to a target to shoot footage with its lighter, 
cheaper camera. 
Notable Feature: Its carbon-wrapped aluminum hydrogen tanks 
weigh only about nine pounds each, which helps this UAV stay airborne longer.  The 
U.S. Navy is converging two separate research efforts — unmanned air vehicles (UAVs) 
and fuel cell systems — to significantly improve battlefield surveillance capability.  The 
Ion Tiger is a hydrogen-powered fuel cell UAV in development at the Naval Research 
Laboratory, the corporate laboratory of the Office of Naval Research (ONR).  Previously 
flown with battery power, it has demonstrated sound aerodynamics, high functionality, 
and low-heat and noise signatures.  Test flights of Ion Tiger have exceeded 24 hours 
with a 6 lb payload. Tests demonstrated how an enduring surveillance solution can 
operate at a low cost with less possibility of detection.  The trials exceeded previous 
flight duration seven-fold from previous designs.  Across the board, the military is 
seeking quieter and more efficient sources of energy.  ONR is leading the Navy with 
support for alternative fuel research, and has been a leader and key supporter of fuel cell 
research for 20 years. By leveraging other ONR research, and cooperating with partner 
agencies, ONR and its partners anticipate success in this mission.189 
                                                 
189 Office of Naval Research “Ion Tiger” http://www.onr.navy.mil/en/Media-Center/Fact-Sheets/Ion-
Tiger.aspx, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.2.7. Excalibur McArdle Productions 
 
 
Figure 118.   McArdle Productions Excalibur190 
Habitat: Future war zones, on land and at sea. If Aurora Flight 
Sciences can scale up the prototype, Excalibur, as shown in Figure 118., could be 
deployed on the battlefield within five years. 
Behavior: Unlike Air Force drones, which are flown by operators 
stateside and are in short supply, the Excalibur can be remotely operated from wherever 
it’s deployed—the mountains of Afghanistan or the helipad of a ship—providing 
immediate tactical support to Army, Navy and Marine troops.  It can take off and land 
without a runway and flies at 30,000 feet.  Fitted with 400 pounds of laser-guided 
munitions, including Hellfire missiles, the hybrid turbine-electric Excalibur strikes 
enemy targets up to 600 miles away from its handler.  It can loiter and inspect the 
damage with a suite of infrared or electro-optical surveillance cameras and follow 
anyone who gets away. 
                                                 
190 McArdle Productions Excalibur, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Notable Feature: After takeoff, the jet engine pivots in-line with the 
fuselage, and the lift turbines retract inside the wing section for forward flight.  It travels 
at a brisk 530 mph—twice as fast as a helicopter.191  It is powered by a turbine engine, 
placed in oblique position, generating thrust and lift for forward flight and rotating into 
vertical, for take-off and landing.  The turbine generates sufficient thrust to accelerate 
the vehicle to dash speed, in excess of 300 knots, enabling the Excalibur to reach flash 
points in half the time of an attack helicopter.  The UAV can also loiter over the target 
area for much longer, even after flying long distances. Excalibur uses a unique three-fan 
design to lift augmentation for vertical takeoff and landing.  The battery powered lift 
fans are embedded in the wings and fuselage. The wing stored fans slide out to augment 
turbine thrust during takeoff and landing.  Excalibur will be cleared for operation at 
altitudes up to 40,000 feet, and 3 hours flight endurance. 
The flight control system will be designed to enable high level of 
autonomy, since the aircraft is not be remotely piloted, like current Predators, operators 
are able are expected to focus on mission planning, finding, and engaging targets instead 
of flying the aircraft. 
Excalibur is under development as a technology demonstrator aircraft, 
funded by the US Army's Aviation Applied Technology Directorate.  Excalibur is 
scheduled for flight in 2007 pending availability of funds. 
Highly autonomous flight control system will reduce human involvement 
in controlling the platform, enabling the operator to focus on mission planning, finding, 
and engaging targets.  The Excalibur, designed by Aurora, is scheduled for flight in 
2007. General Dynamics Robotics Systems (GDRS) is responsible for the ground 
control station and data links.192 
                                                 
191 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones,  accessed May 15, 2010. 
192 Defense Update “Excalibur Armed VTOL UAV” http://defense-update.com/products/e/excalibur-
UAV.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.2.8. S-100 Camcopter (Schiebel) 
 
Figure 119.   Schiebel S-100 Camcopter193 
Habitat: Warships, borders, forest fires, mob scenes 
Behavior: Made by Austrian electronics manufacturer Schiebel, the 
Camcopter, as shown in Figure 119., can take off and land autonomously from a half-
sized helipad and fly for six hours with a 75-pound payload at 120 knots.  Fitted with its 
standard infrared and daytime cameras, it can hover at up to 18,000 feet and watch 
anything from troop movements to illegal border crossings to spreading forest fires.194 
Notable Feature: Separate controls for the vehicle and the cameras 
or payload allow for complex missions, such as deploying tear gas over a crowd.  The 
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) combines long endurance and large payload capacity into a 
relatively small outline. 
The UAV can complete its entire mission automatically, from takeoff to 
landing, controlled by a triple-redundant flight computer based on proven flight control 
methods and algorithms.  Redundant INS and GPS modules ensure precision navigation 
and stability in all phases of flight, ensuring that the payload is accurately positioned in 
                                                 
193 Schiebel S-100 Camcopter, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
194 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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accordance with its tasking.  The onboard navigation computer is capable of storing and 
managing all waypoint commands, allowing continuous operation independent of the 
control station.  The datalink receives control inputs from, and transmits position and 
payload data to, the control station in real-time. Mission radius is dependent upon the 
user-specified ground antenna configuration, and payload weight.195 
B.2.2.9. Skylite (BAE Systems) 
 
 
Figure 120.   BAE Systems Skylite196 
Habitat: Israeli borders 
                                                 
195 Schiebel “Airial Vehicle” http://www.schiebel.net/pages/cam_air.html, acessed May 15, 2010. 
196 BAE Systems Skylite, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
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Behavior: Equipped with cameras and sensors, SkyLite, as shown in 
Figure 120., typically flies up to 36,000 feet, the same altitude as commercial airplanes, 
providing a bird’s-eye view of enemy terrain and movement.197 
Notable Feature: Fits in a backpack and can stay aloft for four hours on 
a single charge. 
This family includes the SkyLite A, a canister-launched mini-UAV, and 
the SkyLite B mini-UAV.  Both mini-UAVs utilize an electro-optic payload that is 
stabilized and outfitted with gimbals.  The SkyLite B is mainly intended for use by 
infantry forces deployed up to battalion level and is capable of staying aloft for more 
than one-and-a-half hours and handles weather changes well.  A major innovation of the 
new mini-UAV is its immediate reusability, which is enabled by landing the vehicle 
with a parachute and air bag and launching it using a catapult. In addition, the SkyLite B 
is characterized by simple operation of advanced command modes from a ground 
station.198 
                                                 
197 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
198 Space War “Rafael Demonstrates Skylite B Mini-UAV” 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Rafael_Demonstrates_Skylite_B_Mini_UAV_Yo_Israel_Defense_Forc
es.html, acecessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.2.10. MANTIS (BAE Systems) 
 
Figure 121.   BAE Systems MANTIS199 
Habitat: Up to 40,000 feet above any battlefield, disaster site or 
border, relaying intelligence data back to controllers on the ground 
Behavior: Can be sent on a mission with a push of a button.  From 
there, it can calculate flight plans, fly around obstacles, and check in with ground 
controllers when it spots something interesting, like smoke or troop movement.  At the 
end of the mission, it flies home and lands itself. 200 
Notable Feature: MANTIS, as shown in Figure 121., is the first in a 
new breed of smart drones.  A craft that can hone its searches requires less bandwidth 
than those that constantly stream images. Mantis can also monitor itself for damage—a 
                                                 
199 BAE Systems MANTIS, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 
15, 2010. 
200 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
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sputtering engine, for example—and adjust its electronics to complete a mission. It can 
fly up to 345 miles an hour and operate for up to 36 hours. Other Keu features are:201 
 
• MANTIS is BAE Systems’ first all-electric aircraft. 
• MANTIS is a fully autonomous next generation unmanned 
aircraft system. 
• The system is designed to be easily deployable and can be broken 
down to fit into a military transport aircraft. 
• MANTIS is designed to be a real workhorse with "plug and play" 
elements in the mission system and the ability to carry a wide 
range of sensors. 
• MANTIS can execute its mission with a much reduced need for 
human intervention by understanding and reacting to its 
environment.  Such autonomy increases operational effectiveness 
allowing more focus on the mission without the usual concerns 
over vehicle control.  It also reduces the manpower requirements 
and the risk of accidents due to human error and the 
communications/data link requirements between the vehicle and 
the ground. 
                                                 
201 BAE Systems “Mantis” http://www.baesystems.com/ProductsServices/bae_prod_mantis.html,  
accessed May 15, 2001. 
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B.2.2.11. Predator-C Sea Avenger (General Atomics) 
 
Figure 122.   General Atomics Predator C Sea Avenger UAV202 
Habitat: Flight-operations center for General Atomics Aeronautical 
Systems in Palmdale, California. 
Behavior: The stealthy jet-powered Avenger, as shown in Figure 
122., is packed with 3,000 pounds of surveillance equipment and lethal munitions, such 
as laser-guided Hellfire missiles and 500-pound GBU-38 bombs.  It can reach speeds of 
up to 530 mph, far faster than its spindly predecessors, the Predator and Reaper.  With 
fuel packed into every available nook of the fuselage, it can loiter above a target for 
nearly 20 hours.203 
Notable Feature: Its internal weapons bay allows for interchangeable 
payloads, such as next-generation wide-area surveillance sensors.  General Atomics 
                                                 
202 General Atomics Predator C Sea Avenger UAV, http://air-news.blog.onet.pl/Pierwszy-lot-
Predatora-C,2,ID374472830,n, accessed May 15, 2010. 
203 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
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declines to comment about rumors that the Avenger, is designed to fly to up to 
60,000ft.204 
B.2.2.12. Zephyr (QinetiQ) 
 
 
Figure 123.   QinetiQ Zephyr205 
Habitat: 50,000 feet above Yuma, Arizona, where London-based 
manufacturer QinetiQ is testing prototypes. 
Notable Feature: Less than 100 pounds, 75-foot wingspan.  QinetiQ 
has completed the first flight trials of Zephyr, as shown in Figure 123., - a High-
Altitude, Long-Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HALE UAV).  This ultra-light 
                                                 
204 Flight Global “General Atomics Attracts First Customers for Avenger UAV” 
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/02/18/338541/general-atomics-attracts-first-customer-for-
avenger-uav-claims.html, accessed May 15, 2010. 
205 QinetiQ Zephyr, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 15, 
2010. 
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aircraft is solar-electric powered, autonomous.  The combination of solar panels on the 
upper wing surface and rechargeable batteries allows Zephyr to be flown for durations 
of many weeks and even months. 206 
B.2.2.13. HALE (High Altitude Long Endurance) (Boeing) 
 
Figure 124.   Boeing HALE207 
Habitat: 65,000 feet above future battlefields, where it will provide 
24/7 surveillance and data communication. 
Notable Feature: The High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) plane, 
as shown in Figure 124., stays up for 10 days, powered by a Ford truck engine modified 
to run on hydrogen fuel.  It weighs 7 tons and has a wingspan of 250 feet. 
Another system under development by Aurora Flight Science and Boeing 
is the Orion, High Altitude, Long Loiter (HALL) Unmanned Aerial System.  This 
stratospheric platform will be able to cruise at an altitude of 65,000 ft for about 100 
hours, powered by reciprocating engines consuming liquid hydrogen fuel.  With a gross 
                                                 
206 QinetiQ “QinetiQ Announces First Flight Trail for Zephyr UAV” 
http://www.qinetiq.com/home/newsroom/news_releases_homepage/2006/1st_quarter/First_flight_trial_for
_Zephyr_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle.html, accessed May 15, 2010. 
207 Boeing HALE, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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takeoff weight of 7,000 lbs (3.175 tons) HALL will be able to carry payloads weighing 
about 400 lbs (181kg).  The U.S. Army/SMDC is supporting a team lead by Aurora and 
Boeing as a strategic partner, developing two Orion HALL platforms, to demonstrate the 
new technology.208 
B.2.2.14. Global Observer (AeroViroment) 
 
 
Figure 125.   AeroVironment Global Observer209 
Habitat: Made by Monrovia, California’s AeroVironment, Global 
Observer, as shown in Figure 125., will circle up to 65,000 feet above battlefields, 
disaster sites, borders—any locale in need of aerial surveillance or a wireless data link. 
Notable Feature: Liquid hydrogen powers an electric generator, 
which drives four propellers. Has a wing Span of 175ft.210  The propulsion uses liquid 
                                                 
208 Defense Update “Hale UAVs Come of Age” http://defense-
update.com/events/2007/summary/auvsi07_5hale.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
209 AeroVironment Global Observer, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
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hydrogen fuel and fuel cells to drive 8 small rotary engines set along the wings; as noted 
above, the goal is 7-day flights. Missions could include: 
• Wide-area “persistent stare” reconnaissance for defense and 
homeland security missions, probably using radars rather than 
optical payloads as the primary sensors; 
• Signals and communications intercepts over a wide area, for long 
periods of time; 
• Low-cost, rapidly deployable augmentation for telecom 
bandwidth, and even GPS; 
• Hurricane/storm tracking, weather monitoring, wildfire detection, 
and sustained support for relief operations; 
• Aerial imaging/mapping, for defense uses or for civilian 
commercial and environmental monitoring, agriculture crop 
management and harvesting optimization.211 
                                                                                                                                                
210 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
211 Defense Industry Daily “ Aerovirnments Global Observer, Flying High, Again” 
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/aerovironments-global-observer-flying-high-again-03902/, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
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B.2.2.15. Samarai (Lockheed Martin) 
 
 
Figure 126.   Lockheed Martin Samarai212 
Habitat: Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Tech Laboratories in 
Bethesda, Maryland. 
Behavior: The Samarai, as shown in Figure 126., has a 12-inch 
wingspan and weighs only 150 grams.  Like the spiraling maple-leaf seedlings—more 
commonly known as whirlybirds—that inspired it, the single wing spins around a central 
hub to create lift.  A miniature jet engine provides thrust.  A tiny flap on the trailing edge 
of the wing, its only moving part, controls direction.  If engineers can shrink it to three 
inches and 15 grams, the autonomous device could be used to spy indoors. 213 
                                                 
212 Lockheed Martin Samarai, http://www.gedop.org/blog/galeri/insansiz-casus-ucaklar, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
213 Popular Science Magazine The Complete UAV Field Guide 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/gallery/2010-02/gallery-future-drones, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Notable Feature: In the future, a camera mounted on the central hub 
that snaps a picture once every rotation will collect enough images to stitch together full-
motion video.  Diet: Today, batteries; but engineers plan to feed the next version 
propane, which is light and readily available in the military supply chain.214 
                                                 
214 Geekology “Lockeed Martin’s Samurai Monocopter “ 
http://www.geekologie.com/2009/09/crazy_lockheed_martins_samurai.php, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.3. UNMANNED SURFACE VEHICLES 
B.3.1. Protector (Rafael/BAE Systems) 
Maritime Unmanned Systems are a newer field than UAV, but they are a 
growing field.  USV can perform everything from port, harbor, and one Navy specific 
mission of Oil Platform security to combat operation with a battlegroup or surface task 
force. The Protector, as shown in Figure 127., is one system under testing was originally 
designed by the Israeli Company Rafael.  Rafael has teamed with BAE (British 
Aerospace) Systems and Lockheed Martin and Rafael are teamed for product production 
and all other program developments with Lockheed Martin.215 
  
Figure 127.   Rafael Protector216 
                                                 
215 Protector, available from http://www.lockheedmartin.com/, accessed January 10, 2010. 
216 Rafael Protector, http://snafu-solomon.blogspot.com/2009/12/protector-usvsolution-to-
littoral.html, accessed May 15 ,2010. 
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B.3.2. Antisubmarine Warfare Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
 
Figure 128.   Antisubmarine Warfare Unmanned Surface Vehicle217 
Habitat: Open ocean and littoral regions 
Behavior: The Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) USV, as shown in Figure 
128., is the Mission System on the LCS ASW Mission Package.  It was designed as a 
common unmanned surface platform capable of carrying and operating different ASW 
payloads.  The Government’s EDM, based on open ocean racing and Rigid Hull 
Inflatable Boat (RHIB) high-speed vehicles technology, can be fitted with modular 
ASW payloads and operate with semi-autonomous control and navigation functionality.  
Current payloads include Unmanned Dipping Sonar (UDS), USV Towed Array System 
(UTAS) and the Multi-Static Off-Board Source (MSOBS). 
Notable Features: The core subsystems include surface search radar and 
advanced communications.  The surface search radar, required for navigation, can also 
detect incoming threats.  The ASW USV is capable of extended-duration operations 
with a high-payload capacity supporting multiple mission sensor systems enabling high-
speed transits to operational areas.218 
                                                 
217 Fiscal Year 2009-2034 Road Map Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap C.1.1.1 
218 Ibid  
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B.3.3. Mine Counter Measures (MCM) 
 
Figure 129.   Mine Counter Measures (MCM)219 
Habitat: Littoral and river regions 
Behavior: The Mine Counter Measures (MCM) Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
(USV), as shown in Figure 129., is the Mission System on the LCS MCM Mission 
Package.  It was selected as the unmanned platform to “get the man out of the 
minefield” and will be used to tow the Unmanned Surface Sweep System (USSS) to 
clear minefields. 
Notable Features: USV core system controller and communications were 
developed and integrated at the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Panama City. 
The USV Platform Controller for LCS is compliant with the Joint Architecture for 
Unmanned Systems (JAUS).  Full Functional Tests were completed at Ft. Monroe, VA 
in June 2008 and validated Functional Requirements.220 
                                                 





Figure 130.   SEAFOX221 
Habitat: Riverine and Maritime Interdiction Operations as well as port 
security. 
Behavior: The SEAFOX USV, as shown in Figure 130., will provide a 
remote, unmanned ISR capability supporting multiple mission areas. 
Notable Features: The SEAFOX USV has a JP-5 jet engine and a payload 
consisting of a Command and Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) system.  
The C3I payload has an amplified military band command and control radio, 
autonomous way-point navigation, amplified communications, and intelligence 
consisting of: wide bandwidth video, object tracking and dejitter software, digital zoom 
Infra-Red (IR) camera, digital zoom daylight color camera, 3x70 degree navigation 
cameras, remote camera operation station, remote ground station, remotely activated 
flood lighting, remotely activated hailer/announcement system, and navigation/ strobe 
safety lights.  In particular, SEAFOX 1 will have enhanced communications ability with 
4 bands (2 MIL, 2 ISM), LCS bands, Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) 
                                                 
221 SEAFOX, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CAVR/Vehicles/SeaFox.html, accessed 
Jaunuary 10, 2010. 
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communications, and ranges of approximately 15 nautical mile (NM) Line Of Sight 
(LOS), 60 NM UAS, and 100 NM relay.222 
B.4. UNMANNED UNDERWATER VEHICLES 
B.4.1. Remus (Hydroid Inc) 
From deep sea submersibles for surveying the ocean floor to hunting for 
submarines to maritime mines UUV have the abilities to greatly enhance our knowledge 
of the oceans but also increase our battlefield awareness under the waves.  One company 
that is working to make this possible is Hydroid Inc the manufacturers of the Remus 
UUV, as shown in Figure 131.  They currently have three models; the 100, 600, and 
6000 which range in size and payload to the capability.  The designation refers to the 
depth obtainable by the UUV in meters.223 
  
Figure 131.   Hydroid Inc. Remus224 
                                                 
222 Fiscal Year 2009-2034 Road Map Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap C.1.1.3 
223Remus, available from  http://www.hydroidinc.com/remus100.html, accessed January 10, 2010. 
224 Ibid. 
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B.4.2. Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (BPAUV) 
(Naval Research Laboratory) 
  
Figure 132.   NRL Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (BPAUV)225 
Habitat: Up to a depth of 300 feet 
Behavior: Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicles 
(BPAUVs), as shown in Figure 132., have been employed in Office of Naval Research 
(ONR) Science and Technology experiments since 1999.  The BPAUV provides 
minehunting and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) capability.  The LCS 
BPAUV is a demonstration system to mitigate ship integration risk of heavyweight 
UUVs (especially launch and recovery).  The BPAUV system consists of 2 vehicles, 
support equipment, spares, and a transportation van.  The BPAUV system will be 
shipped and stored in a Sea frame Type 1 module. BPAUV has been delivered to the 
LCS program as part of Mission Package 1. 
Notable Features: The BPAUV can travel at a speed of 3 knots for up to 18 
hours and utilizes a Klein 5400 sonar to detect targets.  It also can track environmental 
data.226 
                                                 
225 Fiscal Year 2009-2034 Road Map Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap C.2.1.1. 
226 Ibid. 
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Figure 133.   Littoral Battlespace Sensing – Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (LBSAUV)227 
Habitat: Maximum depth of 500 meters 
Behavior: The Littoral Battlespace Sensing – Autonomous Undersea 
Vehicle (LBS-AUV), as shown in Figure 133., is the acquisition POR intended to 
increase the survey footprint of the T-AGS 60 Multi-Mission Survey Ship, as well as 
allow clandestine military surveys to be conducted at a greater standoff range, thereby 
decreasing the risk to the ship and crew. 
Notable Features: Can travel at 4 knots for a maximum endurance of 24 
hours. Utilizes a Multibeam Bathymetry, Side Scan Sonar, CTD, Optical.228 
                                                 
227 Fiscal Year 2009-2034 Road Map Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap C.2.1.2. 
228 Ibid 
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B.4.4. Bottom Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Localization System 
(BULS) 
 
Figure 134.   Bottom Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Localization System 
(BULS)229 
Habitat: Maximum depth of 300ft 
Behavior: The Bottom UUV Localization System (BULS), as shown in 
Figure 134., is part of the “toolbox approach” to equipping EOD forces via spiral 
development of UUVs.  It will be capable of detecting and localizing threat objects on 
the seafloor of harbors and open areas and will support MCM operations from 10 to 300 
feet.  The system is small (two-person portable) with a low unit cost so that inadvertent 
loss is not mission-catastrophic. It will be deployable via multiple platforms and from 
shore. 
Notable Features: Current configuration includes dual-frequency side-scan 
sonar, enhanced navigation (GPS, INS, ultra-short baseline [USBL]), low-light CCD 
camera, and enhanced acoustic communications (ACOMMS).  Future spirals are 
envisioned to support more complex capabilities, such as detailed intelligence gathering 
and chemical and biological detection.230 
                                                 
229 Fiscal Year 2009-2034 Road Map Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap C.2.3.1. 
230 Ibid. 
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B.5. UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLES 
B.5.1. UGV Light 
B.5.1.1. Soldier UGV (SUGV) 
 Habitat: Urban and subterranean operating environments 
Behavior: The Soldier UGV (SUGV) is a man-packable small robot 
system, weighing less than 30 lbs, used to remotely investigate the threat obstacles, 
structures and the structural integrity of facilities and utilities.  SUGV systems will be 
highly mobile for dismounted forces and will be capable of being re-configured for other 
missions by adding or removing sensors, modules, mission payloads, and/or subsystems. 
Notable Features: The Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV) is 
a remotely operated, man-packable, robotic vehicle.  This is a small man-portable 




B.5.1.2. Combined Operations Battlefield Robotic Asset 
(COBRA) 
Habitat: COBRA is a Soldier UGV (SUGV) system small enough 
to be carried by one man over long distances and provide significant increase in 
effectiveness for small unit operations. 
Behavior: The COBRA will be carried by one soldier or 
disassembled and carried by two (8-30 lbs.).  It will be designed for modular multi-
mission payloads and be able to operate 4-12 hours.  The vehicle will have 
semiautonomous control and navigation. With on-board sensors, it will be able to: 
• Detect and neutralize booby traps and AP mines 
                                                 
231 Ibid. 
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• Detect NBC presence 
• Deploy smoke 
Notable Features: Combined Operations Battlefield Robotic Asset 
[COBRA] is coincident with the Soldier UGV (SUGV) component of the FCS and will 
be an integrated node on FCS network of systems.  The COBRA program is coincident 
with and supports the Army Future Combat System SUGV.232 
B.5.1.3. Man Transportable Robotic System (MTRS) 
Man Transportable Robotic System [MTRS] consists primarily of an 
operator control unit (OCU) and a teleoperated vehicle.  The system components will be 
small and light enough to be carried as a single load by a two-person team for 500 
meters over semi-rugged terrain.  The primary mission is reconnaissance, and the system 
will be enhanced to perform other EOD tasks.233 
                                                 
232 Combined Operations Battlefield Robotic Asset (COBRA), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs-soldier.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
233 Man Transportable Robotic System (MTRS), 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fcs-soldier.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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B.5.1.4. Dragon Runner 
  
Figure 135.   Dragon Runner234 
Habitat: Urban environment 
Behavior: Dragon Runner, as shown in Figure 135., is a small, four-
wheeled, rear-wheel drive, front-wheel steer, man-portable mobile ground sensor 
designed to increase situational awareness.  It will give tactical Marine units the 
capability to “see around the corner” in an urban environment. 
Notable Features: At 15.5 inches long, 11.25 inches wide and five 
inches high, Dragon Runner will fit inside the standard Modular, Light Weight, Load 
Carrying Equipment (MOLLE) Patrol Pack.  The total system weighs 16 pounds.  A 
non-active and invertible suspension enables Dragon Runner to be tossed through 
windows, up stairs or over walls for a rapid deployment capability.  The user interface 
features a four-inch video display and home-gaming type controller for vehicle 
                                                 
234 Dragon Runner, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/dragon-runner.htm, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
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manipulation.  The entire system uses standard military radio-type batteries for its power 
supply.235 
B.5.1.5. Mesa Associates’ Tactical Integrated Light-Force 
Deployment Assembly (MATILDA) 
  
Figure 136.   Mesa Associates’ Tactical Integrated Light-Force Deployment Assembly 
(MATILDA)236 
Habitat: Urban environments 
Behavior: Operated by radio remote MATILDA, as shown in Figure 
136., is a reconnaissance robot used in the role as a point man and is capable of 
breaching doors or walls with explosives 
Notable Features: It weights 40 lbs. and measures 26”L x 20”W x 
12”H (platform only).  Optional attachments include a small trailer (400 lbs. capacity), a 
manipulator arm, and a remotely detachable breaching mechanism.  Key elements of 
these evaluations have resulted in the development of a robotic manipulator arm, 
operator control unit upgrade, light kit, 4-wheel trailer, larger monitor, and an upgraded 
radio system for extended range.237 
                                                 
235 Ibid. 
236 MATILDA, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/matilda.htm, 
accessed May 15, 2010. 
237 Ibid. 
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B.5.2. UGV Medium 
B.5.2.1. Metal Storm 
UGV can be used for anything from surveillance, EOD bomb detection 
and disposal, to combat operations.  The US Navy could make use of UGV for EOD and 
surveillance.  Other organizations can make use of UGV for surveillance, re-supply, and 
even combat integrated with manned forces in the field.  One example is the Talon 
UGV, as shown in Figure 137., manufactured by Metal Storm.238 
 
Figure 137.   Metal Storm Talon UGV239 
UGVs have not received a lot of the spotlight in recent years because 
there have not been a lot of breakthroughs in the area of artificial intelligence to handing 
the amount of obstacles for operations on the ground.  In the following section four 
categories of UGVs have been examined and presently in use throughout the military. 
                                                 
238 Talon UGV, available from http://www.metalstorm.com/  and 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/talon.htm , accessed January 10, 2010. 
239 Talon UGV, http://www.engadget.com/2005/03/30/metal-storms-talon-ugv-grenade-launcher/, 
accessed January 10, 2010. 
  353
B.5.2.2. Remote Detection, Challenge, and Response System 
(REDCAR) (ARFL) 
  
Figure 138.   ARFL Remote Detection, Challenge, and Response System (REDCAR)240 
Habitat: The REDCAR program, as shown in Figure 138., focuses 
on the application of mobile unmanned ground systems to support and augment security 
force personnel in the perimeter defense of Air Force installations and forward deployed 
units. 
Behavior: The AFRL REDCAR system will consist of a network of 
robotic platforms integrated with existing security force sensors and Tactical, Area 
Security System (TASS).  The REDCAR system will have limited simulation and 
modeling capabilities to interact with the current AFFPB modeling systems.  All 
components and platforms in the REDCAR system will be capable of communication 
using JAUS for system interoperability and control. 
Notable Features: REDCAR will use at least three different robotic 
platforms: 
                                                 
240 REDCAR, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/redcar.htm, accessed May 15, 
2010. 
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• Surveillance platform 
• Engagement platform 
• Small-scale platform for limited access areas.241  
B.5.2.3. Gladiator Tactical Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
 
 
Figure 139.   Gladiator242 
Habitat: Battlefield, multi-terrain vehicle 
Behavior: Gladiator, as shown in Figure 139., will perform 
scout/surveillance, nuclear biological and chemical reconnaissance, direct fire, and 
personnel obstacle breaching missions in its basic configuration. 
                                                 
241 Ibid. 
242 Gladiator, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/gladiator.htm , accessed May 
15, 2010. 
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Notable Features: Essential Functions of the Gladiator system 
include:243 
• Day/night remote visual acuity equal to that of an individual 
Marine using current image intensifying or thermal devices 
• Battlefield mobility capable of supporting dismounted units in all 
environments, including MOUT rubble 
• Modular design and incorporation of standard interfaces for 
attachment of future mission payloads 
• Remain operable and mission capable after being impacted by 
multiple 7.62mm small arms rounds at zero standoff distance 
B.5.2.4. Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System 
(MDARS) 
  
Figure 140.   Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System (MDARS)244 
                                                 
243 Ibid. 
244 MDARS, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mdars.htm, accessed May 15, 
2010. 
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Habitat: indoor and outdoor storage facilities 
Behavior: The Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System 
(MDARS), as shown in Figure 140., is a joint Army-Navy development effort to provide 
an automated intrusion detection and inventory assessment capability for use in DoD 
warehouses and storage sites.  The MDARS goal is to provide multiple mobile platforms 
that perform random patrols within assigned areas of warehouses and storage sites.245 
Notable Features: Very compact movement and can return to a 
charging station autonomously. 
B.5.2.5. Remote Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS) 
  
Figure 141.   Remote Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS)246 
                                                 
245 Ibid. 
246 RONS, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mdars.htm, accessed 
May 15, 2010. 
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Habitat: Remote Ordnance Neutralization System (RONS), as 
shown in Figure 141., is primarily used in urban environments with versions for tougher 
terrain being currently designed. 
Behavior: The Remote Ordnance Neutralization System provides 
each Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Team with a peacetime/wartime remote, 
standoff capability to perform EOD missions such as reconnaissance, access to site, 
remote render-safe procedure, “pick-up and carry away” (PUCA) and disposal tasks in a 
high-risk and/or contaminated environment. 
Notable Features: A complete RONS consists of a remote-controlled 
platform and an operator control system, linked by either fiber optic or RF link.247 
B.5.3. UGV Heavy 
B.5.3.1. CAT (Crew-integration and Automation Test-bed) 
 
 
Figure 142.   Crew-integration and Automation Test-bed (CAT)248 
                                                 
247 Ibid. 
  358
Habitat: Wide spectrum of terrain can be covered on the battlefield, 
mobility of a tank or transport vehicle. 
Behavior: The goal of the Crew-integration and Automation Test bed 
(CAT), as shown in Figure 142., Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) is to 
demonstrate a multi-mission capable two-man crew station platform concept, which will 
be integrated into a C-130 transportable chassis supporting the Army's objective force.  
This program focuses on an improved soldier machine interface (SMI) design using 
indirect vision driving and automated decision aids, an advanced electronic architecture 
design/network topology, and embedded simulation.  By demonstrating these advanced 
technologies and added capabilities, the CAT ATD will prove out technology readiness 
to sufficiently transition and integrate hardware and software components into the 
Future Combat Systems (FCS) demonstrator. 
Notable Features: Key Program Objectives: 
• Design an advanced 2-man crew station for a system < 20 tons 
incorporating the FCS fight, carrier, reconnaissance, and C2 of 
unmanned systems 
• Provide technology readiness sufficient to enable integration into 
future FCS system demonstrator 
o Soldier Machine Interface technology 
o Indirect Vision 
o Speech Recognition 
o Crewman’s Associate Interface 
o Helmet Mounted Display vs. Panoramic Displays 
o Decision Aids (Route Planning, Driving, Mission, etc…) 
• Embedded simulation while on-the-move 
• Advanced vehicle architecture 
• Prove out technology developments using a FCS class chassis to 
test against our exit criteria 
                                                                                                                                                
248 CATS, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/cat.htm, accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Technologies to be investigated include both traditional Soldier-Machine 
Interface (SMI) technologies (e.g., helmet-mounted displays, head trackers, panoramic 
displays, speech recognition, etc.) and robotics technologies (e.g., intelligent driving 
decision aids, semi-autonomous driving, automated route planning, etc.).  Workload 
analysis performed under the CAT program indicates that the driving aids and 
automation technologies are key to achieving two-person operation of future systems.  
The crew stations and technologies were integrated into an IAV and demonstrated over 
fight, scout and carrier mission scenarios in FY03 and in FY04.249 




Figure 143.   Cooperative Unmanned Ground Attack Robots (COUGAR)250 
                                                 
249 Ibid.  
250 COUGAR, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/cougar.htm, accessed May 15, 
2010. 
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Habitat: Wide spectrum of terrain can be covered on the battlefield, 
mobility of a tank or transport vehicle. 
Behavior: The Cooperative Unmanned Ground Attack Robots 
(COUGAR), shown in Figure 143.,  is a technology effort to investigate and demonstrate 
multiple unmanned systems cooperating for the purpose of delivering lethal fires.  As 
such, the COUGAR is not a system, but a lethal capability that could transition into a 
variety of unmanned system programs including the FCS and Gladiator. 
Notable Features: Phase I of the COUGAR project was completed in 
FY01. During Phase I, a XUV based robot with a RSTA package and a Javelin missile 
were simulated.  A demonstration of the Phase I system was completed with the 
successful launch of both 19 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW) rockets and 1 Javelin 
missile. Phase II of the COUGAR is currently under way. 
The COUGAR Phase II demonstration system is composed of a 
command vehicle that will host the Operator Control Unit and a single operator.  The 
Killer Robot will be a XUV-based robot that will carry HELLFIRE missiles.  The 
Hunter Robot will be a XUV-based robot that will carry a day/night reconnaissance 
payload, a laser designation system, and an organic Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV).  The 
organic UAV will be the Compact Air Vehicle – Shooter Linker (CAV-SL) being 
developed under an Army Aviation and Missile Command 6.2 program. Before launch, 
the operator programs the CAV-SL’s flight path. 
COUGAR is an outgrowth of an Aviation and Missile Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) 6.2 program called Robotic 
Applications for Modular Payloads (RAMP).  RAMP was a technology project designed 
to investigate technologies that support dynamic plug-and-play payloads.  The 
warfighter is then able to reconfigure a robotic system for a different mission simply by 
swapping payloads.  The robotic systems will identify the payload and configure the 
OCU to support that payload.251  
                                                 
251 Ibid. 
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B.5.4. UGV Large 
B.5.4.1. Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE) 
  
Figure 144.   Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE)252 
Habitat: Utilized to clear out mine fields and ranges. 
Behavior: The command and control system used for ARTS was 
expanded to robotically operate the Automated Ordnance Excavator (AOE).  The AOE, 
shown in Figure 144.,  is a Caterpillar excavator that can be used to robotically excavate 
buried ordnance and remove it to a safe place for disposal.  The first prototype system is 
being used by the Army Corp of Engineers to clear an old impact area at Camp Croft in 
Pacolet, SC. 
Notable Features: The ARTS provides Air Force security forces with a 
system to combat terrorist threats.  At Nellis AFB, EOD personnel continue to use 
ARTS for range clearance of dangerous unexploded ordnance.253 
                                                 




Figure 145.   CRUSHER254 
Habitat: Wide spectrum of terrain can be covered on the battlefield, 
mobility of a tank or transport vehicle. Rough terrain is its specialty. 
Behavior: The 6.5-ton "Crusher", shown in Figure 145., combines 
the strength and mobility of a predecessor known as Spinner with NREC-developed 
autonomy capabilities to create an extremely robust, unmanned vehicle that can function 
on its own in challenging off-road terrain.255 
Notable Features: Currently still being tested, by its inventing team at 
Carnegie Mellon University's National Robotics Engineering Center (NREC) in the 
School of Computer Science's Robotics Institute. 
                                                                                                                                                
253 Ibid. 
254 Crusher, http://www.physorg.com/news65522328.html, accessed May 15, 2010. 
255 Ibid. 
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B.6. UNMANNED OUTER SPACE VEHICLES 
B.6.1. Space X-37B (Boeing) 
 
Figure 146.   Boeing X-37B256 






l+2010+launch+test+flight.+Graphic+by+Karl+Tate., accessed May 15, 2010. 
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Figure 147.   Boeing X-37B257 
 
Habitat: Earth’s orbit, space. 
Behavior: It is powered by a solar cells and lithium-ion batteries, unlike a 
traditional craft which is powered by a fuel cell system.  It has a large engine at the rear 
for orbit changing. The space plane is also reusable. 
Notable Features: The X-37B, shown in Figure 146. and Figure 147., is 9m 
long (29ft) and has a wingspan of 4.5m (15ft), making it a quarter of the size of a normal 
Shuttle. 
Built by Boeing's Phantom Works division, the X-37 program was originally 
headed by NASA.  It was later handed over to the Pentagon's research and development 
arm and then to a secretive Air Force unit.258 
Airforce Official Site259 
                                                 
257 X-37B, Daily Mail “ Unmanned Space Shuttle Launched” 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1268138/X-37B-unmanned-space-shuttle-launched-
tonight.html, accessed May 15, 2010. 
258 Ibid. 
259 X-37B, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123032226 accessed May 15, 2010. 
  365
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
  366
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) 
1575 Gator Blvd 
Virginia Beach, VA 23459 
 
4. Mr. Charles Werchado 
Chief of Naval Operations  
2000 Navy Pentagon N8FB  
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
 
5. Mr. James McCarthy  
Chief of Naval Operations  
2000 Navy Pentagon N8B  
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
  367
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
